SOCIALITY.

THE ART OF LIVING TOGETHER

ATKINSON LEE

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THE ART OF LIVING TOGETHER.

THE TWENTY-SEVENTH HARTLEY LECTURE:

SOCIALITY.

The Art of Living Together.

BY

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CORRIGENDA.

Page 20, line 5 from bottom,	instead of *Cologne*	read *Strassburg.*
,, 49, ,, 12 ,, top,	,,	,, *a logical* read *alogical.*
,, 123, ,, at bottom	,,	,, *The saying of the great leader,* read *The great leader who said.*
,, 251, footnote (2)	,,	,, *Lebensanschauun gengrosser,* read *Lebensanschauungen grosser.*
,, 260, line 3 from top,	,,	,, *sheath* read *sheathe.*

to that end. It is expressly not a complete social philosophy, but it does aim at stating essentials. The theme of course is as old as philosophy itself, but modern studies enable it to be expressed in

[1] Laski: *A Grammar of Politics*, p. 15.

fresh forms, and every age needs to hear the old truths expressed in its own tongue.

The present study has much in common, as to temper and purpose, with Mr. Macivor's book, *Community*, but whereas the latter work is primarily sociological this is rather psychological. It owes much to the work of Lipps, Renouvier and Novgorodtsev, amongst foreign writers, and to the brilliant studies of Hobhouse, McDougall, Alexander, Royce and Ward, amongst recent English-speaking authors. My obligations to them will be indicated in the course of the exposition. The older authorities, like Hegel, Comte and Spencer, are by now common property, and I could not say how much my thought has been fashioned by them. But their solutions have little direct relevance to present-day issues, though like Plato and Aristotle they remain perpetual masters of those that know. Two great modern writers, however—Ruskin and Browning—seem to have inspired my creed, and expressed it, the one in the language of art and the other in that of poetry.

Perhaps I have done little more than translate their doctrines into philosophical terms, which both would probably not recognize, or recognizing,

accept. Still, the burden of the following thesis is that the æsthetical is the central thing in social life, of which the various forms can be healthy only in so far as they conform to æsthetical ideals. This doctrine is implicit or explicit in both our authors, and the notion of an æsthetic imperative brings them into curiously near relationship to that strange and at first sight very different figure, Immanuel Kant. True as it may be that

> all charms fly,
> At the mere touch of cold philosophy,

yet the latter but says the same things as art, only in its own way. Gretchen, hearing Faust expound his own thought, remarks, "that also says the clergyman, only in a little different language." I have tried to say what the artist might say, were he familiar with the language of the schools, and interested in applying his beliefs to social and religious life.

My obligations to my friends remain to be avowed. I desire to thank one of my colleagues, the Rev. E. W. Hirst, M.A., B.Sc., for his generous and searching criticisms of my work; another, Prof. A. S. Peake, D.D., for many helpful suggestions;

and yet a third, Principal H. J. Pickett, for kind and sympathetic interest. Above all, I wish to express my gratitude to my wife, who has assisted and encouraged me at every stage of the work.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE study of social life has been comparatively neglected in this country. Whilst we have led the way in the applied sciences and in the sphere of politics, we have lagged behind other nations in the pursuit of the social sciences. In no other country has more thought been given to the methods of mechanics; nor has politics been more continuously and successfully applied; but nowhere has social living been more conspicuously defective, at least amongst great nations in modern times. It is sometimes observed that the extremes of social refinement and social degradation are more violently marked in this country than anywhere else in the world. And certainly, after a century of rapid scientific and political advance, social discontent is more rife than it was at the beginning of that period, even to the point of threatening revolution. That this is due not merely to the great war, but to some neglected factor, is evident from the fact that the discontent was growing before the war, and indeed causing great anxiety at intervals to thinkers and statesmen during the whole of the

19th century. A recent historian of the Industrial Revolution,[1] trying to explain why it was that in a period of rising prosperity the Chartist Movement could take place, laid chief stress upon the lack of leisure, with the accompanying loss of the amenities of life, especially beauty, which that revolution involved. There were seers who discerned this at the time, notably Carlyle, Ruskin and Morris; they strove to make their voices heard, but their words fell mostly unheeded, and their prophecies of doom came only too palpably true. Evidently our lack of social science is bound up with our lack of social sense, and this again with dullness of feeling. For the social life is one primarily expressive of feeling, as we easily see when we contrast ourselves with our neighbours the French, amongst whom social living is by common consent at a high level.

That the social primarily expresses feeling is obscured to our English eyes by several facts. For one thing the material changes of the last couple of centuries have themselves blunted our sensibilities; this is a prime factor. Then the traditional division of the philosophical sciences into the theoretical and practical[2] has tended to merge the social sciences into the ethical or political, so that they have not achieved independence. Hence when social thinkers like Ruskin have striven to

[1] Mr. J. L. Hammond, in a lecture in Manchester, February, 1927.

[2] At Cambridge philosophy is still divided into the mental and moral sciences; there is no mention of the æsthetical or social.

found their theories upon a science of feeling they have had to be pioneers speaking an unfamiliar language. People have supposed that social life has nothing to do with æsthetics. Our preoccupation with ethics and politics has led to the neglect of a whole department of life which is most intimately connected with our well-being. This result is seen in the common identification of the social with the moral.[1] Now whether these two are ultimately identical or not, they are not so immediately. The social directly expresses the life of feeling, not of the will, though doubtless there is much common to the two. Yet the attempt to explain the social by moral science, and to mould it by politics, has something of incongruity. It is like trying to learn good manners by book-study or by codes of rules. Good manners are no doubt also good morals. "Manners makyth man," and in a wide and deep sense manners express a person's nature more—or at least more patently—than his code of morality. Still, manners are not learnt from a sense of duty but by good breeding acting upon native taste. So the social life has laws of its own which are laws of feeling, and their proper science is the science of good taste, or æsthetics. Had we given as much attention to the art of social living as we have to mechanical science and politics it is unlikely that our social problem would be a hundred years behind the political in

[1] "It is usually said that the most distinctive characteristic of the ethical feeling is its *sociality*. Our duties *are* our social relations. This is directly involved in what we have set forth."—DR. MELLONE: *Psychology*, p. 252.

prospect of solution. The very words "æsthetics" and "sociality" are far from being as familiar as their fellows "ethics" and "morality."

There are some, however, who will object that though æsthetic considerations apply to sensuous objects like tones, colours, etc., it is not possible to carry them into the social field. The notion of harmony, for instance, it may be thought, is plain in music but not in social life. To this it may be answered that it has been used by Plato, Leibniz and Herbart at least, and that successfully. From which of these, if any, the present writer obtained it, he does not know. But if he errs in using it, he does so with Prof. Hobhouse, whose social philosophy is governed by the idea of harmony.[1] Prof. Hobhouse works it out, however, in a way altogether different from the method adopted here and does not attempt to ground it upon an æsthetic philosophy. In this respect the present essay may lay claim, for what it is worth, to originality. Otherwise material drawn from any relevant quarter has been freely used, not, however, without due acknowledgment. That harmony, unity in difference, balance and other æsthetical terms can be properly used of social and religious life seems to me beyond question: it is only their recent unfamiliarity in such use which gives a contrary impression. It would have seemed odd to a Greek not to use them so, just as it would have seemed strange to Goethe or Ruskin. If living together is indeed an art, it must employ

[1] See e.g. his *Social Development*.

the ideas and language of art, and the technique of art must be acquired for this purpose.

In the conviction that social living is not in the first instance either a science or a duty, but an art, this book has been written. As an art, living together has a method of its own, and one which must be mastered with as much diligence as that of any other art. Indeed as the first of the arts, its difficulty will probably be of a pronounced character; yet it is the groundwork of all the other arts. Nothing is more insistent in the teaching of the seers already mentioned than the thesis that the fine arts cannot flourish except upon a basis of fine feeling: they are corrupted at the source unless the social life out of which they spring is wholesome. The purification of that life by discipline and training will at first be irksome, but the price of easy mastery has to be paid. "Let who will make a country's laws so long as I can make its songs," is a profound saying; but songs are not made without trouble. As Wandering Willie[1] said, "Ye maun learn to put the heart into it." And so the social art will involve an expenditure of effort and a mastery of technique which we have so far little dreamt of. For this reason the present work dwells at first upon general principles and methods which may seem to have little relevance to the main theme of sociality. Yet they are really basic to the whole study, as laying down theses of which the later parts of the book are applications.

[1] In *Redgauntlet*.

It is said by philosophers that there are three directions of the human spirit. We look outwards, we look inwards, and we look upwards.[1] This, which is true of the human mind generally, is true therefore of the life of feeling. The order in which these directions are considered is doubtless a matter of convenience rather than of necessity; yet, for purposes of exposition, general principles will most naturally be discussed in connexion with the first division of the subject-matter. For this reason, the following work treats of æsthetical theory mainly in reference to the outward direction of feeling—its attitude towards physical nature. The interplay between man's feeling and the natural world, and the consequent repercussion upon himself and his fellows emotionally, is the main subject of the first book. This involves a consideration of the nature of empathy and imagination, their emotional accompaniments, their expression in symbolism and social resonance and play. For all these are manifestations of the æsthetic life, which must not be regarded as limited to the production of "fine" arts, but as a fundamental impulse of human nature. Probably all our activities have their æsthetic side and therefore its consideration is of great importance. One may even go so far as to say, with Professor Wildon Carr, that "there is in human nature a distinct æsthetic or image-forming activity and that it is the fundamental activity, the basis of perception and the condition of action."[2] "An image is the

[1] E. Caird: *The Evolution of Religion*, p. 77.
[2] *A Theory of Monads*, p. 237.

work of the mind *sui generis*. This essential, characteristic, manifestation of mind is the æsthetic activity. The mind expresses its inner impulses and latent force by creating images."[1] Consequently (it is said) the problem of philosophy is in the first place the æsthetical one—the nature of imagination ; and in the second place the logical one—the nature of truth.[2] At any rate the æsthetic question, with its great social implications, is one which cannot be neglected as superficial or trivial, for it goes to the roots of human nature. The fruits of the æsthetic activity are seen, however, in those disciplined sensibilities—purified likes and dislikes, loves and hates—which we call Taste. A consideration of Taste leads naturally to some analysis of its object, the Beautiful, and of æsthetical ideals generally. The earlier parts of the first book will necessarily be somewhat technical.

In the second book the life of feeling is treated as concerned with the interior experience of man as social. This involves the treatment of a neglected subject, the nature of sympathy. In this discussion it has not been possible to obtain much help from the authorities, and consequently mistakes are likely to have been made. It seems plain to the writer however that sympathy, imagination and the æsthetic generally are closely intertwined, and the endeavour to trace some of their connexions is of much importance. The resulting idea of social artistry leads to a consideration of various social wholes from an æsthetic point of view. It

[1] *Ib.* p. 242. [2] *Ib.* p. 239.

seems to be quite as possible to judge social organizations in that way as it is to criticize the products of fine art, though doubtless it is more difficult because of the complexity of the objects. Hence æsthetic preference for one type of organization may be of importance socially, if there is indeed a close connexion between the æsthetic and the social, an obscure impulse to social harmony in human nature.[1] That the author has often misjudged the tendency to harmony is likely enough, but what matters is the method of judgment, not the particular application. That the method is right is seen from a consideration of various æsthetico-social ideals such as those of Plato, Sir Thomas More, and even Kant. Ideals of an Earthly Paradise have obviously shaped history and are doing so still. It cannot be accepted that æsthetical considerations are irrelevant in judging forms of civilization, as the present condition of this country with its great industrial areas—"elongated slums," in John Burns' phrase—and the feverish attempts of its Societies for the Preservation of Rural England, may serve to show. The criticisms of foreign observers—such as the remark of Heine that in England the machines look like men and the men look like machines, or the saying of Nietzsche that England has vulgarized Europe—are things that stick, long after the volume of our trade and the size of the national debt are forgotten.

The emergence of Utopian ideals from the

[1] Cp. below, p. 128.

criticism of existing social institutions leads us to consider the idealizing tendency in human nature—its disposition to look "upwards." The third book is therefore described as religious, the idealistic and the religious being regarded for present purposes as identical. Modern idealism focusses in the great values of truth, virtue and beauty, and it seems not chimerical to think that a universal religion might be found in the acceptance of these ultimate values as the manifestation of divine being. The possibility of a world-church arises, and some description of its modes of worship is made feasible by recent experiments in spiritual fellowship. This, it is maintained, is both æsthetic and social, and the essentially æsthetic character of religion is insisted upon. To show this fully would be a task for the science of comparative religion; hence a selection is made of the Christian religion which took shape in the mind of its Founder as a vision of the Kingdom of God. The interweaving of the æsthetic, the social and the religious in this vision is regarded as a sign of its excellence. The necessity of the symbol in religion follows from its æsthetic character, and hence some discussion of symbolism is required. It is not possible, however, to regard religion as wholly included either in the sphere of the social or the æsthetic or both together, considered, that is to say, as human productions. Its reality must be established in a metaphysic. There is such a thing, all the same, as an æsthetic metaphysic—a cosmos as contemplated by a seer. Perhaps this vision goes nearer

to the heart of things than any other kind of insight. At any rate it is the religious mode of arriving at a metaphysic, and as such worthy of close attention. If any solution of the problems of time and eternity, creation and history, free-will and finality, is possible at all, it is perhaps more likely that it will be found in the realm of æsthetic intuition than anywhere else. One can but make the attempt, and in making it one will find presumably that the æsthetic, the social, and the religious are interdependent. The æsthetic activity impels to sociality, which is the heart of the religious. The social reinforces the æsthetic activity, which prompts to religious idealism. And the religious reacts powerfully upon the social, and evokes the æsthetic impulse. They are one and all primarily modes of the life of feeling, and they centre in that which is common to the pursuit of the artist, the activities of the social worker, and the devotion of the religious person, namely; that fellow-feeling which we call sociality.

BOOK 1.

—

ÆSTHETICAL.

I cannot visit the old house and home,
Encounter the old sociality
Abjured for ever. Peril quite enough
In even this first—last I pray it prove—
Renunciation of my solitude.

BROWNING: *The Inn Album.* Part 3.

* * * * *

Even the beautiful thing, though an object of perception, depends on judgments. Judgments and sociality are convertible. For in judgment our objects or propositions come directly into relations of agreement or conflict with other persons.—ALEXANDER: *Space, Time and Deity.* Vol. 2, page 304.

* * * * *

Empirically the Beautiful interests only in society. *If we admit the impulse to society as natural to man, and his fitness for it and his propension towards it, i.e.,* sociability, *as a requisite for man as a being destined for society, and so as a property belonging to* humanity, *we cannot escape from regarding taste as a faculty for judging everything in respect of which we can communicate our* feeling *to all other men, and so as a means of furthering that which every one's natural inclination desires.*—KANT: *Critique of Judgment,* page 174 (Eng. Trans. by Bernard).

SOCIALITY.

The Art of Living Together.

—o—

CHAPTER I.

EMPATHY.

I may not hope from outward forms to win
The passion and the life, whose fountains are within.
O Lady! we receive but what we give,
And in our life alone does nature live.

COLERIDGE: Ode on Dejection.

Nature of Empathy.

THE teaching expressed poetically by Coleridge is to-day justified philosophically under the name of Empathy. Professor Alexander puts it in his own way when he says, "In the marble block the Hermes does not merely mean life and divinity but is divine and alive, in so far as we appreciate it as a work of art. Its imputations which come to it from the appreciating mind, and, unlike those of perceived objects, do

not belong to it as a physical thing, are for the appreciating mind part of its nature. The artist or the spectator do not ask if the Hermes is really alive: they raise no question of true or false: they see it so."[1] Such æsthetically imputed qualities are said to be the result of empathy. Empathy—a translation of the German *Einfühlung*—means, literally, a feeling into, and to feel empathically will therefore mean to feel oneself into something. Such feeling is something more elemental than witting self-projection into an object—as when one tells a child to think how it would like to be the poor daisy having its head cut off—and again than sympathy, for this is feeling *with* another, and can only become real under the presupposition that the other is animate already, that is apprehended empathically.[2]

The imputation of qualities, therefore, which takes place in empathy is unwitting and unintentional, though none the less native and common to all minds. We all merge the qualities of the perceiving subject into the qualities of the perceived object, without however adopting an artistic pose or definitely conceiving nature as akin to spirit. Thus we spontaneously speak of the gloomy sky, the cheerful view, the rising mountain, the labouring cloud, the hurrying river, the winding valley, and the like. As William James puts it: "Shall we say an 'agreeable degree of heat' or an 'agreeable feeling' occasioned by the degree of heat? Either

[1] *Art and the Material*, p. 24.

[2] Cp. VERNON LEE: *The Beautiful*, p. 67.

will do ; and language would lose most of its æsthetic and rhetorical value were we forbidden to project words primarily connoting our affections upon the objects by which the affections are aroused."[1] Such affectional facts therefore occupy an ambiguous place in the relation between subject and object and cannot be regarded as merely inner and private. For as we shall see later, such imputations are regarded by us as rightfully belonging to the objects contemplated, and as such claiming to be recognized by all persons of taste.[2]

So far we have merely seen that philosophy confirms the verdicts of artists, that imagination half creates and half perceives the mighty world of eye and ear,[3] or, in other words, that æsthetic values are a joint product of the interplay of subject and object.[4] It is imperative to notice however that reflection cannot disentangle the parts played by either factor : that they are co-operative and interdependent. It is the same thing to say that the mind lives in the thing contemplated, as to say that the contemplated thing lives in the mind that contemplates it.[5] Neither "lives"—in an æsthetic sense—apart from the other. The elements imputed to the objects react upon the imputing subject, whose contemplative powers are thus

[1] *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 144.

[2] Cp. KANT : *Critique of Judgment*, § 59, p. 252 (Bernard's Translation).

[3] WORDSWORTH : *Lines upon Tintern Abbey.*

[4] Cp. ALEXANDER : *Space, Time, and Deity*, Book III, (Ch. IX, D).

[5] Cp. VERNON LEE : *Beauty and Ugliness*, p. 58.

reinforced to make further imputations. Hence it is that a subject develops under an artist's hand, so that a Walter Scott finds his Dugald Dalgetty become, in spite of himself, the real hero of the story; or a R. L. Stevenson finds that his female characters no sooner open their mouths than they begin to speak like grenadiers. The material of art exercises an exciting effect upon the artist, calls out his powers, and modifies his intentions. So it is that every art has its limitations, due to the nature of its material; but reversely the nature of the material calls out the powers of the artist. Who shall say then whether it is the resources of modern art which call forth a Wagner, or a Wagner who evokes the resources of modern art? Whilst it is fatuous to say that it is quite easy to make a poem: that the words are all in the dictionary and only need to be a little differently arranged; it is equally futile to believe that an artist can produce something out of nothing. One of the first conditions of attaining a good style is to have a rich material to evoke it, whilst mere artistry cannot be fertile in a poor medium. The selection of the material is no doubt a mark of the taste of the artist, but the taste of the artist is awakened by it to unexpected responses. The product is one in which powers and materials coalesce, and can only be fully appreciated by those who can for the time being live again the artist's own experience. In the critic no doubt the element of receptiveness is predominant; he has to find out what the artist meant to convey. In the artist

the creative factor is uppermost; he has primarily to express himself. But for both artist and critic the æsthetic experience is a joint one of production and discovery. The artist discovers as he produces, the critic produces as he discovers.

That this is so may be shown by comparing together recent impressionism and expressionism. In the ordinary psychological sense an impression is something given, presented to and received by sense. Mind is receptive in regard to it, allows it to make its score, to reveal its nature. Mind is regarded as a clear mirror in which the thing is reflected, if indeed the need for reflection is not denied, and the mind itself made to consist of a succession of impressions *in vacuo*.[1] But in either case the intention is to deny or ignore the contribution which mind makes to knowledge, in order to stress the force of the impression itself. Similarly in art, impressionism would divest itself of rules and codes in order to be open-hearted in receiving what nature presents: it would be innocent and sensitive, giving itself up to a "wise passivity." Contemplation must be restful; it must reap the harvest of a quiet eye. Impressionability is here the mind's first virtue, if not indeed the last. Impressionability however means openness to impressions, and rules out all preconceptions, bias, and formulæ. The mind is to be transparent in respect of the objects which nature provides; it is to be a pure medium through which aspects of reality shine. Its ideal would be a pure experience

[1] Cp. HUXLEY's *Hume*, p. 73.

of the immediate presence of the real, whose business would be truly to disclose itself.[1]

Now that such an ideal of pure impressionability is an impossible one may be proved by anyone who will record his impressions of the same beautiful thing—a landscape, a picture, or a piece of music—as contemplated at different times. It is a familiar fact that the object impresses us differently in different moods, that we see more or less in it than hitherto, that custom makes stale. The special ways in which this modification of the object occurs are less familiar. The record by Vernon Lee of her impressions of works of art,[2] however, shows for instance that there is a congruity between certain pictures and certain tunes (or kinds of tune), so that some masterpieces will fit in with snatches of Bach or Mozart, others with popular airs. Not only so, but unfitting tunes have to be banished and new ones adopted before the painting will yield its "proper" impression. So frequently is this congruity (or its opposite) to be observed, that the writer enquires of herself whether she has always tunes about her unwittingly. This conjecture can be confirmed in my own case; it seems likely that subconscious music is a constant accompaniment of experience, to which it adapts itself. (There is of course a certain analogy between the two systems of sound and sight impressions. In the case of C. Anstruther Thompson however

[1] Cp. JAMES's Essay on "A World of Pure Experience," in *Radical Empiricism.*

[2] See *Beauty and Ugliness*, Ch. V.

the necessary accompaniment of the perception of distance, elevation, direction, etc., in a work of art, is certain respiratory and muscular sensations.)[1]

It is evident therefore that subjective experiences exercise not only a selective influence over our impressions (for that would be compatible with their purity) but also a modifying influence. No impressions uncontaminated by our dispositions are possible ; they are shot through by prevenient hopes, fears, anticipations. They are coloured by the mental medium through which they come, and the desire for a clear, stainless impressionability is fruitless. Mere impressionism in art is like pure empiricism in theory of knowledge. In its desire to avoid any sort of anthropomorphism it only succeeds in being lawless, taking idiosyncrasy for freedom and scepticism for wisdom. This is not to say that it has not provided us with many examples of the finest art : only its practice has been better than its theory. Its desire for sheer fact, for faithfulness to nature, is an outcome of an integrity of mind which has furnished the world with many of its brightest creations. But these remain creations still, and are as inseparable from the individuality of their authors as the convex side of a curve is from the concave. We have therefore to look at its counterpart, expressionism, to see the other side of the shield.[2]

The expressionist theory may be stated in words summarizing Croce's *Æsthetic*.[3] The mind's æsthetic

[1] *Op. cit* Ch. IV.
[2] Cp. on the foregoing LIPPS, *Zur Einfühlung*, Ch. VIII.
[3] See CROCE: *Æsthetic*, trans. by DOUGLAS AINSLIE.

activity consists in imagination, whose functions it is to produce intuitions. From such intuitions knowledge begins, not from sense-data, which are merely an abstraction from concrete experience. These intuitions are expressions of the mind's own activity and are known as images in the widest sense of the word, namely as any kind of human manifestation. There are no unexpressed intuitions, and all intuition is expression. Expression is always artistic and all beauty is expressive. Even sensuous enjoyment is æsthetic, for there is no matter without form and expressed form is of the essence of art. It follows that art is lyrical, the outpouring of a human soul, and therefore also unique.[1] Further, all art is internal activity: there is no external work of art. "The concept of a work of external art is impossible even as a concept, it is for philosophy not only a serious error, it is absurdity. The work of art is a spiritual fact and therefore can never be external or physical. Statues, pictures, poems, symphonies can be weighed, measured and counted, like other physical things, but to the physicists who may so treat them they are external things and entirely without spiritual meaning. For the æsthetician there exist no things which can be weighed, measured, and counted; there exist only images, mental acts. To attempt to find a passage or connexion between the spirituality of the image and the physical complexes of colours, sounds, and words is a desperate enterprise."[2]

[1] Cp. CARR: *Philosophy of Croce*, Ch. III and IX.

[2] *Problemi di Estetica*, p. 467 (quoted by Carr, *op. cit.* p. 167).

Evidently we have here the extreme statement of expressionism, and one which we must regard as inadmissible. For it does not do justice to the degree of constancy which we find in the beauty of physical objects. The figures on the Grecian Urn are things of beauty, at least as long as that urn exists, for all who contemplate it, and the beauty is not dependent on any one individual. It is therefore not merely lyrical but, so to say, epical or historical, in the sense that it is discoverable by all who will put themselves in the right attitude towards it. If this were not so, objects of art could not even be media of the communication of æsthetic experience between individuals, and this function at least the expressionist allows them.[1] But, indeed, why talk of communication at all if art is purely lyrical self-expression? There is no need of such communication and no possibility of it. The artist is self-enclosed and self-satisfied, and produces his own world. In the end he becomes but a solitary, and his theory is solipsism. There seems no escape from this result except by a philosophical "desperate enterprise" which we may consider later.[2]

Extremes meet, and it is often found that expressionism and impressionism speak a similar language. The impressionist endeavours to transscribe the immediate aspect of nature, as seen at a glance only lasting enough to receive a general "impression" of that aspect.[3] But in so doing,

[1] CROCE: *Æsthetic*, p. 111. [2] See Book III, p. 284.
[3] VERNON BLAKE: *Relation in Art*, Ch. XXVI, p. 306.

he omits, selects, gives only a partial representation of a whole object. This however is analysis, and results in a disintegration of artistic expression, and a discovery of the elements of æsthetic form. Such elements, however, become the means of almost arbitrary expression; so that external embodiment in a concrete whole seems to become unimportant and irrelevant. The symbol—cube, musical phrase, word—shall mean what the artist likes to make it mean: external expression is a concession to humanity's physical nature. The critic can win the artist's meaning only by catching his spirit, becoming one with him, sharing his impression. Thus expressionism turns into impressionism again and we shall see that they are the two sides of one shield. Impressionism is emotional, expressionism is volitional (and, I fear, arbitrary rather than intellectual). But the experiments of the last twenty-five years have perhaps reached their proximate limits in the discovery of the grammar of art and, by a synthesis of its elements, are on the way to a new productive period.[1] A combination of the impressionist and expressionist theories, however, is a theory of empathy.

A further development of the theory of empathy follows from these considerations: that is, the doctrine of newly-created objects. It has often been held that art is creative, but in what way and degree has been obscure.[2] The analysis of

[1] *Ib.* Ch. XXVI, generally.

[2] Cp. MATTHEWS: *Studies in Christian Philosophy*, Lecture VI. Sec. III.

Dr. Theodor Lipps has, however, thrown light upon this baffling subject, and has shown elaborately how such production occurs.[1] We need consider but one or two instances. Take the case of a numerical whole. I see seven trees. Now their sevenness is not written upon their surfaces, so that it cannot be said to be presented to sense. They do not communicate the fact of their number to me so that I unavoidably receive it when I attend to them. Their number may not interest me, and I may turn away without being aware of it. Again I can cease counting at any point I like, so that I may never reach the number seven. Or I may group the objects into sets, so that I see a group of four or three, or five and two, or three twos plus one, and so on. Now evidently the trees do not require me to group them in any particular fashion, so that their grouping must be due to my own operation, and not simply a given fact. Units and groups and total sum remain therefore a product of the interplay of my mind with a certain material, which may, within certain limits, be freely manipulated. Such a product is a newly created object. It did not exist until my mind, or some other mind, dealt with that material, and it will cease to exist when such a mind is withdrawn. Here then is a bit of creativeness.

Take a more concrete object, one, for instance, which cannot be said, like numbers perhaps, to be a result of abstraction, but which is more apparently

[1] *Zur Einfühlung* (esp. Ch. I).

"out there," real: take a time or a colour scheme. The notes of a melody are commonly held to be given, and the tune to be compounded out of them. Yet it is plain that out of the same succession of notes, I can obtain one, two, or more tunes. They can be whole tunes or pieces of tunes as my attention determines. A bird's song may be a continuous unity, or a number of more or less detached flights, or a fall of separate sounds (which like musical notes may drive a Charles Lamb to more than midsummer madness); [1] and yet these musical objects are all composed out of the same material. Evidently then, their existence depends upon an activity jointly working with that material. It is a product of two factors of which attentive mind is one. Mind is a co-operative factor in the production of musical objects, and is so far creative. The objects may therefore be called newly-made things: they are freshly born every time a mind is operative upon appropriate material.

But further, such objects may reach any degree of complexity. In a tune I may find smoothness or roughness, sweetness or hardness, richness or poverty, harmony or discord: things which are not found in the notes individually taken, but only in their relations. These relations may become extremely complex so that in a symphony I attain imaginative visions which "bring all heaven before mine eyes." And such vision is attainable for other minds that are musically educated, though impossible to the uncultivated or ungifted. Similar

[1] Cp. *Essays of Elia:* A Chapter on Ears.

remarks are true of a colour scheme, from a tartan pattern to a Turner sunset. The commonplace that the eye sees what it brings with it the power of seeing is wearisome; yet the conclusion that objects of art are new creations, not only in the making but also in the enjoying, needs still to be urged. Thus Mr. Laird says: [the view] "that the *Ninth Symphony* would be beautiful if no one had ever heard it, and that the frozen seas would still glisten with loveliness after all life had departed from the earth . . . is not nonsense, and it is of course extremely simple."[1] though he finally concludes that "if beauty is not a predicate of non-mental things *simpliciter*, it cannot hold of anything less than the whole complex thing that-is-felt-with-delight."[2] Now our present argument has been that the above view *is* nonsense and that beauty only belongs to the thing as enjoyed, that is, created empathically.

Further evidence of empathic creativeness is to be found in experimental studies of what has come to be called rhythmizing. Everyone is familiar with those experiences in which a series of beats—say clock-ticks, the turns of a ship's screw or paddle, the pulses of the heart—though physically having no definite rhythm, takes on a rhythmical character. The beats are found to be integral factors of a tune, and yet the tune may change from one *tempo* to another. Thus one's pulse may beat out a tune in four-time or three-time measure.

[1] Cp. LAIRD: *A Study in Realism*, p. 133.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 134.

One will often—perhaps constantly—find it so doing. Or again the tune may be changed at will or in agreement with circumstances,[1] the time remaining the same. Experiments go to show that a quite regular succession of sounds, having no observable physical rhythm, is yet apprehended by most people as falling into rhythmical groups, on condition that the rate of succession lies between certain limits. If the rate of succession is slow, the sounds fall into simple groups of two, to which, as the rate increases, groups of four or eight succeed. Sometimes groups of three or six are also formed : and all groups, large or small, have about the same duration. Rates below a certain minimum show, however, no grouping at all, and above a certain maximum only certain periodic changes of intensity in the series, but no definite grouping. Again, till some familiarity with the series is obtained, the subject is not aware of any rhythm at all. But where rhythm is established it seems to have a close connexion with the normal beat of attention itself. And whether simple or complex, the rhythm is an intuited unity as truly as any geometrical figure can be.[2]

The foregoing evidence serves to show that new-made objects are a constant result of rhythmizing, and that rhythmizing is a common occurrence. It is not simply the gift of the sounds to the attending subject, but depends upon his acts of attention. The pulse of attention largely deter-

[1] Cp. VERNON LEE, as above.

[2] WARD : *Psychological Principles*, p. 229. The above summary is based on Ward, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-9.

mines the rhythm, by making the furnished sounds fall into regular groups. Such groups however are intuited unities: they have the character of æsthetic wholes: a group of such sub-groups makes a line of verse or a phrase of music which exists in so far as it is apprehended by the listener. This, which is obviously true of a melody which is going on in my head, is none the less true of a symphony played by an orchestra. What evidence can there be that in any literal sense tunes heard are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter? Such unheard tunes are unknown and unknowable, incredible and philosophically useless.

They are a mere *X*. For all that, it is important to notice that there are limits to the power of the mind to constitute objects. It cannot do anything it likes with its material. We have seen above that there are upper and lower limits to its power of rhythmizing and that till a certain facility is acquired there is no rhythmizing at all. In other words if the attention groups the material, the material must be susceptible of being grouped. The rhythm is the joint product of attention and material playing upon each other. Hence once again we reach the conclusion that if it is true that "nature is made better by no mean, but nature makes that mean," it is also true that art is made better by no material, but art makes that material. Mind is, as Lipps puts it, a co-constitutive factor in the production of works of beauty: they are indwelt and informed by mind: each one of them is a fresh creation. "The construction of the

world-picture occurs through a reading in the book of actuality. But this reading is, as always, not a mere staring into the book, nor yet a mere grasping of the closely or distantly separated vowels and consonants which are there printed, but it is an apprehension of words and propositions. But these words and statements are factual wholes and truly not of the most meaningless sort! They therefore require, in order to exist for me, my activity. Even the word 'to read' indicates this activity. Grant that the world-poem consists only of words or statements without sense. Then am I, over against it, a poet, only after the method of the World-poet. How much the more, if it has a meaning, and out of it I seek to make for myself a verse."[1]

The results so far attained go to show that empathy is experimental. Our æsthetic imputations are a mode of finding out the capabilities of our material, which may or may not respond to us. We test its capacity for yielding a story, a poem or a melody: it offers us opportunity for making one. Even another artist cannot simply hand on a work of art to us; we have to re-make (or re-discover) the beauty afresh every time. He can supply the means, the method, the suggestions by which we can attain his own inspiration, but he cannot guarantee it to the unfeeling. The strains of an Ariel are but a sensuous irritant to a Caliban. The rules of composition never enable a Beckmesser to make a master-song. But con-

[1] LIPPS: *op. cit.* p. 128.

versely a Walther cannot dispense, because of natural genius, with the advice of a Hans Sachs. Only so much can be done with a given medium : any attempt to get more results in the curious, the precious, the bizarre. So the attempt of Gothic peoples to imitate in their own language the results of classical art result in the mixed effects of the versions of a Goethe, a Racine, a Pope : effects which are avoided by the more original genius of Shakespeare, even in dealing with classical material. The attempt to modernize ancient subjects is precarious.

Empathy, then, is experimental, tentative and corrigible. This fact is often inadequately brought out by its exponents, who sometimes leave the impression that it is capable of transmuting actuality at will. " If wishes were horses, beggars would ride," we say, and if empathy could of itself simply constitute objects, we should be given over to the purest subjectivism. Mentalism is in sore plight nowadays, and rightly so ; as Professor Mackenzie says, the trail of subjectivism is all over 19th century idealism, and we need not wish to revert to its frequently ambiguous language. Still, it does not follow that the truth in idealism which we are here stressing, namely the imputative nature of empathy, is doubtful. We habitually try to read our feelings into things, test them to see if they will accept our readings, modify both our readings and our materials in consequence, till a unison is found in which they both blend. So, we are told, synthetic imagination in a high

degree is rarely found among painters, and even in the greatest of them there are obvious limits to its exercise, portions being found in their works that were not originally intended but added during their execution; whilst with most painters "when they intend to produce a perfect work they throw their thought into different experimental forms, and decorate it and discipline it long before realizing it, so that there is a certain amount of mere composition in the most imaginative works; and a grain or two of imagination in the most artificial."[1]

The relations of the artist with his medium are comparable to those between a bird and the air. The mere presence together of air and wing results in no flight. But once motion is attained, whether by the incitement of waves of air or by stirrings of the wing, an experimental process occurs in which both factors take part, though with varying relative strengths. The air-forces may drive the bird hither and thither almost wantonly. This is the parallel to would-be impressionism. But a certain proficiency being attained, the bird may float, carried along by its own momentum but always supported by the air upon which it presses. This is like the completion of a pattern of which the artist already knows the governing aims. So Goethe divines what the uncompleted spire of Cologne Cathedral would be like. Yet this completing requires the nicest balance of judgment and resolution of will. It is not mere inertia in an adopted course, but the maintaining of a balance

[1] RUSKIN: *Modern Painters*, Part 3, Sec. 2, Ch. 2, § 17.

of forces liable to be upset and so to involve the ruin of the whole design. Thirdly, there is the possibility of an attempt to soar beyond the normal medium into air so rarefied that it will not uphold the weight of the pinion. This would seem to be the case of ambitious expressionism. There can be no flight in the void, and no art without given material. But the variation of the necessary factors may be continuous and indeterminate, and always involves active adjustment. That is to say it is experimental.[1]

It is a primary contention of this essay, however, that empathic experiment is an expression of sociality. It is a testing by the Self of the Other to see if it will respond to it in kind. It is a groping of spirit after spirit, if haply it may find it. That this is so is to be seen in the universal tendency of primitive mind to regard things as animated, in the anthropomorphic language of mythology everywhere, in the personifying language of poetry, and in the teaching of most idealistic philosophy. As regards animism the position is well stated by Hume: "There is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object those qualities with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which they are intimately conscious."[2] The evidence for this has been supplied in great abundance by Tylor, whose thesis is that animism is the ground-

[1] Cp. LIPPS: *op. cit.* p. 134 and STOUT, *Groundwork of Psychology*, pp. 135-8.

[2] *Natural History of Religion*, Sec. II.

work of the religions of humanity and that materialism is a product of civilized science. The schism between animism and materialism goes far deeper than that between any hostile religious sects.[1] Animism is a primitive philosophy which expands to become a complete philosophy of Natural Religion: no spontaneous fancy, but the reasonable inference that effects are due to causes like those we know best—souls or spirits:[2] an inference whose purpose it is to explain nature on the primitive child-like theory that it is truly and throughout "Animated Nature."[3] Now, whether well or ill founded, such a philosophy is plainly an expression of the sociality of human nature.

A similar remark applies to mythology. "It belongs to that great doctrine of analogy, from which we have gained so much of our apprehension of the world around us. Distrusted as it now is by severer science for its misleading results, analogy is still to us a chief means of discovery and illustration, while in earlier grades of education its influence was all but paramount. Analogies which are but fancies to us were to men of past ages reality."[4] Yet "it always happens in the study of the lower races, that the more means we have of understanding their thoughts, the more sense and reason do we find in them."[5] Mythic fancy, like other thought, is based on experience,[6] and

[1] TYLOR: *Primitive Culture*, Vol. I, pp. 500-502.
[2] *Ib.* p. 108, Vol. II.
[3] *Ib.* p. 184, Vol. II.
[4] *Ib.* Vol. I, p. 297.
[5] *Ib.* Vol. I, p. 357.
[6] *Ib.* Vol. I, p. 273.

from the nature-myths of primitive man to the philosophic myths of Plato there is a continuous development, expressive of universal qualities of the human mind.[1]

Myth records the lives of poetic nations[2] and is inextricably bound up with the doctrine of Animism which is not to be narrowed down to poetic fancy and transformed metaphor, but rests upon a broad philosophy of nature, early and crude indeed, but thoughtful, consistent and quite really and seriously meant.[3] Yet "a student analysing the myth may fail so pitiably in conceiving its depth and intensity of meaning as to convert it into a stupid fiction," . . . "for fully to understand it requires not evidence and argument alone but deep poetic feeling."[4] Mythology, then is evidence of a deep tendency in human nature, leading it, however anthropomorphically, to project its own qualities into other beings and so to form what are called in modern psychology "ejects," that is, objects treated as possessing qualities only directly known in the subject. Such anthropomorphism is evidently a witness of social empathy, and is of course subject to indefinitely great amounts of correction. The history of myth is largely one of its constantly renewed purification and rationalization in the light of wider experience and deeper insight; all the more it is a process of poetic experimentation with reality to see how far it will correspond to æsthetic suggestion.

[1] *Ib.* Vol. II, pp. 13, 244, 246. [2] *Ib.* Vol. II, p. 416.
[3] *Ib.* Vol. I, p. 285. [4] *Ib.*, Vol. I, p. 305.

We are thus brought back to the consideration of poetry as at once a production and a discovery of reality. That poetry animates and personifies its objects needs no proof: a reference to Wordsworth's *Daffodils* or Burns's *Tweed and Till* suffices for illustration. Does it therefore see less deeply than science or history, or not rather more so?[1] At any rate what needs to be remarked is that the appropriateness of the various personifications of things in poetry is a matter for experiment and criticism by poet or by judge. Thus Bacon says of *Envy* that it is "a gadding passion, and walketh the street, and doth not keep home;" whereas Spenser says:

> And next to him malicious envy rode
> Upon a ravenous wolfe, and still did chaw
> Between his cankred teeth a venemous tode,
> That all the poison ran about his jaw.

Is it not plain which writer has used the more truth-piercing metaphor? The winnowing of such metaphors by criticism is a great part of the history of literature. It is empathy tested by judgment.

Finally, that part of idealistic philosophy called spiritualistic has steadily affirmed the neighbourly character of reality; it has carried the tradition of animistic thought to its utmost limits in conceiving

[1] Cp. Aristotle's remark that poetry is a more philosophical thing than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular. *Poetics*, IX. 3 (Butcher's Ed., p. 35).

reality as composed of numberless spirits, or of a world-soul, or of some ambiguous mind-stuff of which body and soul are aspects. The shapes of such a philosophy are numerous, yet they show a progression from the lowest spiritism to the highest pampsychism.[1] Such persistence can be due to nothing less than a deep-rooted impulse in human nature to seek its own kind in reality, to test and criticize its own imputations into the external by the responses it obtains therefrom, in short to experiment empathically with nature. Spiritualistic philosophy, then, coincides with æsthetic impulse in the productive discovery of an animated world. Is it therefore invalidated, as being of the nature of art, or has art a truth of its own, agreement with which is theory's highest merit? Philosophy, like Bunyan, says, "I have used similitudes" (Hosea xii. 10): what is the function of similitude in relation to truth? Is Imagination a faculty leading to error, as according to Descartes;[2] or one which cannot err, as Ruskin says;[3] or again one which leads to a semblance of knowledge having merely heuristic value, as Kant suggests?[4] The answer to such questions, though not demanded by our present psychological exposition, is of great importance for our later metaphysical discussions.

[1] Cp. TYLOR: *op. cit.* II, p. 335, and I, p. 501.

[2] *Principles of Philosophy:* Principle LXXII.

[3] *Modern Painters:* Book IV, Ch. VIII, § 18.

[4] *Critique of Judgment:* Part I, Div. II, § 59 (p. 250, Bernard's Translation).

Function of Imagination.

As respects Descartes, it seems plain that his distrust of imagination rests upon the ambiguous position assigned to sensations and images in his philosophy. They are on the one hand physiological, being the result of the impress of the object upon the *sensus communis*, and on the other hand mental, being the product of the mind's own activity upon the occasion of the physiological impress. They are thus partly mental, partly physical, and as such confused. Their confusion must be abolished by the operations of "pure" thought: they must become clear and distinct, and so self-evident.[1] We are not obliged, however, to follow Descartes in this uncertainty, or to hold that pure reason alone is the organ of knowledge. We may say that the mystery of the perception of an external world is a pseudo-problem; that sensa are just what they are known as, the immediate objects of an individual subject,[2] and a direct exposure of reality. So far as undistorted then, sensation is veridical, and the same can be said of imagination. It may be a correct representation of reality, doubtless often liable to failure or abuse, but in its own nature fitted to convey truth. It has its own way of truth-telling, but that way is not less reliable than the way of reason; which itself is far from having the certainty which Descartes ascribes to it. The mathematical method

[1] Cp. Essay on Cartesian Dualism, by G. A. Batz, in *Studies in the History of Ideas* (Columbia Univ.), pp. 150-153.

[2] Ward in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. I p. 30.

is a highly successful one, but is not alone in the discovery of truth, nor without its uncertainties.[1]

Does it follow that we must say with Ruskin, that the imagination *cannot* err, it being defined as seeing to the heart, and that if anything be wrong it is not the imagination's fault, but some inferior faculty's, which would have its foolish say in the matter and meddled with the imagination?[2] There is this much of justice in that thesis, that every cognitive faculty in its purity is adapted to truth—imagination no less than reason or perception—and only errs because of some contamination from extraneous sources. It may be confused by emotion or distorted by desire, but its own nature is to be a faithful witness. All the same, it is true that such a faculty is rarely found in its purity. It generally does suffer from a meddling by some "inferior faculty." Imagination may be warped by prejudice, or dulled by habit, or befouled by sensuality, and in even the greatest genius flags at times. It cannot therefore specially be trusted as infallible, even though it be extolled as our highest power.[3] Such glorification comes naturally to those in whom imagination works powerfully, for it has a dæmonic force, and easily persuades its possessor that it is the effect of genius. Even Kant accepted the identification of art-production with genius,[4] yet who can believe that

[1] Cp. Mr. Russell's dictum that a mathematician never knows what he is talking about nor whether what he says is true.

[2] *Modern Painters:* Part IV, Ch. VIII, § § 18 and 19.

[3] *Modern Painters:* Part III, Sec. 2, Chap. 3, § 4.

[4] *Critique of Judgment:* Part I, Div. I, § 47.

Kant himself, relatively lacking in imagination but prodigious in reasoning power, is not justly to be called a genius? He stands alongside Goethe or Napoleon. The attempt, then, to exalt imagination as the supreme and unerring mode of knowledge seems overstrained.

Are we then, with Kant, to regard imagination as an inferior mode of cognition? Is it merely symbolical, a representation in accordance with a mere analogy, not demonstrative but useful for practical purposes, and liable, if mistaken for demonstrative knowledge, to fall into anthropomorphism?[1] "If we are to give the name of cognition to such a mere mode of representation," says Kant, ". . . then all our knowledge of God is merely symbolical."[2] Partly however Kant's belittling of symbolic apprehension rests upon his agnosticism, for he goes on to liken such knowledge to that of Understanding, Will, etc., "which only establish their objective reality in beings of this world." The Beautiful then becomes the symbol of the morally Good, but it affords no strict knowledge of super-sensible reality, any more than morality does. It represents nature as purposive, for nature appears to be adapted to reach certain ends and fitted to our own faculties, and all this yields æsthetic satisfaction. Beauty both in nature and art thus seems designed for certain purposes, and suggests a designer behind it all. But it only

[1] *Critique of Judgment*: Part I, Div. II, § 59 (p. 250, Bernard's Translation).

[2] *Critique of Judgment*: Part I, Div. II, § 59 (p. 250, Bernard's Translation).

suggests this: to go further is mere idealism, an extension of our imagination beyond the limits of its tether, which is restricted to "beings of this world." We may regard beauty in nature *as if* it expressed purpose, but to say that it really does so is anthropomorphism. "It is we who receive nature with favour not nature which shows us favour."[1] Nature is beautiful because it looks like Art, and Art is beautiful because it looks like Nature.[2] But they are both only indefinitely purposive,[3] and taste only points to the indefinite Idea of the supersensible.

We are not obliged, however, to accept Kant's agnosticism. His limitations of human knowledge to beings of this world has often been effectively criticized, and the criticism need not be repeated here. What is more to the point is to show that a philosophy of "as if" is still knowledge, true and valuable, though of course not identical with demonstration. But it is the philosophy of the imagination and has at all times been held in honour. Whilst inexact, and hence not amenable to rules of experiment, it is not on that account inferior to scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge, it may be held, is external; it is descriptive, not explanatory;[4] so far as exact, that is, mathematical, it deals with quantities, like space and time, and cannot deal with qualitative changes or

[1] *Critique of Judgment:* Part I, Div. II, § 58 (p. 247, Bernard's Translation).

[2] *Ib.* § 45, p. 187. [3] *Ib.* § 57, p. 234.

[4] Cp. Hobson: *The Domain of Natural Science*, pp. 81–82.

with degrees of intensity, that is, with the intrinsic nature of things ;[1] so far as inductive it rests upon hypotheses and is only probable.[2] It is therefore itself largely a philosophy of "as if" and ekes out its defects freely by the use of analogy. We even hear of the "mathematical imagination," and in the recent development of the theory of relativity are left uncertain whether that theory itself is but hypothetical.[3] Mr. Blake, in his *Relation in Art*, shows that art does what science does, it establishes relations of analogy between the work of art and the universe, between the microcosm and the macrocosm, both science and art being in the last resort, in his view, hypothetical.

Philosophy itself, though prone to use the rationalistic method of Descartes and Kant, has freely employed analogy to grasp the truth. The myths of Plato, the carefully guarded arguments for the personality of God of the Scholastics, the crushing reasoning of Butler against the Deists, all depend upon the analogical method. It is an admitted method of Logic[4] and with the growth of the theory of probability, the defects of which Butler lamented in his day, it should yield more and more precise results. Modern positivism may, in the spirit of Kant, proclaim that this is anthropomorphism, and try to content itself with a merely descriptive account of things by avoiding such

[1] Cp. BERGSON *passim*, e.g. *Matière et Mémoire*, pp. 232-4.

[2] HOBSON, *Ib*, pp. 80-81.

[3] BLAKE: *Relation in Art*, pp. viii-x.

[4] Cp. JEVONS: *Principles of Science*, Ch. XXVIII.

categories as substance and cause. But when it comes to apply its abstractions—space, time, motion and the like—it has to employ such concepts as force and energy, attraction and repulsion, tension and stress, action and reaction, all which are facts primarily felt in human experience and imputed to things by analogy. It is "tantamount to treating the objective as ejective"[1]—as possessing qualities only directly known in our own immediate experience. Science is shot through with such expressions, which to eliminate leaves us only with mathematical formulæ without any content.[2] Even Professor Alexander uses the analogy of body-mind to illustrate the nature of space-time.[3] Which idea was derived from which, and which is primordial as a principle of explanation? It seems that philosophical explanation, as distinct from scientific description, must needs use the analogical method.

Our result is that a philosophy of "as if" is a true philosophy and that symbolism is a true guide to reality, whether sensible or supersensible. When I say what a thing is like I say something true and valuable about it. A "likeness"—photographic or pictorial—is a revelation of a person; it is a counterfeit, no doubt, but also a presentment. Indeed our knowledge of other persons is derived from analogy. Certain beings behave in ways like our own, they respond more or less as

[1] Cp. WARD: *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 38.

[2] Cp. TAYLOR: *Ib.* p. 300.

[3] *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 44.

expected and are again modified by our own reactions to them. They gradually become "ejects"—objects into which our own experiences are projected—the whole process being dependent on analogical interpretation.[1] If so, then a similar interpretation of the apparent purpose in nature leads us, despite Kant, validly to ascribe design to its cause or causes, in proportion to the degree of the resemblance of those apparent purposes to purposes that we intimately know. True, these last belong to human beings, beings of this sensible world, but if we reject agnosticism, as we must, we may extend the analogy to beings of a supersensible world. The only relevant difference between them and, say, a supreme designer is that between finitude and infinitude, which need not be a difference in kind.[2] An infinite being is not necessarily another kind of being than a finite. Certainly, an argument by analogy from the latter to the former is not demonstrative, it is only probable. But probability suffices for our belief in other persons, for our ascription of works of art to certain authors, for our understanding of the animal world. Why should we desire more for our interpretation of apparent design in nature? May we not rather say with Browne, that "all things are artificial: for Nature is the Art of God?"

Imagination, then, yields knowledge, even though it be "merely symbolical." There is no doubt a

[1] See BALDWIN: *The Individual and Society*, pp. 24-26.

[2] See BERNARD'S Introduction to *Critique of Judgment*, p. xxxvi.

form of it censured by Ruskin as the "pathetic fallacy."[1] In this we impute, under the influence of emotion, false appearances to objects, entirely unconnected with any real power or character in them; whereas in realism we describe the ordinary, proper and true appearances of things to us. The difference is illustrated by a contrast between Coleridge and Scott,[2] the one stating what *seems* and the other what *is*. A careful examination of Ruskin's illustrations, however, will show that the difference is but one of degree. Thus we are told that "as Nature is bright, serene or gloomy, Scott takes her temper and paints her as she is."[3] But *is* Nature a she, and *has* she tempers, and *are* they bright, serene, or gloomy? Ruskin has to allow that Scott says of Nature: "I cannot help thinking you are a little alive—no one can help thinking that." And certainly the writings of Ruskin himself exemplify abundantly the "pathetic fallacy." What else is the whole burden of the *Ethics of the Dust*, but an attributing of human moods and tempers to physical things? In the very argument in which he censures such attributions, he tells us that the word "blue" does *not* mean the *sensation* caused by a gentian on the human eye, but the power of producing that sensation, which power is always there, whether experienced by us or not.[4] Yet is power seen, or imputed? Surely since Hume's discussion nothing

[1] *Modern Painters*: Part IV, Ch. XII.
[2] *Ib.* Part IV, Ch. XII, § 6.
[3] *Ib.* IV, Ch. XVI, § 37.
[4] *Ib.* IV, Ch. XII, § 2.

is plainer than that power can only be mentally projected into things, not perceived in them. Such projection can still be tested and verified, thus showing that it is experimental. The difference between morbid and healthy imagination is that of the difference between false and true projection, no doubt, but neither can avoid imputing.

This imputing is a form of empathy, the form more distinctively called Imaginative Symbolism. Here Imagination seizes truth, but truth in the form of semblances, analogies or symbols. As such it reaches its highest achievements, especially in the form of grotesque,[1] for the highest truths are obviously incapable of mere imitation. Hence it is led to discover in material things characters like infinity, unity, repose, symmetry, purity, moderation, and adaptation, which convey an idea of immaterial qualities such as the divine incomprehensibility, comprehensiveness, permanence, justice, energy, government by law, and purposefulness, respectively.[2] These types of divine attributes, found in beauty, are grasped by imagination in three modes of operation—analytic, synthetic and idealizing—[3] the whole process resting upon that mutual interplay of passive contemplation and active invention involved in the relation between subject and object.[4] So by an analysis of imagina-

[1] *Modern Painters :* Part IV, Ch. VIII, § 6.
[2] *Ib.* Part III, Sec. I, Ch. V-XV.
[3] For so I translate the words, penetrative, associative, and contemplative, into terms of modern psychology. *Ib.* Part III, Sec. II.
[4] *Ib.* Part III, Sec. II, Ch. II, § 16 and Part IV, Ch. III, § 23 and Part IV, Ch. X, § 13.

tion which resembles Hegel's account of mental dialectic in general, we are brought to the idea that beauty is a spiritual language, only to be deciphered by those who possess the clue. Music admittedly is such a language, the most universally communicative of all the arts. Must not the music of birds, streams and winds be such a language also; must not the whole "choir of heaven and furniture of earth" be symbolic speech? As such it is an expression of sociality on the part of the universe, seized by human empathic imagination in acts of experiment involving a faith in the æsthetic imperative, which commands us to realize the ideal of beauty. Thus spirit greets spirit in sensuous guise, and says:

Remain awhile, thou art so fair.

CHAPTER II.

Emotional Reactions.

Bang-whang-whang goes the drum, tootle-te-tootle the fife!
No keeping one's haunches still: it's the greatest pleasure in life.
Browning: Up at a villa—down in the city.

Organic Response.

So far we have treated of sociality as if it were a purely mental affair. Empathy has appeared to involve little or no bodily reaction, and as explained by Lipps this is undoubtedly the case. In its purity it is a spiritual process, to be verified psychologically. It is vain however to ignore the organic response to an object, for to many people this is the main part of an æsthetic experience. There is a very close connexion between sensation and organic disturbances such as those of circulation, respiration and secretion, which are bound up with the familiar fact of emotional "diffusion."[1] Any sensory excitement tends to spread its effects over the whole organism, in the form of a wave of vague stirrings passing into more or less violent agitations which strive to find an outlet in action. There

[1] Cp. Ward: *Psychological Principles*, pp. 52-3.

does not seem to be a definite attachment of such a diffused emotion to any one form of action[1] but rather an indeterminateness of expression, varying according to circumstances. Thus, though anger has been described in classic fashion both by Darwin and James, there is a considerable difference between, say, its hot and cold varieties. In any but a very blind emotion there is some measure of adaptation to conditions; its tendency to be parasitic, that is, to explode upon various (even irrelevant) objects, does not make it wholly unintelligent.[2] This is a point of view of some importance in social theory, for were emotion as blind as is often supposed, it would be an individualizing and disruptive force rather than a socializing one.

This brings us to consider the view that emotion is nothing but its bodily expression. The famous thesis of William James is that "we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful as the case may be."[3] These emotions are complexes of organic sensations and may be set up by physiological stimuli without the presence of mental objects. Various instances are cited by James to prove the possibility of emotions without objects and objects without emotions. Emotionless objects and objectless emotions are supposed to establish

[1] As is maintained by McDougall: *Social Psychology*, Ch. III.

[2] Cp. Jastrow: *Character and Temperament*, p. 525.

[3] *Principles of Psychology*, Ch. XXV.

the independence of emotions from the cognitive situation, with the result that the bodily manifestation becomes the whole of the emotion. James's theory, when stated in this extreme and crude form, is open to damaging attack which shows that the cases he cites are very questionable; that there is always some situation apprehended (even though mistakenly) to which we react; that such reaction is more or less adaptive and therefore not purely physiological; and that even the bodily reaction is initiated in the brain, not in the visceral organs as James' descriptions would suggest, and are therefore presumably connected primarily with cognition.[1] Emotion in short is a response to impressions, not the reception of them, and is the expression of feeling, which has some objective ground.[2]

What has been insufficiently noticed, however, is the reinforcement which the bodily reaction brings to the emotion, once it has begun. It is a familiar fact that expression of the emotion tends, up to a point, to augment it; laughter or weeping enhances joy or sorrow even to a hysterical pitch, till finally exhaustion ensues. For this reason a military officer represses the first signs of fear in his troops; flinching may lead to panic, for flight increases fear at first. Hence also the Stoic counsel to control the manifestation of the emotions as a means of restraining the emotions themselves. The Chinese sage recommends "the cheek of brass,

[1] BECHTEREW: *Psychologie Objective*, p. 109.

[2] WARD: *op. cit.* p. 275.

the eye of porcelain" as a means of cultivating impassivity. Reversely, Pascal advises us to practise the habits of devotion, in the hope of inducing the devotional spirit itself. Educators know how sulkiness can be made to give way to cheerfulness by playful exercises, if but the initial willing act can be secured. The orator knows how important it is to obtain an early emotional reaction to his suggestions, if he is to succeed in capturing his audience's enthusiasm. Purely intellectual wit is apt to resemble more the crackling of thorns under a pot than laughter holding both its sides. It has little power of self-sustainment and is apt to be fatiguing, whereas humour is heightened by healthy laughter. Similarly we must

> Give sorrow words: the grief that does not speak
> Whispers the o'er-fraught heart and bids it break.

Such examples illustrate the reverberation of emotional response upon the original stimulus, and to that extent confirm the James-Lange theory.

Emotional responses of this sort are divided into two kinds, according as they are exciting or depressing. In the one case they will produce a more active functioning of the vital organs—the heart, lungs and viscera, in the other a constriction of the vessels, an oppression of the respiration and a slowing down of the functions. These two kinds are called respectively the sthenic and asthenic emotions. Generally speaking, sthenic responses involve aggressive actions and are favourable to the well-being of the organism, whilst asthenic

responses are unfavourable and are accompanied by defensive actions. The nature of the stimulus and the needs of the organism play chief parts in determining the kind of response. Thus food produces sthenic response when the individual is hungry, but an asthenic when surfeited. But æsthetic effects interest us especially in the present discussion and hence we notice that certain sounds, discords, for instance, have an asthenic result, whilst musical harmonies have the opposite effect. Similarly certain colours, red, yellow and to some extent green, produce a sthenic effect; whilst blue, pale blue and violet are generally asthenic. Again, certain combinations of colours are stimulating, others depressing. As for lines and forms, the consequences are even more obvious; some are exciting (as Morris said of French Gothic) and others, like low and heavy buildings, depressing.[1] A knowledge of these facts is of value to the educator and the practical sociologist.

Corresponding to these sthenic and asthenic responses are affective states characterized as positive and negative feeling-tone respectively. Generally speaking, pleasurable feeling-tone reinforces the pulse, dilates the blood-vessels, and quickens and deepens the respiration; displeasure produces a weakening followed by a quickening of the pulse, a constriction of the blood-vessels and also a quickening, though often irregularly and superficially, of the respiration.[2] But there are

[1] Bechterew: *op. cit.* p. 96.

[2] *Ib.* p. 109.

great variations from this general law, according to the nature of the stimulus, the violence of the reaction and the association of ideas involved. As respects these last, positive feeling-tone favours rapidity and variety of association, whilst negative hinders and stereotypes them. Logical processes are similarly facilitated or retarded. Further it is found that affective states tend to colour their exciting stimuli, so that impressions which normally are unpleasant may be for the time pleasant, and *vice versa*. Every one is familiar with the way in which a joyous mood will colour objects usually repugnant, or how melancholy tinges the brightest objects with its own gloom. Lastly, one finds that rapid alternations of feeling-tone tend to affect injuriously the power of memorizing, though not so plainly if the emotion, say of fear, occurs in an interval between impression and reproduction. These results, though they do not disagree with the generalization that pleasure promotes, whilst pain destroys life, all go to show how largely emotional expression is a product of the interplay of subjective and objective factors, and how little can be expected of simple theories whether of the æsthetic or the social life. Still there remain the two chief types of emotional expression: the expansive, positive type illustrated by the face which opens, broadens, smiles; and the negative, defensive, which is shown in features which narrow, contract, frown. Other forms of expression are modifications of these two types, as in anger and fear.

The more specialized forms of emotional expression have been classified in various ways from the time of Charles Darwin, but it seems most convenient to treat them as responses to external impressions.[1] We obtain then (*a*) tactual expressions which exhibit hunger, surfeit, comfort or uneasiness and the like, and in their higher forms are associated with joy, sadness, fear, pride, ecstasy, etc.; (*b*) muscular expressions which indicate fatigue, vigour, attack, defence and so forth, with their symbolism of courage and fear, energy and listlessness, confidence and abasement; (*c*) sexual expressions which manifest desire, lust or shame directly, and indirectly love, jealousy, modesty and innocence; (*d*) expressions of the organs of taste and smell which reveal not only appetite and disgust, but also desire, aversion, scorn and inspiration; (*e*) tactual expressions which show familiarity, endearment, sympathy, cruelty and irony; (*f*) auditory responses which reveal appreciations of sounds as fearful or delightful or curious (as with dogs) or musically beautiful (as among men); (*g*) visual responses expressive of astonishment, shyness, furtiveness, envy, anger, mildness and the like. All these are, of course, associated together, so that there arises a sign-language in the highest degree complicated and tending to become conventionalized. There developes a language of gestures which, whilst showing much that is common all the world over, becomes formalized into an accepted code in a modern

[1] So Bechterew, p. 296.

theatre. Thus the eyes are covered for fear or shame, the head is raised for defiance, the arms are opened for welcome, the fist is clenched for anger, and so forth. So descriptive may such gestures be that they may serve as a language between people of different speech, Red Indians for instance. Finally there develops a system of symbolical movements such as those of the conductor of an orchestra. This is a highly artificial system, yet rests upon a few simple principles of expansion and contraction, elevation and depression, quickening and retarding of members of the body. A study of the face and gestures of a musical conductor will reveal the same two fundamental types of expression, sthenic and asthenic, but complicated in all manner of ways and elaborated into a professional technique. The private signs of secret societies are an extreme refinement of such symbolic movements. In their origins the expressive movements we have so far considered have doubtless had utility; the rôles they play have been variously estimated by biologists, but there can be no question about their social value in their higher developments. It is largely through them that man has attained supremacy over the other species, and has been able to communicate his experience to other human beings. The social life depends upon them; they are necessary factors in the socialization and civilization of mankind.

It is, however, through the voice that the emotions find their fullest expression, especially in man. Whatever be the explanation of song in

birds—whether as implying sexual excitement or warning or simple self-expression—it is plain that in man the vocal sounds have an organic basis. The vowels correspond to certain emotional states. Thus "O" expresses a groan, and it is produced by an opening of the mouth and a relaxation of the vocal chords indicative of a lack of motor control; "OO" is the long sigh of fatigue involving prolonged expiration with vibration of the vocal cords; "A" is the sound uttered in surprise or fear as a result of contracting the thorax and expiration across the vocal cords; "E" and "I" are purifications of the coughing sounds which are made to overcome obstruction in the throat. The consonants arise mostly from respiratory responses which meet with obstruction in the throat from lips, teeth, nasal passages; hence "P," "D," "N," etc.[1] Similarly the gutturals of German and the nasal sounds of French are modifications of organic expressions, probably largely determined by physical conditions. The widespread sounds involved in the sounds "papa" and "mama" seem to spring from very early infantile utterances which have become associated with most familiar objects. Duplication of sounds, imitation, and economy of effort have guided the development of language further, and there is always going on a process of experimentation by which new sounds are combined into new words. The history of childish babble and adult slang is witness enough to this. Vocalization is serviceable

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 426.

to the race, instinctive in the individual; in both cases being primarily expressive of the emotions.[1]

It is here noteworthy that song precedes speech. Amongst birds there can hardly be said to be language, though song is highly perfected. Many observers have found that children can often sing before they can speak, and educators like Froebel have utilized that fact. Similarly children draw before they write, poetry precedes prose, and rhythmical movements are among the earliest made and retain a superiority over others both physiologically and economically. Gesture and pantomime and imitation anticipate the drama. In short, art at first outstrips science and retains to the end a certain immediacy of expressiveness, though in its higher reaches it becomes formal and conventionalized. Even in its most symbolic form, however, it retains its organic appeal. In music a change of time is commonly accompanied by movements of the hands or feet, high tones by a tautening of the body, low tones by a relaxation, harmonies by an expansion, discords by a contraction or torsion. These correspond to asthenic, sthenic or mixed emotions. For some persons, probably not musically gifted, these are the sole or chief factors in music. So Kant remarks that the beneficial effects of music consist in a stimulation of the intestines![2] Reversely those who feel little of these organic responses, though connoisseurs of music, are probably more mathematically than

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 387.

[2] *Critique of Judgment*, p. 223 (Bernard's Translation).

musically minded. Art has approximated to science.

Again, in painting, certain forms stand for specific emotions. A curve symbolizes smoothness and ease, a straight line firmness and decisiveness, broken lines indecision, zig-zags shocks, and the like. In recent art this symbolism is carried so far that sensuous beauty is ignored or flouted. Yet the emotional reaction remains (or is intended to remain). The experiences of an artist like Mr. Vernon Blake, who tells us that in drawing a line he feels the depth or thickness of the limb he is sketching, is illustrative.[1] A more striking case however is the case of C. Anstruther Thompson. This lady found by introspection that in mere appreciation of an object of art she always felt organic sensations which were imitative of the object. Thus in contemplating a common jar, its wholeness was correlated with a bodily sense of composure, balance, correlation in diversity. Its erectness was imitated by the feet pressing on the ground whilst the eyes fixed the base of the jar. Then the lift up of the jar was accompanied by a lift up of the body, the downward pressure of the jar's rim by a slight sense of downward pressure of the head. The jar's equal sides brings the two lungs into play ; the swelling outwards of the jar's two sides is followed by an inspiration of the breath, the narrowing to the neck by an expiration, and the flattening out of the top by a short inspiration. In addition balancing movements follow

[1] *Relation in Art*, pp. 203-4.

the shape of the jar, the left curve provoking a stance on the left foot, the right on the other. The whole harmony and unity of the object was correlated to a sense of bodily poise and harmoniously adjusted movement.[1]

Many other such experiences give support to the theory that the appreciation of art consists in an inner mimicry of the forms, motions or life of objects. However inadequate this is as a complete account of æsthetic enjoyment, it is doubtless a common element therein, and is that which sustains and reinforces our contemplation. Whilst there may be, in highly cultivated minds, purely æsthetic empathy, for most persons such empathy is supported by an accompaniment of motor, respiratory and other organic feelings. In æsthetic appreciation forms commonly mean actions or energies which correspond to energies of our own personality. The more variously and yet accordantly these energies are brought into play, the greater the enhancement of the beauty of the object and the enjoyment of its presence.[2] The activity of the forms may be "only imaginary," yet they involve our imaginative activity, and in the world of the æsthetic the imagined is the real. Imagery, however, usually if not always, has an escort of organic sensations and hence we are brought back from purely ideal contemplation to its emotional background. "Emotion recollected in tranquillity"[3]

[1] *Beauty and Ugliness*, p. 175.

[2] Cp. MÜNSTERBERG: *Principles of Art Education*, pp. 82 seq.

[3] WORDSWORTH's definition of Poetry.

does not seem to be a complete account of æsthetic enjoyment. If actual emotion is not the source of æsthetic appreciation it is at least its normal expression.

Social Resonance.

The expression of emotion is not merely the concern of the individual : it has social implications. It is remarked by M. Lévy Bruhl that in primitive societies the word "to be" has not the logical meaning which it has for us, but possesses a mystic power implying a participation of the collective mind with the object represented, a sort of symbiosis by identity of essence. Hence the possibility of the belief in the totem which is the individual, his ancestors, and the animal or vegetal species, which all participate at once in the same essence.[1] Similarly every image participates in the nature, properties and life of that of which it is the image.[2] This participation is represented under various forms : contact, action, transfer, action at a distance, etc.[3] In general, primitive mentality implies the participation, felt and lived, of the individual with his group, and of the group with surrounding groups. The two participations are "*solidaires*."[4] M. Levy Bruhl allows however that such mentality persists into later civilized mentality, which is thus

[1] *Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures*, p. 9.
[2] *Ib.* p. 80. [3] *Ib.* p. 78. [4] *Ib.* p. 430.

imperfectly logical. So far as civilized language is emotional it does indeed possess such characters. It is dynamic and expansive, it produces reverberations in other hearers, often without or against reason. So it is that cries of pain call forth involuntary wails, anger spreads amongst crowds, catch-words possess magical qualities, formulæ, shibboleths and emblems are adhered to long after the virtue has gone out of them.

Largely this effect is the result of repetition and suggestion. It is well known that repetition is a great factor in hypnotism, to which a logical consciousness bears so much resemblance. The motor and emotional elements in these conditions of mind get the upper hand and produce a peculiar sense of unity between the mind and its environment. This concentration upon objects results in self-intoxication leading to fascination and ecstasy. Repetition of these experiences brings about an emotional accumulation which is ready to be discharged upon the occurrence of the stimulus—shout, cry, catch-word or what not. Not only so, but these emotional reactions arouse similar tendencies in bystanders. Emotions tend to spread by suggestion, which is primarily a sub-conscious and unwitting process, both on the part of the suggester and of the person influenced by the suggestion. Both are ignorant of the source from which the suggestion springs, though both feel a similar tendency to thought or action. In fact, suggestion is definable as the process by which every member of a group is able to apprehend intuitively what is

passing in the minds of the other members of a group.[1] It is the working of the gregarious instinct in man and animals and is perhaps telepathic in nature.

Whilst this principle of the storage and spreading of emotion is true of all mental life, it is specially important in the realm of art. There is doubtless in the soul of the artist an unwitting desire to attract.[2] The love of admiration of one's work is a normal and healthy part of human nature, and is perhaps more pronounced amongst artists than amongst other people. Some artists profess to live for their work's sake alone, careless of opinion. Their work however is apt to become eccentric, or if not, to exhibit either pride or contempt. Thus Ruskin remarks how much of the best modern work is produced in a spirit of self-contempt, instancing Scott, who thought his work in the world was to provide amusement. Morris similarly regarded himself as "the idle singer of an empty day." The modern cult of "expression for expression's sake" is the climax of such despair. A true artist works for an audience, even if an invisible and future one. What he finds beautiful he desires to display to others; this for no selfish reason but from delight in the object which deserves their admiration. This delight tends to spread by unwitting suggestion, and is imitated by others who may, or may not, have the genuine artistic perception. Hence it is that there arise schools,

[1] RIVERS: *Instinct and the Unconscious*, pp. 91, 99.

[2] RUTGERS MARSHALL: *The Beautiful*, p. 135.

cults and coteries which hand on traditions that are educationally valuable or æsthetically paralysing according to conditions. They do however satisfy in a measure that desire for appreciated achievement which is natural to the artist, from the lover who says

> Is she not pure gold, my mistress ?[1]

to the musician who waits for the verdict of

> Rossini sitting patient in his stall.[2]

Doubtless along with this unwitting craving for the recognition of excellence there is also mingled a desire for the confirmation of one's own judgment. There are few who can say like a master of his craft: "It could not be better done." External opinion reinforces internal conviction, which again impresses outside opinion, and so on indefinitely. There is thus a reverberation between artist and observer which is of great importance as a condition of art-production. Mass-suggestion produces a sense of realness in an object, for we tend to regard as real that which is generally accepted, constant and stable. The object of beauty conforms to this rule, and only the strongest artist can do without the assurance from numbers that his product is real and not illusory. Community of belief in the importance of his work is what commonly saves him from a sense of futility. Such reinforcement is perhaps in inverse ratio to the general discussion of artistic principles; it comes

[1] BROWNING: *Song.*

[2] BROWNING: *Bishop Blougram's Apology.*

rather as a silent stimulus from tradition and from the cultural interest of one's own time. Tradition is, after all, the comparatively passive acceptance of the standards set up by original genius in the past; these standards are unwittingly adopted and act as supports to newly-budding genius. The spirit of the age, again, largely determines productiveness in the artist. So Matthew Arnold explains the poet Gray's infertility by the fact of his living in the prosaic eighteenth century rather than in the nineteenth.

There is then, in all art-production a powerful impulse to express feeling, whether pleasurable or painful, in such a way that it is at once echoed and enhanced. Emotional community is sought and, in so far as it is found, relief is also obtained from the urgency of the impulse. This is the principle of the social resonance in art.[1] The art-product is like a stone dropped in a pool of water; it affects wider and wider circles of observers whose reactions play upon the original disturbance till the whole emotional area is stilled. (So much at least of truth there is in the old Aristotelian doctrine that tragedy purifies by pity and terror. It affords relief to the over-wrought emotions and that in a social manner which at once confirms and justifies them.) Not only so, but the permanence of a work of art gives that sense of genuineness which we have found to be needful in æsthetic enjoyment. The desire to make a lasting object of art is no mere egoistic craving for fame on the

[1] HIRN: *Origins of Art*, Ch. 6.

part of the artist. It is some sort of guarantee that his insight is sure and his execution sound. He feels that the fleeting emotion deserves to be fixed, to endure and to be transmitted to others. To do this it must be stripped of its passing and accidental conditions and embodied in a permanent form.[1] The emotion must be socialized, and in so far as it is able to evoke responses from succeeding generations the producer feels that it is that real sort of beauty which is a joy for ever.

It thus appears that art essentially involves social participation; communication of emotion is its function and the artist is one who shares his delight with others. He is therefore not primarily a teacher or preacher or moralist; he is a sharer. Now to share is probably more important than to instruct or exhort or edify; perhaps indeed none of these things can be well done except by one who shares. Every educator knows the difference between saying to his pupils: "Go and do that," and: "Come, imitate me." So the true artist preaches no sermon, though all his work may be idealistic. Hence it is that it is so hard to say what is Shakespeare's philosophy, though few would doubt that his plays have an elevating influence. And Greek art, though it made men wise and courageous and temperate, did not point a moral: it communicated a fine emotion.[2] This being the office of art it follows that it is the great socializer.[3]

[1] *Ib.* Ch. 9.

[2] PATRICK: *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 433.

[3] MARSHALL: *op. cit.* p. 138.

For it is characteristic of the finer arts that they yield unselfish pleasure ; unlike even domestic love they are not exclusive ; their common enjoyment enhances pleasure and brings no bitterness therewith. More than science or ethics they promote sociality. Knowledge enlarges, morality builds up, art unifies. It is most likely that it has done more than anything else to humanize man's animal nature. It goes beyond mere utility, or survival value for the individual in the struggle for existence ; it is the most significant sign to the anthropologist that man has risen above the brute. It binds communities together more than economics, or politics, or anything save religion, which is itself however for most people mainly imaginative.

Whilst these things are true of Art generally they are especially true of one art—music. The arts may be ranked in different orders of importance, according to purpose. Thus for Hegel music stands below poetry, as being less spiritual, whilst for Ruskin it is inferior to painting as being more sensual and sharable with the brutes.[1] Yet from our present standpoint it is unquestionably the most important of the arts, precisely because it is the most sharable. It is a universal language and at present the only one. It communicates emotions, which are socially more important than ideas, and it can discipline the passions more strongly than any other art. For such reasons Plato made music the chief instrument of education,[2] or rather,

[1] *Ruskin on Music*: Ed. by A. M. WAKEFIELD, pp. 19 and 47.
[2] *Republic*: Book III.

perhaps, gathered together all the arts under the name of the chief of the muses. He held that as gymnastic exercise is necessary to keep the body healthy, so is musical education necessary to keep the soul healthy. As Ruskin elsewhere allowed,[1] "Music was among the Greeks quite the first means of education; and it was so connected with their system of ethics and intellectual training that the God of Music is with them also the God of Righteousness; the God who purges and avenges iniquity, and contends with their Satan as represented under the form of Python, 'the corrupter'; and the Greeks were incontrovertibly right in this." Justice being understood by the Greeks (or at least by Plato) as the harmony of the functions of the soul (or the state) it is apparent why they emphasized the discipline of music. Hence it is that their social theory constantly refers to music, and their musical science is related to social law, whilst philosophy as the unifying discipline is called the highest form of music.

It is most probable that the simplest and earliest of all art-forms is rhythm.[2] Feeling, which is expressed most naturally in casual movements, soon takes on a rhythmic form. This, as we have seen, is the most economical and efficient mode of action, and is highly communicable. Furthermore it is capable of repetition and so of that perpetuation of emotion which is a secret desire of the artist. Add to this the extreme suggestiveness of tones,

[1] *Time and Tide*, Sec. 61.

[2] WALLASCHEK: *Primitive Music*, pp. 230-231.

whether in melody or harmony,[1] and we have largely explained music's socializing influence. This is reinforced by its close connexion with some of the most socially exciting occupations of man, such as love, work, and war. Music is proverbially the "food of love"; its importance for work is less realised, but the researches of anthropologists show that work-songs are among the earliest forms of art; they are found all over the world as a means of relieving or enheartening labour, and are even now being urged by psychologists upon industrialists as economically productive. It is significant that the nation which in the 19th century was pre-eminent in music was also foremost in social organization. In war the intoxicating effect of music is used to overcome natural fear, to excite anger or express exultation, and as a most effective instrument of disciplined co-operation. Ruskin's discovery that artistic nations are also warlike is explainable as the result of the fact that art and war, however mischievously directed, spring from a common root in sociality, and powerfully reinforce each other. The problem of the present is to provide an æsthetic substitute for war, which may perhaps be found in religion, between which and art—notably the musical art—the connexion is of the closest. Music and religion alike possess unfathomable mystery. They are, in Otto's phrase, exceptionally "numinous."

Art in general we have found to be the great socializing agency. It is so because of its in-

[1] SCHOPENHAUER: *World as Will and Idea*, Vol. I, pp. 334-7.

fectiousness, for it is true to say that all art is infectious, and that all infectious feeling socializes. It does not follow that the converse is true, and that all infectious feeling is art. Tolstoy's definition, "Art as a human activity, consists in this, that one man consciously, by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that other people are infected by these feelings and also experience them"[1] is wrong in this, that it mistakes one of the signs of art for its innermost nature. One may surely transmit such feelings inartistically. And his test of good art—universality of appeal to the feelings of religious and simple common life[2]—fails in that it does not distinguish between immediate and cultivated response to such appeal, and therefore makes the standard a lowest common factor. All the same, the capacity to become universally infectious is a complex sign of great art, and follows from it. To potential catholicity and infectiousness may indeed be added a third mark, namely religiousness; not indeed for Tolstoy's reason, that it is the business of art to spread true Christian feelings,[3] but because beauty is indeed religious. And beauty is after all the object of art. Art, then, infects; it is potentially universal in its appeal; and it is implicitly religious. It has in fact usually been closely bound up with great historical religions; and its comparative decline in

[1] *What is Art?* Translated by AYLMER MAUDE, p. 59.

[2] *Ib.* pp. 164-6 [3] *Ib.* p. 196.

modern life is a matter of great importance both for religion and civilization.

That there is a comparative decline of art in modern civilization is incontestable. Though many works of high genius are produced and though countless pupils study art, its influence over the everyday life of ordinary people steadily lessens. Probably no great period of civilization has been less artistic,[1] and so deprived therefore of art's socializing influence. This is to some a sure sign, apart from many others, of its impending disruption ;[2] civilization is, as Morris puts it, eating its own children, and the arts first of all.[3] The worship of Mammon and Mars has superseded that of the Muses, and must in the end produce its natural result of revulsion. A new art, however, may then be born to enrich and sweeten men's lives. The proper effect of art in human life is æsthetic joy, and man cannot live for long without such joy. Ugly living is isolating, narrowing, irreligious in tendency, whereas beautiful living is contagious, broadening, and idealizing. To further the cause of civilization and religion, then, a new birth of popular art is necessary, as the informing soul of social life. This can transform modern mechanical toil into happy work : drudgery into artistry. It can also help to change modern unbelief into faith, for art cannot exist without

[1] PATRICK : *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 433.

[2] *Life of William Morris*, Vol. 2, p. 150.

[3] *Lectures on Art*: p. 187, and cp. pp. 12, 13, 175 and 210 (1882 edition).

implicit belief in ideal beauty, which is sacred. Art and religion are therefore closely bound together; if we accept the aphorism that art is praise, we shall seek to make both civilization and its religion praiseworthy. Artistic feeling has discovered that our present system of life is blameworthy and decadent. With a new and better system, however, the arts will spring to life again, having for their purpose the praise of perfection and for their result the diffusion of joy amongst mankind.

Play.

An organic response, frequently combined with social resonance, of great importance for the development of sociality, is found in play. That most deep-seated motive of human activity, the instinctive tendency to enhance pleasure or find relief from pain, finds in play a chief mode of expression. Play is usually said to be the spontaneous expression of vital energy, having no end beyond itself, and yielding pleasure or at least relief from pain.[1] As yielding pleasure it is amusement, as relieving pain it is relaxation. Whether there is a special instinct of play, or whether it is the overflowing of "surplus energy,"[2] or whether it is just the free expression of vitality generally,[3] we may in the present state of psychology leave

[1] HIRN: *op. cit.* p. 73. [2] GROOS: *Die Spiele der Menschen.*
[3] MCDOUGALL: *Outline*, p. 172. PATRICK: *op. cit.* p. 440.

undetermined. That it is free and purposeless and pleasant is, however, generally conceded. Its relations to social life, and again to art as the great socializer, are what concern us here. It is plain that play is not simply identical with either social life or art, and yet it has close affinities with both. Social living evidently includes many forms of association which are not playful. The great institutions—such as state, church, guild—are earnest, and involve severe discipline which is foreign to play. So much is this true that one thinker even regards play as a reaction against the social order.[1] Further, play is not always artistic. In some of the great national games—the gladiatorial fights and the Saturnalia of Rome, the Feast of Unreason in the Middle Ages, the novel-reading of the modern world, and the pranks and horse-play of youth—there is much that is inartistic.

We have seen reason however to regard art as essentially social, and we shall see that it is also playful. The social and the playful therefore appear as wider circles which overlap in art. The relations between the three may be illustrated by what happens at a gathering, such as a garden party. The assemblage consists of some people who are there primarily for social purposes, though they may regard it as a duty; others are there for amusement which may be primarily individualistic; a third section may be present for æsthetic reasons, including self-display and the contemplation of the

[1] HARRIS: *Psychologic Foundations of Education*, Sec. 192-4.

scene. The third section alone will be necessarily social and playful at once. The ideal situation would be one in which the social, the playful and the artistic were identical, as perhaps occurs sometimes in a drama, in which everybody participates sympathetically, whether as spectator or actor; in which also everyone is seeking no further end than immediate enjoyment of the "play" (which is more likely to occur in amateur than professional acting); and in which all are concerned to find only what is beautiful. Wagner's Master-Singers perhaps owes its unique triumph to the harmonious combination of these three motives. The Guilds, figuring there so conspicuously, stress the social nature of the drama; this again is through and through sportive in spirit; the whole being suffused with the beauty of sound and colour and form which it owes to the genius of the composer, but in which both performers and observers at once delight. Such combinations, however, are rare.

We have now to consider the psychology, sociology, and æsthetics of play in more detail. Play is contrasted with earnest as being spontaneous, purposeless and pleasant. Work is obligatory, has an end beyond the mere activity, and may or may not be agreeable, according to conditions and expected results.[1] Play is done for its own sake, work for some ulterior end. It is best regarded as the agreeable exercise of one's powers, whether for recreation or relaxation or as an experimental preparation for life's functions. In the case of

[1] HORNE: *Philosophy of Education*, pp. 74-77.

the mature, play is mainly a relief from work and is restorative, whereas for the young it is chiefly an outflow of energy in directions which rehearse the serious occupations of later life. In all cases, however, it is joyous activity. Needless to say, a large part of what is commonly called work comes under this head, and fortunately so, for prolonged painful effort would destroy life itself. It does not follow that much play is not strenuous, but the strenuousness must not exceed certain limits and become painful earnest. Modern sport, with its technique and discipline, is on the border-land between play and earnest, and gives point to the remark about the English taking their pleasures sadly. In a wide view of play must be included not only personal amusements and recreations, but also organized games, adventures, many arts and crafts, the fine arts, and leisure occupations. According to Ruskin, the great English game is making money. Idleness as a fine art may be added to this list. We have to examine the psychological springs of action involved in such pursuits, and to bring out their relations to our subject, sociality.

A first great impulse to play is the need for the occupation of attention. One can scarcely conceive of play where there is no exercise of either theoretical or practical activity, involving some measure of attention. From the earliest childish amusements up to the highest flights of artistic production, such deployment of mental activity is to be found ; and where it is not found there we have weariness,

boredom and satiety. There is, within limits, pleasure in mere stimulus as such, still more in stimulus which is itself agreeable, most of all in stimulus which is intensive and which occurs with our own consent. Play fulfils all these conditions, even play which has some element of fear or horror, as in children's plays of fright or men's adventures. The sense of enhanced reality which comes from such experiences is highly agreeable, and will outweigh many incidental discomforts. It is not far from this to a second motive to play, enjoyment of causation. The sense of causal efficiency gives great delight, and accounts for all sorts of experimental yet purposeless activities, from the ball games of infancy to the flirtations of later age. Modifications of it occur in emulation and rivalry, where the sense of equalling or surpassing others is also involved. From "I can" to "I also can" and "I can do still better" is but a gradation in causal achievement. This leads to a third play-impulse—the sense of freedom. In play the subject is largely released from the pressure of reality and can even fashion a world of its own. The rules of the game are self-made or freely adopted, and can be withdrawn from at will. This accounts for the element of make-believe which enters so largely into play, especially into the voluntary illusion of art. In art, from the "Let's pretend" of childhood to the symbolism of poetry, a new world is created, richer and fairer than the real world, from the hard necessities of which we can withdraw in order freely to fashion another which is nearer

to the heart's desire. Here the self is enhanced by rich and intense experiences till something like ecstasy is reached. In æsthetic empathy this enjoyment, as an experimental and voluntary play, is seen at its highest pitch.[1] War is a serious and dreadful thing enough, but to play at being soldiers is highly delightful to children of all ages ; and the column which to the dull mind is perhaps a mere lump of matter is to the artist a vigorous up-springing thing. Empathy brings us to the border-land between individualistic and social impulses in play ; for empathy is often styled an inner imitation. Imitation of and by others is a strong reinforcement of the personal play-impulses. The pleasure in repetition, so noticeable in children's plays, is called by Baldwin imitation, since it involves a circular reaction of (*a*) agreeable stimulus followed by (*b*) movement which tends (*c*) to reinstate the stimulus, and so on indefinitely. This tendency to self-imitation is greatly augmented, however, by the social resonance we have already discussed, as well as modified by the imitation of others. The interesting actions of others are imitatively repeated ; these react upon the persons imitated, till the whole company act in unison. By imitative repetition and diffusion, then, it is possible to account for a great deal of our playful activities, notably those exhibited in plays of love and war—which are the great themes of poetry[2]—and for much in the fine arts themselves. Did not Aristotle define all artistic activity as essentially *Mimesis* ?

[1] Groos : *op. cit.* p. 420. [2] *Ib.* p. 314.

The motives so far considered are self-centred and seem to justify the statement of W. T. Harris that "in play . . . . (man) gives full rein to the individual whim or caprice. In play his activity is wholly turned to his own immediate gratification. . . . . He regains his feeling of self in play, because in play immediate inclination alone guides his activity, and thus the particular self is the impelling principle, and also the immediate object of it."[1] He distinguishes, however, plays and games from festivals and holidays, national ceremonies and celebrations, which are social activities and which reconcile the individual to the social order. In a wide sense, however, all these must be called play, and hence the antithesis of play to social law need not arise. As Groos puts it, play in common is the social school of growing men.[2] Individuality and sociality are the two correlated poles of human nature, and both are developed in play. The strong desire to see reflected in others one's own feelings, and the similarly strong impulse to reflect the emotions of others, are guarantees of this development. The number of social plays is very great. One of the commonest is the feast, which redeems the partaking of food from much of its utilitarian character, and is the very type of sociality in our religion. The dance has at all times been a great socializing factor, bringing the individual out of his idiosyncrasies and impelling him to move with others in a common rhythm, in

[1] *Psychologic Foundations of Education*, p. 283.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 433 and p. 524.

an agreed manner, and for the same ends. Unions, guilds, clubs and the like are largely playful in their aims; their efficiency in diffusing good humour between different classes of society has been used to account for the comparative harmlessness of English social and political struggles. The drama has been at all times a great socializing agency; its function of holding up a mirror to human nature has made it a great school of social manners; to it the French owe in large measure their superiority in the art of living. Epic poetry and drama, by steeping the individual in the ethos of his race, play a great formative part in social education. The influence of Greek, English and Icelandic epic stories, for instance, upon the developing individuals of these nations must have been enormously unifying, even whilst they seemed like idle tales. Architecture, also, so far as it is a fine art and therefore playful in nature, serves a social purpose, and, in the form especially of domestic architecture, was regarded by Morris as the master art. To the foregoing plays must be added celebrations of many sorts. It was not without reason that Comte substituted for religious services, in his *Religion of Humanity*, social celebrations in honour of great men. These, though serious, were joyful, and in the very spirit of Ecclesiasticus when it says, "Let us now praise famous men, and our fathers which begat us." Such celebrations are being advocated by a distinguished educationist [1] as a normal part of our

[1] Dr. F. H. Hayward.

school life to-day ; if generally adopted they would do much to temper the individualistic tradition which pervades our schools. Festivals, on the Continent, take the place of our rather empty holidays, and civilize whilst they amuse. Pageants, of late happily springing up in many quarters, foster a sense of continuity with the past ; at the same time they encourage unity in the present. Finally a word may be spoken in favour of the more recent cinema and wireless telegraphy as at least potential means of welding modern life together in a spirit of common enjoyment. A discussion of the nature and value of Humour would take us far afield,[1] but its social importance is undeniable.

Coming to the sociology of play, we premise two fundamental tendencies of human nature : namely the tendencies to associate and to communicate. These are more than mere gregariousness and suggestibility, for man is not just an animal, and the herd-instinct alone does not explain society. They may however rest upon a fundamental " consciousness of kind,"[2] which involves a selection amongst like and unlike beings so as to discover one's own " kind," and a process of mutual interpretation whereby the relations amongst individuals of a " kind " are made explicit. This last implies in human beings a full use of the resources of language.[3] Sociality is complete only where the processes of preferential selection and mutual interpretation have resulted in a union which is

[1] Cp. HÖFFDING's *Psychology*, pp. 290-298.
[2] GIDDINGS's *Principles of Sociology*, p. 17.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 108, 109.

agreeable.[1] The whole experience, then, is essentially one of meeting and sharing experience agreeably. Now play, though it does not create such a twofold tendency, does greatly intensify it, and may serve as an instrument of its social selection. Persons who are unplayful are in large measure ill-adapted for social life ; play and games therefore exercise a winnowing function as between social and unsocial individuals. Though a child is born into a society—the home—the first society which it voluntarily enters is the play-society, in which the primary quality required is good comradeship. On the other hand, meeting in play permits and even evokes opportunities for self-display ; this is largely corrected by the habit of teasing and bantering which forms a large part of social humour, to the extent of becoming a periodic ritual in some groups, such as, for instance, students' societies. Good comradeship is insisted on, its opposite being punished, with poetic justice, by being "sent to Coventry." In play, again, leadership is discovered and earns its meed of hero-worship, yet at the price of identifying itself with the interest of the play-society, of feeling responsibility and setting an example. On the other hand, sharing in play involves willing subordination of individuals to a common desire, cheerful obedience to accepted rules and rulers. Add to this its tendency to promote corporate feeling by an artful diffusion of sympathetic impulses, and also the educative effect of the imitative actions which it invokes,

[1] *Ib.* p. 116.

and we have some explanation of its great sociological importance. Finally we must notice how our social heritage is largely transmitted by means of play. The cultural tradition of a people cannot be handed on by physical inheritance, but has to be acquired by each individual anew. By imitative plays, especially of a dramatic sort, the social traditions of a people are appropriated by new generations, who meet and share the experience of the past in a highly intensive manner. It is remarked by Giddings that if ever the people of our slums are socially organized, it will be after they have felt the influence of healthier social amusements than those to which they are prone.[1] Of such amusements, what may be termed historical culture-plays stand in the first rank.[2]

On a wider sociological view we observe that play humanizes whereas work often de-humanizes. Kant's maxim that a man should be treated as an end in himself, never as a mere means, is fulfilled in play as a voluntary association. For this reason it is as necessary for grown men and women as for children, for whereas the latter have the protection of the home the former are in our modern industrialism increasingly subject to external constraining mechanism. As Lotze puts it,[3] in modern times *work* which was once a self-animating exercise of activity, is being supplanted generally by *business*, which is increasingly remote from the

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 121.

[2] Op. Groos: *op. cit.* p. 516, and pp. 491-503.

[3] *Microcosmus*: Vol. II, p. 395.

ends it serves, and seems to roll on like a huge machine; and so work becomes more and more like drudgery. It is in keeping with this that modern art is becoming more and more like mathematics.[1] Now mathematics has a beauty of its own, though not the highest beauty; yet a civilization which so largely lacks the richer and finer types of beauty is gravely impoverished. In acquiring the mechanical means to live we lose the art of living. Modern leisure has not compensated for the drudgery of mechanical toil, and one may doubt if it ever can. What is needed is a recovery of happy and indeed of playful work. It is possible to play *in* work, though one should not play *at* work. Drudgery however is the antithesis of both play and happiness. A mere gospel of relaxation will not serve.[2] Joyful work is what our generation needs, and is striving blindly to obtain. A great connoisseur in happiness, William Morris, expressed his philosophy in short form when he said of another writer that he "worried himself in seeking, with obvious failure, some incentive to labour to replace the fear of starvation, which is at present our only one; whereas it cannot be too often repeated that the true incentive to useful and happy labour is, and must be, pleasure in the work itself."[3] A society in which this should obtain would be one in which æsthetic joy in the simple and common goods of life superseded our

[1] *Ib.* p. 442. Cp. BLAKE on *Relation in Art*: preface.

[2] Cp. JAMES's essay on that subject in *Talks on Psychology*.

[3] *Life*: Vol. 2, p. 244.

admiration for complex machinery; in which there was no luxurious "leisure class," and no servants; and in which everyone "played the game." This brings us back to the consideration of play as art.

We have seen already that art is play, but that it is also more. In what does art go beyond play? Now all æsthetic enjoyment is bound up with the sensuous [1] and all play involves sensuous stimulation; mere observation for its own sake is characteristic of both. So far they are at one, but the æsthetic involves a certain kind of sensuous experience, which is by some identified with the agreeable.[2] But the æsthetic is not the merely agreeable, for there is æsthetic delight in the fearful, the sublime and the tragic. This is only so, however, when "imagination amends them"; they then rise from the world of sensuous experience to that of æsthetic illusion. The "play of imagination" however involves empathic experiment; and joy in this activity can outweigh the disagreeableness of the object upon which it is directed. Hence the possibility of the æsthetic portrayal of the horrible, say a battle-field. The act of empathic imagination brings life, power, feeling with it, and goes along with the nature of the object itself to determine its æsthetic value. Empathy is play which tends to animate its objects, though of course some objects may reject our overtures and remain dull and ugly. Two sorts

[1] Cp. Milton's description of poetry as simple, sensuous, passionate.

[2] HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL: *The Beautiful*, p. 78.

of objects, though, especially call out our imaginative participation, the agreeable and the intensive, whence we get the common distinction of the beautiful and the sublime. It is in accordance with this that the two great themes of poetry are love and war. In all cases of æsthetic contemplation, however, the distinguishing mark of the object is the impression it gives of being full of life and soul.

Doubtless the æsthetic goes beyond this into a world of ideal contents, of truth and goodness, and so far it ceases to be a mere play.

> Art still has truth, take refuge there!

yet so far as it remains art, it is experimental empathy. It may involve laborious study of technique, it may be a means of livelihood, and it can be used as a means of propaganda; so far it is utilitarian and not artistic or even playful. It is rather in its later developments that art becomes the servant of other ends than itself, and tends to be divorced from play. Primitive and also childish art are pre-eminently playful, and the true artist preserves much of the joyous naïveté of childhood to the last. This is also true of all creative workers, no doubt; as Groos well says, pleasure in production gilds all earnest work with a glimmer of playful joy.[1] Yet art has this advantage over other playful production, that at each stage of his work the artist has æsthetic joy in the contemplation of his developing object. This reinforces his energies in a way that surpasses mere work or mere play, and

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 511.

makes the producer also a delighted spectator. This bridges the gap between mere amusement and earnest co-operation, and ensures full sociality. Sheer play weakens and softens, sheer work dulls and brutalizes; art transfigures both. So that once again we are led to see the need for a recovery in contemporary life of the spirit of art as contrasted with the soullessness of mechanics, for only so can the purest, most universal, and most satisfying pleasures be restored to civilization.

CHAPTER III.

Sensibility.

Likes and Dislikes.

OUR thesis has been that the chief motive to sociality is the æsthetic, thus far exhibited in the general form of empathy and emotional resonance. The æsthetic attitude however needs further specification, for as it develops it becomes reflective, and is more precisely defined as Taste. Taste, however, in its primary meaning, refers to bodily appetite, and to the last is not independent of organic condition; we must therefore enquire into its instinctive bases. The proximate bases are to be found in likes and dislikes, which are primarily expressive of feeling. Feeling is admittedly central in human nature, as indeed in all mind, yet its meaning is not unambiguous. Most strictly it means feeling-tone, that is, pleasure or displeasure, and as such it is said to be purely subjective or inward, and in no way presentable in the field of objects. It is, as Lotze puts it, the coloured light which throws a glow upon otherwise neutrally grey objects. For all that, it is not the

only motive to action, as the pleasure-philosophy would have it, for the whole mind acts together, and so idea and will play their parts in prompting action. Feeling-tone however is the mercurial part of our nature, and gives the sign as to what is *prima facie* advantageous or injurious to life. It is the immediate touchstone of welfare though not the only or ultimate one, for all parts of our nature have to be satisfied. Yet what is agreeable is so far beneficial, and what is permanently disagreeable must be destructive. In feeling-tone, then, we find the readiest and most obvious but not the sole indicator of value.[1]

Feeling-tone is reflected however in more concrete states of mind, which in a wider sense are called feeling, and which are said to possess three dimensions. They have not only positive and negative direction, that is, pleasure and displeasure, but also breadth and depth. A feeling, besides being agreeable or disagreeable, is describable as tense or relaxed, restless or quiescent, mobile or immobile, in a word transitional between other states of feeling in the past or future. It moves upon a background of feeling-disposition and so may by comparison be called broad or meagre. On the other hand a feeling may be described as expansive or contracted, ecstatic or reposeful, and so may be regarded as having degrees of depth. Intensity, breadth and depth, then, are characters of a concrete state of feeling, which we call a passion. The famous statement of Lessing thus becomes

[1] Cp. WARD : *Psychological Principles*, p. 388, note.

intelligible: "In this we are then agreed, my dear friend, that all passions are either strong likes or dislikes. Also in this, that in every such feeling of like and dislike we are conscious of a greater sense of reality, and that this consciousness cannot be other than pleasant. Consequently all passions even the most unpleasant, are, *as passions*, pleasant."[1] This verbal contradiction is excusable if we see that what is meant is that a passion may be negligible in pleasure-quality and yet rich in movement and expansion of the personality. Its total worth is not dependent merely upon its pleasure-quality, but upon its fullness of certain kinds of experience. So Goethe corrects a person who complains that old scenes revisited do not excite the same intensity of feeling, by remarking that what is lost in freshness of feeling is compensated by inner growth.[2]

Likes and dislikes are then, feeling-attitudes, comprising conation and cognition as well as hedonic tone; they express acceptance or rejection of an object. That is to say they are feeling modified by conditions, the conditions depending both upon the nature of the subject and of the object. Our likes and dislikes rest upon circumstances not wholly within our control; we cannot like what we like, but have to take our likes as largely settled by our constitution. Thus most of us natively like sweet and dislike sour tastes; yet at certain times, as after an illness, these likes may be

[1] Quoted from HIRN: *op. cit.* p. 60.

[2] HÖFFDING: *Psychology*, p. 282.

reversed. One man's meat is another man's poison, we say; and most animals seem to know by instinctive likes and dislikes what foods are good for them. Doubtless such likes and dislikes can be modified to some extent by discipline; and still more by developments within the organism. We call these acquired tastes. But for the most part our feeling-attitudes are originally no more accountable than that involved in the rejection of Dr. Fell. They are to be accepted as the appointment of nature, and made the groundwork of further spiritual construction. As mere likes and dislikes they are however diverse and unordered, largely subconscious and, as compared with choice, relatively passive. They are, moreover, apt to conflict with one another. My liking for alcohol may clash with my liking for wholesome food or exercise, my liking for one person with that for another, and so forth. The relations of likes and dislikes are therefore largely a matter for experiment, and so far is it from being true that untrained people "know what they like" that it takes a good deal of education to bring coherence into their likings.

Persistent and coherent feeling-attitudes are described as interests; here we not only like, but in some measure know what we like, and even why we like. Our attitude is more or less permanently directed to certain objects or kinds of objects, which maintain a certain dominance in consciousness. This dominance, we have seen, depends primarily upon its appeal to feeling. But feeling,

we found, focussed our appreciations of value, and so also our interests express our valuations in a fairly definite and consistent way. Furthermore these interests tend to develop from mere passive enjoyment of pleasure to an appreciation of its conditions. The mere sensuous pleasure of music may give place to an appreciation of its structure, its mode of production, its significance for life. So we pass from merely immediate to more remote and even ultimate ends. This fact of the development of interests we shall find to be of much importance for our study, for upon it depends the possibility of the achievement of sociality. For the moment, however, we may notice certain classifications of interests, namely into extrinsic and intrinsic, lower and higher, narrower and wider. Extrinsic or instrumental interests attach to things as means to an end, whereas the objects of intrinsic interest are ends in themselves. A sea voyage may have instrumental value for a merchant, but intrinsic value for a traveller. A school prize often begins by having extrinsic interest, though it may, upon reading, acquire intrinsic interest. Lower and higher interests evidently distinguish levels within the character of the person who manifests them; we rank the pursuit of truth higher than the concern for health. The epithets "narrower" and "wider" refer primarily to the objective field of interest; wide interests are likely to be inter-personal or social. Plainly these forms of interest may vary, within limits, independently of each other. We may have an interest which,

though intrinsic, is narrow and low; or again one that is lofty but limited, and so forth. Evidently here our three-dimensional theory of feeling appears again, but at a higher level than before. Mere likes and dislikes have become fairly definite attitudes of interest, which implies that knowledge has modified them. Appreciation, of a definite sort, involves judgment, and so it is possible now to speak of feeling-judgments, or of feeling-attitudes which presuppose judgments. These judgments need not be fully explicit, but may lurk in the background as presuppositions. The native credulity of the child or primitive man takes for granted the reality of many things, such as fairies, for instance, and adopts an attitude of (say) courtesy towards them, which would be transformed into fear, perhaps, if one actually appeared, and which again passes into æsthetic joy in the spectator of the *Midsummer Night's Dream*. The cognitive attitude has changed from mere presumption to assertion and again from assertion to voluntary assumption, and the feeling attitude has altered to correspond with this. Value-judgments, that is to say, are on the emotional level (where moods, sentiments and interests all take their rise) and involve an attitude of the whole mind towards its field of objects.[1]

Values may now be defined as objects which satisfy, or shortly as satisfactions. By this is meant more than pleasure, for pleasure is not the only thing which satisfies; indeed it is unlikely

[1] Cp. URBAN: *Valuation*, p. 64.

that mere passive pleasure could satisfy. We take pleasure in an object, and apart from an object there is no pleasure.

Further, we can be satisfied with objects to which there attaches a minimum of pleasure or even possibly displeasure. Thus an invalid may find satisfaction in the fact that he can feel again after anæsthesia, though the feeling may be painful. A judge finds satisfaction in doing justice, though the decision is unpleasant. An artist's satisfaction in an object of beauty may be out of all proportion to the intensity of pleasure it affords, and our appreciation of a friend may be increased though his deeds give us pain. "Faithful are the wounds of a friend." Evidently satisfaction has to be measured not in terms of degree of pleasure alone but also in breadth and depth of appeal to our whole nature. Values satisfy our cognitive and conative powers no less than our feeling-tone, and hence again it is impossible to subscribe to a mere pleasure-philosophy. The intellect and the will have their claim to satisfaction, claims which in some persons override the demands of human nature for pleasure. Browning paints such a character in his *Grammarian's Funeral.* Plainly, complete satisfaction is attainable only where all sides of our being have their fundamental demands adequately met, though what this means precisely we have still to discover. It is important meanwhile to notice that values satisfy the whole self and do not appeal merely to a part of it.

Valuations at the level of irreflective likes and

dislikes we call sensibilities. These involve preferences, acceptances, rejections, choices—of however lowly a sort. Primarily they are at the sensory level, and are determined by the nature of the organism and its special sense-organs. Hunger, thirst, fatigue, nausea and the like are the groundwork of our sensibilities, though these are further specialized by sight, hearing and the other "senses." The first function of the sensibilities is to further successful living; but the function is soon enhanced by enjoyment in their exercise on its own account, which gives them a quasi-æsthetic status. Thus the senses which satisfy the instincts of hunger, sex and exercise, lie at the root of the sensibilities called taste, gallantry and sportsmanship. The eye and ear which warn of danger become the organs most sensible of beauty. The activities involved in constructing shelter develop into the sense of craftsmanship. In general the useful is overlaid and intertwined with the delightful, and sensuousness becomes sensibility. Even the lower senses—the organic—are susceptible of some degree of refinement, and we learn to feel shame in their indelicate functioning. Allied to these are what are called the hygienic sensibilities—those connected primarily with bodily condition. Their first purpose is to keep the body clean and avoid pollution, but cleanliness at length extends its range to cover delicacy, purity, scrupulousness of attire, manners and conduct, and even of religious bearing. Taboo, caste and social strata are differentiated largely by hygienic sensibilities; in morals

we speak of dirty tricks, clean reputations, stainless characters and the like; and in religion we pray for clean hands and a pure heart.[1] These quasi-æsthetic feelings may even become obsessions, as in the washing-mania of certain abnormal cases like Lady Macbeth. A slight excess of these feelings we call fastidiousness, and a defect coarseness; but their widespread presence in a community is a sure mark of civilization.

The senses involved in nourishment, taste and smell, become the source of fine sensibilities. Mere feeding, which in some Eastern countries is a solitary act, becomes in the West the art of dining, having its conventions and etiquette, and thus gaining a socio-æsthetic position. It becomes an opportunity for the preference of quality to quantity; and a connoisseur in wines, like Dr. Middleton, becomes an arbiter of taste. A *chef* is a craftsman, a hostess a social artist. So are mere tastes transcended by good taste. Again the temperature-sense, with its variations according to heat and cold, gives occasions for the recurring changes of fashion in dress, with its powerful sexual and social reactions. There are few things in which the utilitarian is more modifiable by the æsthetic than dress, few things more distinctive of sensibility, and more influential in their effect upon the producer in making them. The economic effects of its production are equally weighty; two of the chief industries of England depend upon it. Yet the play of fashion at present in the case of women's

[1] Cp. JASTROW: *Character and Temperament*, p. 514.

dress seems to be capricious, and in the case of men's is banal.

The three remaining senses, touch, hearing and sight, are those which develop the highest sensibilities. Handicraft is the basis of civilization, and its refinements are the *sine qua non* of the plastic arts. We describe loose relationships as "keeping in touch." Above all we define delicate action as tact, which is the application of principles of right feeling to particular situations by a sort of æsthetical logic.[1] Doubtless the substitution of machino-facture for manufacture[2] is destroying artistry in manual work; yet it is still intelligible to speak of tactual sensibilities, especially in the increasing use of scientific instruments. Possibly the telluric sense to which Goethe attributed his apprehension of the earthquake of Lisbon was a refinement of tactual sensibility. The kinæsthetic (movement) sensibilities are closely allied to the tactile, and mainly distinguish the practical man, with his adaptability to finer shades of sensory stimuli. By contrast, the eye is the intellectual sense *par excellence;* visual sensibility pertains to colour and especially to form, and so is the counterpart of knowledge with its general relationships. It is however limited to surfaces, and it is not fanciful, perhaps, to find in auditory sensibility a deeper significance in that it discovers the inner nature of things in their rending vibrations.[3] It

[1] So HERBART. [2] LESTER WARD'S terms.

[3] SCHOPENHAUER: *World as Will and Idea*, Vol. I, p. 333. (cp. also Ch. XXIX on the Metaphysics of Music).

is the most emotionalized of the sensibilities, and, it may be, attains the richest valuations. All the sensibilities, however, become woven together in a socio-æsthetic complex and form that level of development which we call, distinctively, culture.

The opposite of sensibility is vulgarity, and as Ruskin points out in an interesting analysis of what constitutes gentlemanship,[1] the essence of vulgarity whether in manners or morals or breeding, consists in insensibility. It is by no means identical with lowness of station in society, yet is hardly compatible with absence of leisure, as the phrase "gentleman of leisure" indicates, though unfortunately vulgarity and leisure are in our present economically stratified society only too commonly found together. Sensibility is, however, as we have seen, possible in a measure in all practical arts, and as exhibited in the performance of utilitarian acts is what we describe as "style." Style redeems even the lowest activities from their degrading character, and in literature it has a sanative effect. In the form of "manners" it is, according to a recent writer, the second of the visual arts (the first being the cultivation of human beauty), to which all the others minister[2]. Certain it is, at least, that the coarser activities are also those which are most unsocial, whilst the most refined are also those which most promote sociality. The lower senses least admit of participation in their satisfaction, whilst the higher most encourage and

[1] *Modern Painters*: Part 9, Ch. 7.

[2] TRYSTAN EDWARDS: *The Things which are Seen*, Ch. II.

even demand community in their enjoyment. This statement is, as Sidgwick said, subject to this much of abatement, that the means of satisfaction—pictures, books, landscapes and the like—are still subject to economic forces. This is true enough and points to the necessity of a right polity as the servant of a sound philosophy of society. The corollary of the socializing value of æsthetic goods is the socializing of the means of their enjoyment.

Taste.

So far we have seen likes and dislikes becoming specified as interests and refined as sensibilities. That is to say, mere tastes have become Taste. This involves a definitely æsthetic attitude which we have now to define more precisely. For whilst there can be (I think) no æsthetic attitude without empathy, yet that attitude is insufficiently defined by empathy, and needs making more clear. Taste evidently implies valuation, but valuation in respect of beauty, which last is notoriously hard to define. It can however be described in terms of the attitude we adopt towards it. Æsthetic valuation is plainly a peculiar kind of satisfaction, namely the kind called contemplative. It thus differs from moral satisfaction, which is the product of respect or reverence, and is directed to the results of actions. Causes and results are the study of the theoretical and practical man respectively, but "the man of feeling" is concerned with what a thing is. As

Jastrow put it,[1] theorist and practitioner are both rationalists, both interested in what a thing means rather than in what it is. The one is concerned more with principles and the other more with facts, but both tend to move away from the original object to others connected with it, to explore its relations and consequences. By contrast with both, the æsthetic type of mind tends to dwell upon an object, to go deeper into it, to brood over it. It reaps the harvest of the quiet, not of the roving, eye. As such it is contemplative and its language is that of Wordsworth in his lines on Tintern Abbey.[2]

Contemplative satisfaction then is the mark of the æsthetic attitude, and its specific emotion is admiration. Now admiration is one of the feelings we are said, on the authority of the same poet, to live by, and consequently its right analysis is of some importance. Mr. Shand defines it thus: "Admiration is the joy or delight we feel in an object, mixed with astonishment at its superior excellence." Here are two factors, joy and astonishment, both of which seem to be primary emotions. They do, however, in a fashion counterbalance each other, for whilst joy tends to the enhancement

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 90.

[2] Especially the lines beginning:

> . . . The sounding cataract
> Haunted me like a passion . . . .

and ending:

> . . . . . a feeling, and a love
> That had no need of a remoter charm
> By thought supplied, or any interest,
> Unborrowed from the eye.

of the object, astonishment tends to the abasement of the subject of the emotion. Self-abasement and object-enhancement result in that diffident yet fascinated attitude which is so characteristic of the poet or the lover. The fascination springs from joy, which is more than mere pleasure, for we can rejoice in states of feeling which contain an admixture of bodily pain, as is often seen in the hero or martyr. Joy is an emotion which is directed outwards to an object, and which strives to maintain that object in being, or what is the obverse of this fact, strives to perpetuate its relation to its object. It is a conservative state of feeling which inhibits destructive actions towards the enjoyed object. Its most characteristic expression is play, for in play we dwell upon an object, or perform an action, for its own sake; hence follows both the repetitive character of individual play and the restraining, preservative, recreative nature of social play. Here "Joy is its own security," whilst ill-tempered action leads to destructiveness which is contrary to the spirit of play. Furthermore, joy is a well-spring of value-judgments. We value that which we enjoy, and though a certain development of intelligence is necessary before value-judgments can be framed, yet our spontaneous exclamation of joy indicates our belief in the excellence of the enjoyed object.[1]

[1] In the above account I have followed the analysis of Shand rather than that of McDougall, who in his *Social Psychology*, p. 151, seems to be analysing a more complex emotion than joy, namely maternal love.

The other element in admiration, astonishment, springs from the superiority of the object, before which we feel a certain shrinking or even humility; surprise at its greatness or excellence produces a submissive and asthenic attitude accompanied by the emotion of subjection or negative self-feeling. For astonishment is a higher form of surprise, which is induced by the unexpectedness of an event and the difficulty of the adjustment of knowledge to it. It may, therefore be continuous, in proportion to the depth and inexhaustibility of the object. Mystery incessantly renews it, and brings about that quasi-religious attitude which Otto calls the sense of the numinous. Evidently astonishment is, like joy, a source of value-judgments, as our exclamations "Strange!" "Rare!" "Marvellous!" show; these exclamations are noticeably of an æsthetic sort, and though we can have judgments of dispraise towards the astonishing, say the ugly, yet our disposition is to end our astonishment by flight.

The upshot of the foregoing study of admiration is to bring out its essentially social character. Its factors, joy and astonishment, are eminently social emotions. Though there may be solitary joy, yet its normal trend is to be diffusive, communicative; it is illustrated in the woman who searches privately for the lost piece of silver but when she has found it says, "Rejoice with me." We have seen previously how joy breaks out into play and is spread by social resonance. Schiller says of it that it binds together what custom

sharply divides, and that all men are brothers where its soft wing lingers. His whole poem[1] illustrates the socializing effect of joy. Not less does Coleridge in his poem upon *Joy*, emphasize its æsthetic productiveness, for he calls it :

This beautiful and beauty-making power.

The social and æsthetic character of one component of admiration, joy, is then sufficiently plain. The like character in the other factor, astonishment, is revealed in the tendency to self-abasement which it contains. This subjection before a strange and great power is said by McDougall[2] to be primarily and essentially social, and to involve a personification of the power behind the machine, the picture or the landscape. Admiration then is inherently social, for it contains a reference to presupposed personal agency, whether in the form of personal gods or in that of personified Nature. Apart from such personification we have not admiration, for we have not abasement ;[3] and reversely the person who is full of self-esteem is, because incapable of humility, also incapable of admiration. The emotion natural to such a person is the anti-social and anti-æsthetic one of contempt.

Admiration then appears to be fundamentally æsthetic and social. But admiration implies preferences, and constant æsthetic preferences are what we mean by Taste.[4] As mere preferences

[1] *An die Freude.* [2] *Social Psychology*, p. 130.

[3] Cp. URBAN : *Valuation*, p. 348, note, "The immensities of time and space are, as such, worthless."

[4] *Modern Painters* : Part I, Ch. 6, Sec. 1, § § 1 and 2.

they do not involve judgments; they are spontaneous and irreflective and individual. So far there is no disputing about them. But when one goes on to assert and assume their validity, and to assert their constancy, as one normally does, then judgment arises and with it the possibility of the conflict of judgments. We need to have our judgments confirmed or corrected by those of other people in order to guard against mere idiosyncrasy. This implies that Taste in Kant's sense, the faculty of judging of the beautiful,[1] is a social product. For as Alexander remarks, "Judgments and sociality are convertible."[2] This appears clearly if we take one of the accepted tests of good taste, namely universality. It is absurd to say, "This is beautiful for me" with the implication that it is not or cannot be equally so for anyone who is normal. When this seems to be otherwise, it is, I think, because the two or more persons judging do not really contemplate the same object. Thus it is quite easy for two judges to seem to be admiring the same thing, say a landscape, a statue or a tune, and really to be attending to different features in it. So a short poem of Browning may be beautiful as a whole to one person, whilst repellent because of obscurity or harsh rhymes to another who is attending principally to technique. But when the same object is in question, we say, "Beautiful for me, beautiful for all." That is to say, our test of good taste is social. Doubtless the pioneer in

[1] *Critique of Judgment*, p. 45.

[2] *Space, Time and Deity*: Vol. II, p. 304.

judgments of taste may be some highly gifted or well-skilled individual; but our belief in his judgment is dependent upon its ability to be confirmed by general experience. For this reason Kant regarded Taste as a kind of communal sense which judges of the universal communicability of a feeling that is bound up with an object. We need not accept Kant's numerous inner senses and faculties[1] in order to acknowledge that we do vindicate our judgments by tacit reference to possible experients beyond oneself to whom our feelings might be communicated. Uncommunicable feelings would be eccentricities.

Does it follow that the object of Taste, which is Beauty, is also social, and that a solitary individual would have no interest in beauty? According to Kant "a man abandoned by himself on a desert island would adorn neither his hut nor his person. . . . . It is only in society that it occurs to him to be not merely a man but a refined man after his kind."[2] If so violent an abstraction can be thought out, it seems probable that a quite unsocial individual would in time be reduced to the level of merely sensuous enjoyment, to mere pleasure of bodily condition. This, though the starting point of valuation is hardly to be called admiration, for this last implies pleasure in the nature of an object as distinct from pleasure in mere bodily stimulation.[3] It is the presence of

[1] Cp. WARD: *A Study of Kant*, Sec. 21-3.

[2] *Critique of Judgment*, p. 174 (Eng. Trans. by Bernard).

[3] BOSANQUET: *History of Æsthetic*, pp. 7 and 9.

this "nature"—variously called form, as by Kant, or order, as by Urban, or the typical, as by Ruskin—that is the *sine qua non* of æsthetic admiration. This element of order is doubtless to be found in the simplest sensation, were we able to discern it; but the difficulty of finding it is what makes the lower senses dubiously æsthetic, whereas its obvious presence in the rainbow or chord of music is what makes our heart leap up in æsthetic joy. Now there is little reason to doubt that the (relatively) private individual has growing perceptions of this ordering "nature,"[1] yet it is unlikely that it would ever become explicit without social intercourse. As iron sharpeneth iron so do our judgments of admiration refine each other, till the "nature" of the beautiful attains sharp definition. It is with this nature as with the universal in logic; psychology shows how dependent upon social intercourse we are for the formation of the concept, and Kant's error concerning beauty consists in an unhistorical opposition of the solitary to the social man. As for woman, it is doubtless true, as Richter says,[2] that she does not adorn herself merely for the sake of the opposite sex, but also for her own. Yet all that enrichment of beauty which goes by the name of style, fashion, or mode, would be lacking apart from society, absurd as its vagaries often are. It appears, then, that it is substantially right to say that refinement, the beginning of civilization, requires explicitly recognized beauty. To any other than a socialized being beauty would

[1] URBAN: *op. cit.* p. 222. [2] *Levana*: Sec. 96.

afford little interest, for life would be, in Hobbes' classic words, "solitary, nasty, brutish, and short."

Disciplined tastes are commonly called loves. However certainly loves spring from lusts—and the ultimate connection cannot be denied[1]—yet we do not use the former word till their basis in organic instinct has been purified by social and æsthetic discipline. We do, however, treat them as comparatively independent of each other and speak of them in the plural as passions, as, for instance, love of music, dress, sport. It is only when such passions are organized into a comparatively stable system that we speak of love in general, that is, as a sentiment.[2] Now it is upon the right direction of our loves that the art of living depends. This statement, as old at least as Plato, is yet one which needs fresh emphasis in our times. For the misdirection of our loves is certain to produce, as it has already produced, the most violent social reactions. It is pointed out by Masefield in his book on *Shakespeare* that the great lesson of that poet is the perilousness of obsessions, whether of jealousy as in Othello, or paternal indulgence as in Lear, or sex-passion as in Angelo, and so on. Generally speaking, the obsessions the poet portrays are emotional—they are misgoverned loves, and result in tragedy. However good and pure in themselves, these passions need bringing into subjection to the judgment and into due proportion to each other to avoid disaster. So much wiser

[1] Cp. McDougall: *Social Psychology*, p. 393.

[2] *Ib. Social Psychology*, p. 122.

was Shakespeare than Browning who in his poem, *The Statue and the Bust*, says

> Let a man contend to the uttermost
> For his life's set prize, be it what it will!

for such unbalanced striving is an obsession. What is true in the imaginative world is true in the real and social world. The disordered loves of the 19th century, with its attempt to worship God, Mammon and Moloch simultaneously, have led to a most bitter harvest in the 20th century.

The opposite of a love is a hate; this, however, is not to say that they are co-equal. A hate is a love reversed and derives its strength from the love which it subserves. There is no solidarity of hates as there is of loves, for hates are of themselves principles of destruction and futility.[1] Their proper function is to clear away hindrances to the development of loves, which they purge of error and defect. One who loves is rightly jealous of the excellence of the beloved thing and hates that which, from within or without, detracts from it.[2] Hence there is such a thing as loving criticism. Since however love tends to dwell upon its object, to maintain and explore it, whilst hate tries to destroy or avoid it, it is important that criticism should be primarily suggestive and constructive, unless a thing is irremediably bad. The art of education is thus essentially the "criticism of life" in the way of guiding our loves and measuring our

[1] Cp. BRADLEY: *Shakespearean Tragedy*, p. 35 (on effects of evil generally).

[2] Cp. PERCY NUNN: *Education*, pp. 144, 145.

hatreds, and of all the agencies for such control of our passions the central one is that whose *sine qua non* we have found to be order, that is, æsthetic activity.

Sin, it is said,[1] arises from the false distribution of affection, and therefore education consists in learning to love and to hate correctly. Our fundamental impulse to love cannot be wrong, but our loving may fail through ill selection of the objects of our loves, or through neglecting to seek those objects. Just taste depends upon continuous criticism of the objects of enjoyment, upon a harmonious adjustment of our values. Our likes and dislikes, our loves and hates, are capable of indefinite improvement by purification and harmonization. This may occur within the world of the individual himself, so that his loves and hates form an ordered system. Each individual expresses himself, and that in a unique way; yet his life should be a true poem. "The way of the artist shows in the clearest and most definite form what is fundamentally and ideally the way of all life."[2] Furthermore, his loves and hates should harmonize with those of other people, for as an essentially social being his valuations modify, and are modified by, theirs. Mutual criticism of admirations results in a stable and progressive world of values; in a stamping upon their faces of an authoritative mark whereby we can order our desires aright. So begins to arise a great society which embraces

[1] DAVIDSON: *Education as World-building*, p. 29.

[2] NUNN: *op. cit.* p. 31.

the little worlds of individuals, and fosters within them mutual commerce among things of agreed value. In this way sociality is enormously enriched, and so far is it from being true therefore, that morality is not a matter of taste, that on the contrary morality is grounded upon a disciplined and harmonious culture of our likes and dislikes, that is, on Taste.

Implicit Ideals.

The art of living we have seen to depend upon right feeling—upon a just distribution of our loves, or, broadly speaking, upon disciplined Taste. This is the same as refined admiration of the beautiful, which requires further investigation. The æsthetic attitude can be described in terms of cognition, no doubt; there is such a thing as intellectual admiration, as the joy of the logician or mathematician in the order or symmetry of his argument may show. Yet, so far as intellectual, it differs from the purely æsthetic attitude in that it is discursive; it moves from point to point towards a conclusion. Again there is doubtless a beauty of holiness, yet this belongs to an attitude which primarily is active, earnest, desirous of change; it seeks an end—righteousness—beyond the present. These two attitudes—which may be called the discursive and impellent modes of experience—differ from the properly æsthetic in that the latter seeks a deepening of the present; it dwells upon, broods over, goes deeper into the present object.

It is the immanental mode of experience,[1] a resting in reality. For this reason the tragic and the sublime are not the purest forms of the æsthetic; they contain pseudo-æsthetic values of a moral or theoretical sort. They not only excite admiration but also make demands upon us, and so go beyond the sphere of contemplative satisfaction.[2] In such a work as Ibsen's *Brand* we feel the contrast between what can be admired in and what required from a person; the tension involved goes far, in my judgment, to destroy æsthetic satisfaction. Where art is most successful, as for example in Shakespeare's *Tempest* or Bach's *Mass*, it is so by abating demand and striving, and by inducing an atmosphere of calm, awe and mystery which stills wandering desire. This reminds us of a Kantian criterion of taste, namely disinterestedness. The æsthetic experience is disinterested or desireless in the sense that it is not a movement from a present state to a different, to which it is a mere means, but is concerned with a deepening of a state which is felt to be intrinsically valuable. The difference that the æsthetic attitude makes is well seen in sexual relations, where so far as admiration of beauty supervenes upon primitive instinct, crude desire is checked by an astonishment which involves abasement. The object is reconstructed by imagination so that the field of stimulation is widened to

[1] For the terms immanental and impellent cp. URBAN: *op. cit.* pp. 68 and 70.

[2] Cp. WORDSWORTH'S remark that "Shakespeare could not have written an epic; he would have died from plethora of thought." Was it not that he was too much the pure artist?

include elements (such as dress, carriage, graces and charms) which are irrelevant to mere coarse desire. Moreover the various stimuli are balanced into a unity so that no impulses break loose and destroy the harmony of the "voluntary illusion" of the admirer. How often the discovery of a slight flaw will ruin the whole idol by releasing inhibited tendencies, for instance, of scorn or shame! Again, crude desire being stilled in admiration, the immanent life-energies of the admirer are enhanced, so that enjoyment is enriched through repose. This state we often describe as that of intoxication or fascination—definite action ceases whilst life is made fuller.[1]

The æsthetic attitude, then, involves balance of stimuli, repose in activity, and enhancement of feeling. These are attainable only under certain conditions, of which a chief is emotional unity. The object of admiration must bring a certain unity of tone, mood or sentiment, which even details may help to further. Thus the solemn note of Gray's *Elegy* is maintained throughout the poem, the metre assists it, and the imagery is chosen with the greatest nicety to echo it in diverse ways. Contrast the clash of feeling, out of all proportion to the relative sizes of the objects, when one sees fine scenery defaced by commercial advertisements! Æsthetic objects can be æsthetically enjoyed only if there is a certain congruity amongst their elements, and this commonly requires on the part of the contemplator a selection, detachment

[1] Cp. URBAN: p. 219.

and removal of those elements from the immediacy of desire. These again must be recombined so that they throw each other into relief, act in a cumulative or progressive manner, and exhibit a focus or climax to which they all point. The laws of composition in drawing or music show how these characters are attained. As a result the object achieves unity in variety, the formal canon of æsthetics. The whole process has involved imaginative reconstruction of given elements, which taken separately might be negligible in beauty, into a whole whose beauty is surpassingly great. Just as the parts of a watch are by themselves of little value, but when fitted together, most valuable, so the components of an object of beauty may receive extreme enhancement by being unified. The thoughts, words and music of Schubert's song, *Who is Silvia?* express this in a telling manner. Shakespeare himself seems to have recognized it in writing the song, for to Silvia's fairness in the first verse he adds kindness in the second, and finds their union excelling in the third. The law of complementary values asserts this fact of mutual enhancement when it says that parts of intrinsically little worth, by combination with each other can attain the value of the whole, which may be very great. This law of complementary values we shall find to be very important in our further exposition. Upon it largely depends the possibility of social progress through the harmonization of values. Economic goods may attain a hygienic status, or that of a social class, or of a degree of culture which

is highly valued, though their own independent value is quite low. The tooth-brush or hairpin reflects a certain level of civilization! Similarly personal or social traits may be recombined in various ways so as to reflect and enrich one another, the whole thus produced being of value far beyond the mere sum of the individual characteristics. A home is, or should be, more than a collection of individuals, a state more than an aggregation of citizens. It is a synthesis, and a synthesis involving harmonious adjustment of very many factors. Such harmonious adjustment of possible complementary values involves æsthetic idealization.[1]

This æsthetic idealization is to be seen even within the sphere of individualism. The philosophy of self-assertion can still be argued[2] but it is noticeable that its emphasis has changed from the acquisition of pleasure to that of the pursuit of the æsthetic ideal. "The way of the artist shows us in the clearest and most definite form what is fundamentally and ideally the way of all life."[3] There are as many ideals as there are persons, and each must embody his own ideal in his own unique way, as a poet embodies his creative impulse in his own and not in another's poem, saying, "that is what I intended to do."[4] This is true enough so long as such activity is not divorced from sociality. Yet the present point is that this embodiment involves a reconstruction of the natural

[1] Cp. on foregoing URBAN: pp. 175, 176.
[2] As by DR. T. P. NUNN: *Education*, Ch. 1.
[3] *Ib.* p. 31. [4] *Ib.* p. 5.

self ; it requires an idealization which transfigures the given imperfect person into the likeness of some hero, martyr or saint ; and consequently a revaluation of oneself according to one's belief in his approximation to that ideal. The extreme outcome of this glorification is the ideal of the superman, whether Zarathustra or the Galilean, about the efficacy of which as a spring of action there can be no question whatever. Probably such æsthetic idealization has done more for human transformation than any other factor. All the same it presupposes that detachment of the object from its natural and historical surroundings, that selection of traits, and that removal from the heat of immediate desire, which characterize art and which may be called æsthetic isolation.

It is allowed on all hands however that the individual is a social individual, and that everyone draws his ideal of life largely from the inspiration of others.[1] The world which he builds up, however uniquely his own, is composed of materials mostly drawn from his neighbours' resources, and differs from their "worlds" mainly in the form of organization. The organizing principle of each individual's world is some liking or longing which is a dominant passion and which assimilates material for its satisfaction. The macrocosm of Napoleon, Kant and Beethoven was very much the same—the world of the 18th century in Western Europe—but the microcosm how very different, according as the organizing principle was (say) ambition, or

[1] NUNN: *op. cit.* pp. 4, 5.

love of truth, or passion for harmony. If we call this principle by the name of aspiration, then a person's ideal would consist of what satisfies his aspirations. Such a world yields a maximum of satisfactions, so long as the individual remains the same, and it forms a practical Absolute. By this is meant that in the view of the possessor it is unconditional in its demands, and that nothing else can be substituted for it. The mystic feels that his rapture is the summit of bliss, the lover that his mistress is "pure gold," and the like. It does not follow that such a practical Absolute is not capable of criticism, whether by others or by the individual himself on a different occasion ; Napoleon in exile may well have wondered whether his dream was worth while. Yet those goods for which all other goods will be given up—liberty, honour, loyalty, and like qualities—especially when woven together into a sytem, become for the time being a working ideal or absolute.

Such an ideal, as the object of aspiration and admiration, manifests those characteristics of the æsthetic which we have described as the synthesis of complementary values and æsthetic isolation. Its relation to the rest of reality has to be investigated and its claims substantiated, if possible, by a metaphysic, but for the believer its actual or possible existence is assumed as the goal of aspiration.[1] It is an Æsthetic Imperative whose demand is obligatory and unconditional. As such it is parallel with the imperative of duty in morals.

[1] Cp. URBAN: *op. cit.* pp. 69 and 70.

The beautiful ideal demands realization. Why this is so is doubtless as obscure as the reason for the authority of conscience, though some good evolutional reasons can be given.[1] But "all art, except that of children, ignoramuses and extreme innovators, invariably avoids ugly shapes and seeks for beautiful ones,"[2] even whilst also pursuing all manner of non-æsthetic aims. The many practical absolutes of the æsthetic life can therefore be generalized under the one head of Beauty, whose realization would involve satisfaction. Not complete satisfaction, perhaps, for beauty is not the only value which satisfies human nature; truth and virtue are generally regarded as having equal claims to recognition. Yet there are reasons for considering beauty to be pre-eminent amongst the ultimate values; or shall we say first among its equals? As Professor Mackenzie puts it: "Beauty is the only thing that is its own excuse for being. Everything else has, in some way or other, to justify its existence."[3] The other values we have described as involving impellent modes of consciousness; they urge to a fulfilment beyond themselves. Truth-seeking is discursive, it moves restlessly from point to point; duty-doing is dynamical, it pursues an end beyond the present. The enjoyment of beauty is immanental; though active enough, it is activity in repose. Even the production of beauty, though the very type of creativeness, is self-satisfying. So it is that we

[1] VERNON LEE: *The Beautiful*, p. 155.

[2] *Ib.* p. 99. [3] *Ultimate Values*, p. 141.

hear about the defence of truth or the vindication of the good ; but beauty seems to be its own warrant. If there is anything " beyond good and evil " and beyond truth and error, it would seem to be of the nature of beauty. In beauty, striving is lost in attainment, whereas in the other two forms of value-seeking the stress is laid upon the pursuit. Hence Lessing's famous remark about the preferability of seeking truth to finding it, and Tennyson's hope for the future life of " the glory of going on." It is remarkable that the beatific vision of the religious person is generally couched in æsthetic terms ; perfection seems to lend itself to the language of beauty more than to any other kind. The perfect life would not be passive, truly ; it would be reposeful activity. So it is that it can be suggested that we might attain moral perfection, and thereupon occupy ourselves with the production of æsthetic values.[1] This is probably an overstatement ; the great values are no doubt interdependent ; " a universe known as beautiful and consciously chosen as such, seems to be our complete ideal of perfection."[2]

Our affective absolutes having been generalized under the one title Beauty—which at least shows us in the most definitely attainable way what Perfection is—it remains to be considered whether our attitudes towards it can be similarly generalized. Loves and hates, we saw, became organizing principles of a " world " the enjoyment of which we endeavoured

[1] Cp. SORLEY: *Moral Values*, p. 526. (He puts the discovery of truth on a par with the production of beauty however.)
[2] MACKENZIE: *Constructive Philosophy*, p. 289.

to realize. Evidently there is no general name for such affective aspiration but Love. "Ideal form is to be reached only by Love," says Ruskin.[1] and Browning sings:

> O world as God has made it! All is beauty.
> And knowing this is love; and love is duty.

If there is such a thing as a poet's philosophy it can be summed up in the principle of the supremacy of love in the universe;[2] and so must all other artists say. It is not sufficiently noticed, however, that love may be misdirected or perverted, and that its beneficence depends upon its right direction. One may love blindly or disproportionately or mistakenly, and thus bring about great mischiefs. Is there any object towards which it is always rightly directed? It would seem that the correlative to love is beauty, and that the production or appreciation of beauty is a guarantee of the rightness of any love. The object of love is loveliness, and hence, when we speak of the love of truth or virtue, do we not love them for the elements of beauty they contain—the symmetry of truth or the beauty of holiness? It seems difficult, if not impossible, to love "brutal" truth or rigid virtue, however salutary they may be to other sides of our nature.[3]

Love does not necessarily promote sociality. It does so only when rightly distributed. Our

[1] *Modern Painters*: Part 3, Ch. 14, p. 16.

[2] Cp. SHELLEY'S *Adonais*, stanza 54, which is quoted somewhere by Prof. Herford as the representative poetic creed.

[3] Cp. on above, MACKENZIE: *Ultimate Values*, Book 3, generally.

ideal of social life therefore is one in which love is rightly bestowed upon admirable people. It need not be stressed that what is admirable in them need not be merely physical beauty but spiritual too, and inclusive of their mutual relations. For such an ideal society the proper description would be that it exhibited harmony; a completely harmonious society would exhibit sociality in the highest degree. The æsthetic thus appears once more as the great socializer, and harmony of persons as the great object of social endeavour. Harmony implies that reposeful activity which accompanies balanced stimuli and enhanced feeling; it involves variety in unity and progression within law. It seems to be the æsthetic description of sociality. As such it suggests fairer forms of human life than we have attained hitherto; for who would contend that we have achieved social harmony? The study of the main ways in which this is attained will occupy us next; we have to see how it allures men to the construction of societies and even civilizations. For there can be little doubt that Utopias have been the greatest incentives to social construction during the ages, and they are imaginative productions in which are embodied those ideal societies which the love of beauty begets ever anew in the human mind.

BOOK 2.

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SOCIOLOGICAL.

The propædeutic to all beautiful art, regarded in the highest degree of its perfection, seems to lie, not in precepts but in the culture of the mental powers by means of those elements of knowledge called humaniora, *probably because* humanity *on the one side indicates the universal* feeling of sympathy, *and on the other the faculty of being able to* communicate *universally our inmost* [*feelings*]. *For these properties taken together constitute the characteristic social spirit of humanity by which it is distinguished from the limitations of animal life. The age and peoples, in which the impulse to a* law-abiding *social life, by which a people becomes a permanent community, contended with the great difficulties presented by the difficult problem of uniting freedom* (*and therefore equality also*) *with compulsion* (*rather of respect and submission from a sense of duty than of fear*)—*such an age and such a people naturally first found out the art of reciprocal communication of Ideas between the cultivated and uncultivated classes and thus discovered how to harmonize the large-mindedness and refinement of the former with the natural simplicity and originality of the latter. In this way they first found that mean between the higher culture and simple nature which furnishes that true standard for taste as a sense common to all men which no universal rules can supply.*—KANT: *Critique of Judgment*, p. 254 (Bernard's Translation).

CHAPTER IV.

Sympathy.

THE principle which we have so far discovered is that socialization is essentially a process of harmonization, whether of powers within the individual or of individuals with one another. In the lower forms of life this impulse to harmony is blind and imperfect, but as it develops it becomes explicit and takes the form of aspiration towards an ideal. At this level its mainspring is admiration and its goal is beauty. It has been considered in the foregoing part of our study, however, mainly from the point of view of the individual; the standpoint has been primarily self-centred. We have now to see how the movement of feeling impels to inter-personal or social values properly speaking. Even love, we have seen, does not necessarily socialize, for it is apt to be partial, and its counterpart is jealousy. Certainly jealousy cannot arise except within a social environment, but its tendency is disruptive. From the time of Achilles sulking in his tent to that of Othello or even the World War it has been a melancholy theme of poets and moralists that love and jealousy

are close neighbours and that their end is commonly tragic. As Mr. Shand puts it, "it is a defect of Love that it cannot acquire justice, unless it can first love all men equally or according to their deserts."[1] It can only do this by widening out into sympathy.

It is true as the same author remarks, in musing upon "the fate which has overtaken Sympathy, for so long regarded as the special disinterested emotion," that sympathy is not necessarily disinterested, for it may be sympathetic fear which leads to a stampede, or a sympathetic depression which leads to aversion from its source;[2] yet sympathy does break down the narrowness and exclusiveness of an emotion, and so far tends to socialize. We shall further see that it is mainly in its lower or more passive grades that it is self-interested, whereas in its higher and active reaches it is eminently disinterested and just. For, as Mr. Shand elsewhere allows, the sympathies give insight into the minds of others to whom we would do good, and hinder the antipathetic emotions of hatred for those to whom we would do evil.[3] Very much, again, turns upon the meaning we give to the word disinterested. Interest is not necessarily egoistic, nor is disinterestedness necessarily ascetic. The pains and pleasures which are shared are of course felt by the sharing individuals; it does not follow that these share merely as a means to greater self-enjoyment. Sympathy may very well be

[1] *Foundations of Character*, p. 109.
[2] *Ib.* p. 48. [3] *Ib.* p. 107.

painful where egoism would be pleasant, yet it may be preferred to the latter. The insight it gives may be preferred to the contentment of unfeeling ignorance, yet the knowledge need not be considered as distinctively mine. The characteristic of sympathy is just the obliteration of the distinction of the merely mine and thine.[1]

The origin of sympathy—of the impulse to feel with another—which was something of a mystery to eighteenth century writers, has been partially explained as the product of constant and indissoluble association. We are continually in contact with things and people, and these, it is supposed, lose their natural separateness and become blended into one whole. Hence means and ends are identified, as in the case of the miser and his gold or the soldier with his horse. And again, similarity will tend to identify with its like our feeling for one thing or person, and hence our feeling spreads over from self to neighbour in so far as we recognize his likeness to ourselves. Such a simple theory, however hard-worked,[2] presupposes that man grows up within a society having traditions of co-operation, and furthermore that he is unable or unwilling to discriminate between his own contribution and that of others to the common lot. Such simplicity cannot be taken for granted in a being assumed to be selfish by nature, nor can his continuance in a society be explained except as means of increasing his own advantage. Such advantage is doubtless

[1] Cp. HÖFFDING: *Psychology*, p. 257.

[2] As by MILL in his *Utilitarianism*.

generally a fact, but it by no means justifies the identification of private with public benefit, as the laborious argument of Sidgwick in *The Methods of Ethics* has abundantly shown. For this reason indeed Sidgwick was impelled to seek a reconciliation of the two standpoints in a possible future life, and evidence for that life in the phenomena of spiritualism.[1]

The theory of evolution gives a more credible account than the associationist theory of the rise of sympathy, when it finds it in the organic connection of parent with offspring. In the higher organisms the new life is begun within and even as a part of another organism. There is continuity of physical being between the new and the old life, and hence it is intelligible that an affect in the one is also an affect in the other. Even after separation of the two organisms the need of protection felt by the offspring ensures unison of feeling between the two generations, so that the same emotion, e.g., of fear or of anger, is felt by both together. Where infancy is prolonged, as in human beings, more complex emotional relations spring out of the common vital feeling, and the parent will deliberately strive to awaken response to his or, more probably, her emotions, by caresses, smiles, speech and the like. So emotional echoing occurs whilst the child develops an individuality of its own, when it requires imaginative insight on the part of the parent and child to enter into each other's feelings. In time the difference between

[1] See his *Methods of Ethics*, pp. 502-507, and *Memoir*, p. 347.

crabbed age and youth may make mutual accord difficult, but increasing experience of life enables the new generation to appreciate the conditions of the earlier, whilst the emotional response of parent to child is scarcely ever lost. Sympathy, then, presupposes an organic basis which instinct and imagination build upon.

The main instinct which fosters natural sympathy is gregariousness. Most animals have a tendency to seek their kind, and apart from that tendency would be very liable to be destroyed. Whether through an extension of "family feeling" or through natural selection there has then arisen a "consciousness of kind" which is regarded by some sociologists[1] as the groundwork of sociology. In the form of the herd-instinct it is sometimes[2] made the explanation of all social relations except the sexual, which oddly enough are apparently not regarded as social. This exaggeration apart, it is evident that gregariousness is a great socializing force. Its phenomena are: a strong impulse to seek the presence of one's likes, guided by appearance, sound and probably scent; great uneasiness in their absence, and strong emotional community in their presence. This may fairly be regarded as animal sympathy, which is so strong that animals kept in solitary confinement will at once seek their species, whilst it is noted as a surprising thing by Maeterlinck that the dog alone will desert his fellows and live with man. Sometimes "happy families" of animals of different and even enemy

[1] E.g. GIDDINGS. [2] As by TANSLEY: *The New Psychology.*

species can be established by custom, but their permanence is notoriously unstable, and instinct asserts itself by their dissolution into species once more, if not in more tragic fashion.

In human beings it cannot be doubted that gregariousness plays a great part. The fear of solitude in some individuals, the disposition to congregate of Celtic people, the impulse to bury oneself in a crowd, the drift toward the town in modern life, all owe much if not most of their strength to gregariousness, involve instinctive sympathy, and result in a common level of emotional life. So much is this true that an important writer is found deploring the dangers of modern urbanization, not only for physical welfare but for the development of the higher forms of social life.[1] The large city tends to develop the mob-mind with its crudity, suggestibility, imitativeness, its response to the broader and coarser emotions, and its violence and irresponsibility in the manifestation of its feelings. It is pointed out by sociologists that dispersion of the population throughout the countryside prevents this contagiousness and uniformity of sympathies, since it takes time for news to spread in successive waves, and in any case the comparative detachment of individuals or families makes the emotional effects of such news much less dangerous than in the crowded streets of a large town. The pages of Carlyle or Dickens show the effects of gregariousness upon the sympathies of a Parisian crowd, and the modern

[1] McDougall: *The Group Mind*, pp. 76, 77, 253.

British industrial city reveals its effects when undisciplined by art.

Passive Sympathy.

The means by which passive sympathetic emotions are spread is still something of a mystery. There seems to be no specific "instinct" of sympathy, for its manifestations are too various and generic to be the outcome of one instinct; yet the interplay of sympathies is usually so immediate as to be sub-rational. The way in which fear spreads in a flock, or anger in a herd, or humour in a crowd, gives some colour to the idea that in sub-conscious regions animate beings are confluent; that they are jets from a common reservoir of mental life. This explanation, popularized by William James in his writings upon religious experience, is however one which is incapable of verification, and which involves explaining the dim by the still more obscure. Doubtless in religious revivals there is an appearance of emotional unity and continuity in the individuals affected. This however does not amount to proof of more than identity of cause playing upon all of them, whether that cause be human or superhuman. The similarity of human nature in the same circumstances, and especially of its emotional deeps, is sufficient general explanation of the remaining parts of the phenomena, though the actual mode of sympathetic contagion

remains uncertain. It is better to attempt explanation from known causes than to seek help from the mysterious.[1]

Dr. McDougall proposes to account for the spread of passive sympathy by assuming that in gregarious animals there is, for each of the principal instincts, a special perceptual inlet that is adapted to receive and elaborate the sense-impressions made by the expressions of the same instinct in other animals of the same species. Thus fear and anger have a special perceptual inlet, so that the cry which one animal utters is a key which fits a certain lock in the same instinct in another animal. This fitting of emotional expression into instinctive locks is also to be found in human beings; it explains the frenzy of mobs, and is the essential basis of the higher forms of sympathy.[2] In illustration Dr. McDougall cites the pang of fear which thrilled through him upon hearing the cry of a child alarmed by thunder. Now doubtless it is tempting to suppose that animals are furnished with such sets of locks and keys, and the immediacy of response in many creatures to emotional excitement is some warrant for such an hypothesis. Yet the notions of locks and keys remains a metaphor, and there is little or no evidence of organs for the reception of the keys, other than the usual organs of sense. Doubtless many animals have organs of communication of which we are unaware. But that does not make them special sympathetic inlets,

[1] Cp. note 1, p. 264, in WARD's *Psychological Principles*.

[2] *Social Psychology*, p. 94 and p. 156.

and in human beings there is no warrant for assuming the existence of anything of the sort. It is curious that an author who rejects telepathy as an explanation of communication[1] should resort to the fanciful theory of sympathetic locks and keys. Would not the striking of keys upon highly sensitive piano strings be a better metaphor, the strings being, however, the ordinary sense-organs?

We are left, then, with the ordinary explanation by means of the apparatus of imitation and suggestion. These involve the tendency in the presence of a model to copy it, in the case of suggestion passively and in that of imitation actively. This may however take place unwittingly,[2] and probably usually does so. An obvious example is that of the spectators of a feat of peril such as a steeple-jack's climbing. The onlooker involuntarily performs nascent actions imitative of those of the climber—hesitates, trembles, pants, grapples and stands firm—along with the real or supposed actions and emotions of the performer. In man this sympathetic emotion is helped out by imagination, and in this ideational form it is the grand condition of socialization. In animals the stimulus is probably perceptual rather than imaginative, though the possibility of imagination there is not to be ruled out. It is at least as likely as the existence of sympathetic locks and keys.[3]

[1] *Group-Mind*, p. 29.

[2] To use Dr. Rivers' convenient term in *Instinct and the Unconscious*.

[3] Carr: *A Theory of Monads*, pp. 247-8.

Active Sympathy.

The sympathy so far described is primitive passive sympathy;[1] it is strictly feeling-with, and may be egoistic though at the same time a means to sociality. It is otherwise with active sympathy, which is a feeling for another, and which may be quite disinterested.[2] True it is that people of sympathetic nature can be very exacting in their demand to have all their emotions shared by others. But this is sympathy at a low and insensitive level. The higher sympathy knows how to efface itself, as in many parents who forbear to ask for responses from their children, or even to share their thoughts. The finer sympathy will forgo for oneself the achievement of an end earnestly desired, if another can realize it more effectively; and there are apparently those who can love God without desiring to be loved in return, as in the case of Spinoza. It does not seem correct to say therefore that active sympathy is egoistic, a seeking of one's own satisfaction.[3] Doubtless it springs out of gregariousness and is little felt by solitaries, yet it presupposes that one can ideationally enter into the experience of others, represent it as if it were one's own, and act so as to relieve it if painful or enhance it if pleasant. Naturally enough such a foreshadowing of the golden rule is commonly feeble and uncertain in competitive struggle, so that it is primarily playful situations which produce it. The "sporting spirit" is a

[1] McDOUGALL'S new *Outline of Psychology*, p. 155.

[2] See above, p. 110.

[3] McDOUGALL'S *Social Psychology*, p. 172.

compromise between the antipathetic attitude of war and the sympathetic attitude of play.

Adam Smith wrote a chapter on The Pleasures of Mutual Sympathy. It is doubtless a fact that sympathy tends to increase pleasant emotions and to relieve painful ones, yet it cannot be that sympathy is shown merely for the sake of increased pleasure or diminished pain. Some emotions with which one sympathizes are intensely painful, like fear, hate, and remorse. Yet it is with these deeper painful emotions that we commonly sympathize; for trifling vexations we have rather impatience. As Adam Smith points out, we have little sympathy for bodily pains,[1] and tragedies which depend upon their representation are accounted the least successful. Again, for exceptional or eccentric passions we have small sympathy; the transports and pangs of the lover are usually the subject for mirth rather than for sympathy, though treated with indulgence; for querulous moods we have little tolerance, and nothing but ridicule and contempt for the henpecked husband. "We are generally disposed to sympathise with small joys and great sorrows."[2] Great joys mostly have the effect of arousing jealousy or envy, themselves painful feelings, at the undeserved fortune of others. It is only when they fall to some great person—some hero or person

[1] ADAM SMITH: *Moral Sentiments*, p. 55, Bohn's Ed. (If this were not so, wars would have ceased long ago. Contrast the excitement of people over some real or imaginary injury to their rights or honour in political affairs, with their indifference to the sufferings of the soldiers they send to defend their interests.)

[2] *Ib.* p. 55.

of rank—that we feel them to be commensurate with their possessor. So little is it true that we sympathize merely for selfish reasons that it is unattainable joys and the cruellest real sorrows with which we sympathize most intensely.

On the other hand it is with the smaller joys of life that we sympathize most extensively. These are the emotions which are nearest to our own powers of understanding and also of attainment; they are agreeable to encourage, and bring no aftermath of jealousy. We commonly make excuses for introducing our sorrows into the presence of our friends; none for bringing our joys. We feel that our sorrows make big demands upon them, and endeavour therefore to exhibit mastery of our sufferings. What can be the explanation of such delicacy? Clearly it cannot be the desire to exact a maximum of commiseration from our friends, but some sense of fitness or good taste. The word used by Adam Smith is propriety, which is defined by the synonym decency and is contrasted with ungracefulness, and is said to consist in the suitableness or proportion which the affection bears to the object that excites it.[1] We judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of others by their concord or dissonance with our own, that is, by the degree with which we can sympathize with them, but our sympathies are founded upon our own sense of propriety, not our sense of propriety upon our sympathies, still less upon our perception of utility. Thus far Adam Smith.

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 17.

Propriety is evidently an æsthetic term and is distinct from utility[1] or "conveniency," and is what is involved in the sentiment of approbation.[2] The characteristics of heroism or magnanimity in a person, the beneficence of an institution of government are a new beauty added to the primary one which awakens our approval.[3] Man's primary approbation is upon virtue or praise-worthiness;[4] we desire not only to be loved but to be lovely; and emulation, the anxious desire that we ourselves should excel, is originally found in admiration of the excellence of others.[5] "It is not the love of our neighbour, it is not the love of mankind which upon many occasions prompts us to the practice of those divine virtues (of generosity and magnanimity). It is a stronger love, a more powerful affection which generally takes place upon such occasions; the love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of our own characters."[6]

The constant use of the words "love and admiration" for "approbation" show that the utilitarian Smith had within his scheme another and æsthetic philosophy upon which his moral (or rather social) theory was founded. "The man within the breast" of Smith was an artist who would have surprised Smith the economist had the latter recognized the former beneath his eighteenth century veil. The illustrations of the nature of the "propriety and perfection" of

[1] *Ib.* pp. 271, 276. [2] *Ib.* p. 271. [3] *Ib.* pp. 129, 270, 276.
[4] *Ib.* p. 170. [5] *Ib.* p. 166. [6] *Ib.* p. 14.

conduct by comparison with the perfection of works of poetry or painting,[1] and the description of the social and agreeable passions as those which are imitable by music—joy, grief, love, admiration and devotion being naturally musical, soft, clear, melodious and regular, whilst the rougher and anti-social emotions like anger are harsh, discordant, irregular and therefore not easily imitable—are further confirmation of the view that Smith's Moral Sentiments were primarily æsthetic.

A similar conclusion is reached from a consideration of the way in which, according to Höffding, the feeling of pleasure becomes *delight* and *love*. "The idea of that which has an essential connection with the feeling of pleasure blends with it and gives it a certain direction. There arises an involuntary desire to retain and protect that which excites pleasure. Delight is this desire regarded from the passive, contemplative side, is pleasure in dwelling on the object; love denotes the active side, the impulse to an action which shall make the object secure, or at any rate shall secure it to us. At higher stages of development arises sympathetic love, pleasure at the pleasure of others, together with pain at the pain of others (compassion)."[2] Delight is eminently an æsthetic term, and passive, contemplative desire—pleasure in dwelling on the object—is almost the definition of the æsthetic attitude.[3] Love we have seen to be essentially directed towards the lovely, and sympa-

[1] p. 49. [2] *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 235.

[3] Cp. BOSANQUET's definition, supra, p. 91.

thetic love and compassion are therefore not merely feeling with the pleasure or pain of others but with their delight or aversion. That is to say that we sympathize with the "direction" of their feeling to a given object; we dwell with pleasure upon that which they contemplate, or love that which they love. There being no such thing as pure feeling without any cognitive element,[1] when (in active sympathy) we rejoice with them that do rejoice and weep with them that weep, we necessarily delight in or have aversion from the object of their delight or aversion. Otherwise we consider their joy or sorrow misplaced and proceed to correct their wrong estimate of the object.

Active sympathy thus appears to be æsthetic. It involves an appreciation or depreciation of the objects in which other people show delight or contempt; it is a chiming in with their attitude, not with their mere feeling. Everyone knows how difficult it is to sympathize with persons who do not enjoy the same objects, who despise what we delight in, who have not the same tastes. Lack of such sympathy is a common cause of the disruption of marital and family life and is embodied in the phrase incompatibility of temperaments. Though mere organic love can subsist without much active sympathy it is precarious and is apt to bring little satisfaction. Conversely active sympathy in the same objects or pursuits will usually produce mutual liking, leading probably to warm attachment. The saying of the great

[1] HÖFFDING: *op. cit.* p. 234.

leader that adherence to his cause would mean the breaking up of families, and that those who were not so capable of leaving their natural attachments were not worthy of him : yet who commanded his followers to found a new society which should replace the old, and, dying, asserted that natural relations gave way before spiritual ones : this leader was asserting the necessity of the extension of sympathy beyond the bounds of ordinary loves and hates to a cause in which all could sympathize. Such a cause must be, however, to use Royce's term,[1] a fascinating one, and fascination is distinctly an æsthetic term implying attraction, delight, charm.

It is in keeping with this conclusion that our sympathy is predominantly benevolent, not malevolent. There can be sympathetic malice, no doubt, as the familiar cases of blood-feud show. Yet as we have seen earlier,[2] there is no solidarity of hates, which tend to the destruction of life, whereas sympathetic love furthers its conservation and increase. Sympathetic malevolence therefore brings about its own elimination ; it goes against the very conditions of life. We have had reason to see previously, however, that the pursuit of beauty is the pursuit of enhanced life, that art is a great socializer and a great reliever of tension and pain.[3] Must it not be the fact that active sympathy and art spring from the same root, namely the æsthetic impulse in man—love, the desire to produce beauty

[1] *Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 138.

[2] Cp. supra, p. 94. [3] See supra, p. 52-3.

whether in sensuous materials or in human nature ?[1] Active sympathy always appears to be beautiful, antipathy always ugly. Doubtless there may be many mixed effects, as in descriptions of warfare, but it seems that pure malevolence, as it would awaken no sympathy, would also have no beauty. The endeavours of theologians to explain the actions of Judas, the comparative failure of Milton to portray a thoroughly evil Satan, and the attempt of critics to explain away the apparently motiveless malignity of Iago, all point in the same direction. Greatly varying degrees of beauty can be tolerated in a work of art, but pure ugliness, if possible at all, only by way of making beauty a contrast-effect which appeals to our sympathy the more.

Certain it is that the chief agency in spreading sympathy is imagination—the characteristic æsthetic activity. It is only as I can enter into your experience, put myself in your place (as we say) that I can sympathize with you. The lack of vividness of imagination is a prime cause of lack of sympathy : hard-heartedness is constantly bound up with narrow-mindedness. The history of civilization is largely an account of the way in which imagination has overleapt the bounds of tradition, colour, kinship, religion and the like, and has enabled the emotions of man as man to be felt sympathetically. For this reason it was, no doubt, that Kant recommended the culture of the mental powers by means of the *humaniora*, since these consist mainly of works of imagination

[1] Cp. HÖFFDING : *Outlines*, p. 264.

through which the mind can be trained in that sympathy and communicativeness which constitute the distinctively social spirit of humanity. For this reason, too, Tolstoy commended the work of linguists and translators as being the highest form of social service for our times. The work of translation requires, notoriously, a combination of scholarship with that imagination which captures the spirit of the original. This need not be what is called, distinctively, creative imagination; it is primarily interpretative and must rely upon memory-images of one's own experiences. None the less, the effort to apprehend through imagination the emotions of another is a forerunner of the extension of sympathy, and tends to produce that universal sociality which is apparently the goal of civilization.

The partiality which we found to belong to mere love is overcome by imaginative sympathy. It is impossible to sympathize at once with an angry man and with the person who suffers from his anger; or at the best, if we happen to be friendly to both, we have mixed or oscillating sympathies which tend to neutralize each other and so to render us impartial. The problem of the right distribution of our loves begins to be solved when our sympathies are widened, when we can value things as others value them, and compare and contrast different valuations. There arises a need for a standard of comparison of estimates, from which the personal equation shall be eliminated, and which is superior to merely local or temporary bias. General rules

of sympathy arise, varying from what is merely "correct" or in "good form" to the deeper manifestations of congratulation or mourning. Doubtless many of these rules come to rest upon mere custom and tradition—like the observance of Sundays and holidays by non-Christians—yet they spring originally from real feeling which has approved itself to numbers of people. Moreover the clash of sympathies, even among friendly persons, promotes reflection and leads to the attempt to find a many-sided nature which is responsive to the pull of many sympathies and yet preserves its balance. So arises the impartial, but not indifferent,[1] spectator who, like Solomon in his famous judgment, can enter into the sympathies of persons very unlike himself, and yet assess the relative merits of their valuations.

It is in accordance with the measure in which a balanced sympathy of this sort is attained by the individual that he becomes truly social. He then attains membership of a community in which he is merely one, a community whose bounds extend beyond the human race to the animal and even the vegetable kingdom.[2] Each other member has a claim upon his sympathies, and the appropriate distribution of his affections becomes a matter of the nicest tact. What he aims at is a society in which all sympathies shall combine harmoniously. A system in which all sympathies were harmonized

[1] In the modern sense, though so called by ADAM SMITH.

[2] Cp. WORDSWORTH'S saying:

> And 'tis my faith that every flower
> Enjoys the air it breathes.

and no antipathies remained would be one in which maximum satisfaction was attained at any given level of development. For it is doubtless true that new desires and new needs would be liable to disturb the equilibrium. Yet once attained it might be a moving equilibrium,[1] and in any case the tendency to return to equilibrium is grounded in the very nature of the life-promoting character of sympathy and the suicidal effects of antipathy. So that as Höffding says, "there will always be present (if not in the individual, in the race) an obscure impulse leading beyond what is scattered, one-sided and conflicting, to an inner harmony of the deepest mental currents. Ethics and æsthetics are quite right when they recognize in such a harmony the highest type of human life."[2] That this impulse is essentially æsthetic and its goal complete sociality seems to follow from the very meaning of the terms.

Idealization.

The frequent hindrance of this impulse to harmony leads to a development of the highest importance, namely the tendency to idealize. The misplacing of our sympathies, their abuse by other people, and most of all their thwarting by the loss of their objects, lead to a mental reconstruction of those objects. This must, in the case of actual objects, necessarily be experimental; one tries to imagine

[1] Cp. ALEXANDER: *Moral Order and Progress*, Book III, Ch. I, Sec. 2.

[2] *Outlines*, p. 100.

the effect of extending sympathy to a person and has to await verification or refutation. Since a person's character is never presented as a whole and in one event, it is necessary to rebuild his history or at least his chief traits, in imagination. This, as we constantly say, can only be done by sympathy of the sort that is shown by an artist or poet. It leads to a belief in someone, whom we expect to act in a certain way in spite of the inevitable changes which time brings. Our belief becomes a working hypothesis or venture of faith, for we act on the principle that a man's character is his destiny. His fate tests the insight of our sympathetic imagination. Even where our view of another person's character is adverse and our reconstruction unflattering, the activity involved on our part is that of synthetic imagination, which of course is often defective for lack of materials in ourselves. Difference of temperament may make successful synthesis impossible, as in the case of Charles Lamb's friend George Dyer, who could not be got to condemn a murderer but, being eccentric himself, could only remark: "He must have been very eccentric."

In the development of sexual love the interplay of sympathy and imagination is conspicuous. Beginning with blind impulse, sex interest even in the animal world is apparently affected by æsthetic qualities such as brilliance, imposingness, loudness or sweetness of tone, and the like. In the human race, the object which at first is a means of self-gratification becomes through imagination and

sympathy an object of delight which we wish to preserve and cherish. So much so, that delicate consideration for the feelings of the other becomes an accepted part of refined courtship, sometimes leading to grotesque results as in the gallantries of Don Quixote. The turning point between mere gratification and genuine devotion comes when the beloved object is regarded as of intrinsic value, having the privilege of leading a self-directed life and of freely giving or withholding favour. Then the æsthetic qualities which were once a means to an end become ends in themselves, and beauty is admired and cultivated for its own sake. "This æsthetic development goes in some measure hand in hand with the general development of sympathy. The two support each other; the power of unselfish devotion is common to both."[1] Devotion may go so far as to sacrifice itself for the welfare of the admired person, in which case it takes the form of resignation or renunciation. So Browning makes the priest in *The Ring and the Book* overcome his selfishness by sympathetic insight into the nature of Pompilia, and transmute his earthly passion by devotion into spiritual. As Dowden remarks,[2] such devotion can rarely be portrayed except by those who have experienced it; by these it is felt far to transcend the more common passion. It is possible only to those who have a high degree of sympathetic imagination and that often of the most realistic sort. For apart from close grasp of fact it would be unhelpful.

[1] HÖFFDING: *op. cit.* p. 264. [2] *Life of Browning*, Ch. XII.

The close connexion between sympathy and imagination is brought out by John Ruskin, who is perhaps our chief authority, at once artist and critic, when he says : " And thus there is reciprocal action between the intensity of moral feeling and the power of imagination ; for, on the one hand, those who have keenest sympathy are those who look closest and pierce deepest ; and on the other, those who have so pierced and seen the melancholy deeps of things are filled with the most intense passion and gentleness of sympathy. Hence I suppose that the powers of imagination may always be tested by accompanying tenderness of emotion. . . . . And, on the other hand, I suppose the chief bar to the action of imagination, and so to all greatness in this present age of ours, is its mean and shallow love of jest."[1] . . . . Similarly we are told that greatness in an artist depends, other things being equal, on power of sympathy, and is above all exhibited in Turner amongst landscape painters, whereas merely picturesque artists are comparatively heartless[2] (being really sentimentalists). Sympathy is a sign of good breeding and its lack a mark of vulgarity.[3] For sympathy is proportioned to the appearance of joyfulness or suffering in things and is not concerned with their utility. Sensations of beauty spring from our unselfish sympathy with their happiness and perfection, " so that the keenness of the sympathy which we feel in the

[1] *Modern Painters* : Part 3, Sec. 2, Ch. 3, § 10.

[2] *Ib.* Part 5, Ch. 1, § § 11-17.

[3] *Ib.* Part 9, Ch. 7, § 8.

happiness, real or apparent, of all organic beings . . . . . prompts us from the joy we have in them, *to look upon those as most lovely which are most happy*."[1]

It is when the object of sympathy is totally removed that æsthetic idealization most manifests itself. The enchantment that comes of distance is proverbial, and many a lover finds in an ideal person the object he has lost from the real world. Dante's earthly Beatrice becomes Divine Philosophy. Scott remarks in *The Betrothed* that constancy to such an ideal is easier in persons of a cool temperament, perhaps because a warmer nature requires immediate presence more. Still, in any case, such a transformation from reality to ideality requires high æsthetic power. It is found markedly amongst the religious, and is the source of numberless transfiguration scenes. Amongst the populace it is often found in the form of a belief in the continued life of a hero, like Napoleon or Kitchener, and is proof, at least, of common sympathetic response to an imaginative appeal. In more speculative minds it takes the form of symbolism, as when cross or crescent becomes an object of devotion, sex a sign of higher unity than belongs to the individual, nature a garment of deity. In all such cases what is so notable is self-devotion to a person or a cause in which one believes intensely, even in spite of, or perhaps all the more because of, its removal. The sympathies are raised to a high plane by æsthetic distancing, which only comes

[1] Part 3, Sec. 1, Ch. 12, §§ 1-6 (italics in original).

about by a certain selection and isolation of its objects. The precondition of this is imagination playing upon the sympathies, or reversely of the sympathies stirring the imagination, for their action is mutual.

The clue to the rise of æsthetic ideals seems then to be sympathetic imagination raised to a high pitch by the removal of its objects from the sphere of immediate attainment. This æsthetic idealization seems to be best described by the words ideational admiration. We have seen that admiration is the joy or delight we feel in an object, mixed with astonishment at its superior excellence.[1] When this object is absent, not present to sense, it can only be pursued in the realm of ideas, and then the conditions of ideational admiration are present. It is remarked by Dr. McDougall that "not all admiration is æsthetic admiration,"[2] but he gives no examples of any other kind, nor have I been able to find any. It seems to be the distinctively æsthetic emotion, and is admittedly essentially social.[3] It seems evident therefore, that, as the æsthetical is central in human life, so admiration is central in æsthetic life, and therefore the great source of sociality. That obscure tendency noted above, leading to an inner harmony of the deepest mental currents,[4] here becomes explicit. What we admire, that we have sympathetic joy in, strive to promote, and try to imitate; what we despise we cannot have sympathy for, nor can we cultivate

[1] Supra, p. 86.
[2] *Social Psychology*, p. 227.
[3] *Ib.* p. 130.
[4] Supra, p. 128.

or copy it. Friendship of any degree seems impossible without admiration, and, reversely, with admiration it seems easy to make the transition to love. The close connexion between love and admiration is shown in the constant way in which we use these two words together. Admiration is the love of harmony made explicit.

From this it follows that admiration as a socializing factor is of great importance. Sympathy, imitation and suggestion are commonly regarded as inter-related, and are manifestly most powerful social influences.[1] If they are expressions of that movement to harmony which we have found to issue explicitly in admiration, then the study of the modes of æsthetic idealization becomes urgent. Now it is found that in all sympathetic participation in the experience of another, without any witting attempt to idealize, there is yet of necessity a certain amount of abstraction and schematization.[2] I am bound to interpret you by acts of imputation to you of my own experiences. I regard you as strong-willed, or generous or quick-witted. That is to say I adopt a plan by which I make an outline sketch of you. This sketch can never be fully filled in, since I cannot become you, and the gaps may often contain matters for surprise. The tendency is therefore for me to make my outline sketch bold and vigorous, to raise to a high pitch the lights and to deepen the shades, whilst leaving

[1] Cp. BALDWIN: *Social and Ethical Interpretations*; Appendix D, on The Genesis of Sociality.

[2] URBAN: *Valuation*, pp. 246, 248.

much in mystery. This sort of Rembrandtesque effect follows from my admiration of certain qualities imputed to you, or, what is the counterpart of this, from my contempt of certain others. As æsthetic, I am not indifferent to personal qualities, but tend to throw into bold relief those which I admire. A certain amount of idealization seems therefore unavoidable in any effort merely to understand another; how much more so when the other is wittingly admired! The tribal chief becomes to the savage the embodiment of valour; the parent is, to the child, all-capable; the student Wagner thinks Faust's knowledge unfathomable; the devotee finds his God perfection. What is called in theology monolatry—the worshipping of individual gods in turn as supreme—is made possible only by æsthetic heightening. This idealization however reacts upon the person imputing, for he now finds a standard of attainment set up within himself, and so gradually constructs an ideal personality.

This ideal now becomes the source of a further movement. The contrast between the actual and the ideal self leads to division of the personality; a struggle between the higher and lower selves, a war between members. The attempt is made to identify oneself with the admirable and to cast out the contemptible. In pathological cases this may lead to alternating "personalities," like Jekyll and Hyde, and in more ordinary instances to a belief in possessions by demons or angels. Personifications of the tempter arise easily, whilst

good tendencies are ascribed to one's God. Or again one's enemies are the source of evil, one's friends of the good. Reversely the excommunicated or outcaste despises himself, thinks himself beyond the pale and glorifies the society from which he is exiled. So by a series of oppositions a world of personalities is half-playfully and half-earnestly created—a world greatly enriched by a mode of æsthetic idealization which may be called that of contrast-effect.

Another mode is found in the tendency to dramatize personal action. In order to make real to oneself the behaviour of another one has to impute to him a certain consistency of action, which may go beyond that of which he is self-conscious. Our own behaviour being most explicable when regarded as purposive, we explain other people's action as purposive too. So arise life-histories dominated by certain aims, ambitions, ruling passions and the like, which act as clues to the personalities. Evidently in proportion as our world is peopled with personalities taken to be pursuing interesting ends, it gains in intelligibility as well as in zest. Mr. Laski pleads for the two-party system in order to ensure the dramatization of politics, the two parties having a life-history which can be followed like characters in a play. The mode of æsthetic idealization which is describable as that of serial-effect is plainly of social importance. By its means history and contemporary life are made vividly human ; instead of consisting of a number of tendencies, movements,

causes, laws and the like, they become a theatre of the personal activities of heroes, saints, villains, etc., whose actions are intelligible as arising out of plot and counterplot. This dramatization of life is no doubt precarious history, yet is it not intrinsically more scientific than treating society as the expression of certain impersonal forces? At any rate it cannot be avoided in all mental reconstruction of individual or social life.

Lastly, æsthetic idealization takes place in a mode which may be called that of climax-effect. We tend to read a life-series in the light of its climax, which determines whether it is to be regarded as successful or not, heroic or futile. The years before the crisis gain a reflected glory from final triumph, a deeper discredit from final defeat. A barren life, we think, is redeemed by some last great act, like that of Byron in Greece; and a brilliant beginning, like Prince Charlie's, often serves to darken the shadows upon mature life. This influence of climax-effect accounts for the popular demand that novels should have a happy ending, for our dislike of lost though perhaps righteous causes, and for our demand that the good shall ultimately, if not immediately, triumph. Few can be found, like Browning, to praise apparent failure, and even that poet does so only to show hidden success in the strenuous deed. How much of the success of Christianity has been due to the interest of the culminating scenes in the life of Christ, surpassing altogether those in the life of any other religious founder! Evidently then our

tendency to think in terms of scenes of climax has great effect upon our social life. Admiration for a certain dramatic arrangement of personal life must exercise a creative as well as a selective effect upon individuals, and so tend to mould society in æsthetic fashion.[1]

The result of this process of æsthetic selection is the adoption of certain types of personality as ideals. Such a type embodies the aspirations of individuals or societies and is of the greatest importance in social education. As McDougall says, "it is, in the main, by sympathetic contagion and by suggestion from admired personalities that the child's moral sentiments are shaped."[2] Admiration, with its joy and astonishment at excellence, produces submission to and imitation of its model, and wittingly or otherwise results in some measure of reproduction. So the child becomes like its heroes. The same is true of whole societies or nations. Prometheus, Sigurd, Parsival, Buddha, Socrates or Jesus, become types upon which societies model themselves, and far surpass the influence of real contemporaries. It is interesting to see how the great social teachers have availed themselves of this trend of human nature, and have painted their ideal characters with loving care. Thus Plato elaborately portrays Socrates, Aristotle his magnanimous man, Locke his gentleman, Milton his cultured citizen, Carlyle his heroes.

[1] Cp. ADAM SMITH: *Moral Sentiments*, Part 6, Sec. 3, pp. 350-1 (Bohn's Edition).

[2] *Outline of Psychology*, p. 436.

The depiction by Adam Smith[1] of the characters which we admire or despise is of more ethical and social value than the philosophic framework in which he puts them, and Kant's stoical creed is recommended to most people more by his life than by his arguments. Types, of the foregoing sort, though primarily æsthetic and so lacking the coerciveness of reality-judgment, come to acquire "an after-feeling of reality" and so to be objects of belief which impel to action.

To sum up. Active sympathy tends to idealization of the characters of others, since it involves admiration, which, being an æsthetic attitude, acts according to those laws, previously studied,[2] of æsthetic valuation, synthesis of complementary values, and insatiability of interest. This reconstruction of a personality is no doubt a work of art, since it involves much effort of imagination whereby the one person participates in the life of another. Yet it is not on that account false or illusory. Though it tends to see the best in everyone it is perhaps for that very reason truer than a more cynical view. Our "impulse to harmony" plays upon the most admirable features in another, helps to realize their potencies, and thereby reacts upon our own finer elements. The discovery (or creation) of admirable types of personality sets up working ideals or practical absolutes which we strive to realize and to multiply in society. Indeed we may come to see that each person has his own perfection; that there are as

[1] *Op. cit.* Part 6, *Of the character of virtue.* [2] Ch. 3, pp. 96-106.

many ideals as there are persons.[1] This however is another way of putting what Kant required, that we should treat humanity as an end and never as a mere means. It gives to each person a status of intrinsic value, and makes him or her unique. We may of course hold that there are two main classes of personal perfection,[2] corresponding to the sublime and beautiful, namely, the one embodying the heroic or tragic type whose merits culminate in one supreme moment, and the other the rounded, balanced, harmonious type whose qualities are blended into a whole ; but the attempt to enter sympathetically into the experience of individuals of all varieties is the beginning of that stage of sociality which is known by the name of the golden rule.

[1] Cp. *Modern Painters*: Part III, Sec. I, Ch. 14, § 12.

[2] Cp. URBAN: *op. cit.* p. 272.

CHAPTER V.

Reciprocity.

Circular Response.

IN the form of the golden rule we have the ideal interplay of mutual and sympathetic admiration. It is a law of reciprocity, but a law that is imperfectly understood and consequently misapplied. We are to do unto others as we would that they should do unto us, but what do we want them to do unto us? To love us as they love themselves, truly, but not to love any and everything in us, but only that which is lovely. "Man naturally desires not only to be loved, but to be lovely. . . . . He desires not only praise but praiseworthiness," says Adam Smith. These are the natural and proper objects of love and praise, he adds, yet "emulation, the anxious desire that we ourselves should excel, is originally founded in our admiration of the excellencies of others."[1] Thus I am to love your excellencies and you are to love mine, and in consequence we desire to possess them for ourselves as well as foster them in the other. I must

[1] *Op. cit.* Part 3, Ch. 2, p. 166.

model myself on you and you must model yourself on me; our admiration must be mutual, though in each case, perhaps, directed to a different excellence. But I cannot rightly love you as I love myself without knowing what is excellent in myself, and this I can know only by first seeing it in you! This of course is one form of the paradoxes of social life, that I only become self-conscious by being conscious of others, that introspection goes hand in hand with extro-spection, that self and neighbour are mutually involved.

Sympathetic admiration of qualities in others is then the precondition of their witting pursuit in oneself. Such an attitude towards another does not, however, leave that other unaffected. He will respond differently to the admirer in consequence of the admiration. He may not respond by returned admiration (though the tendency will be to do so) but by embarrassment or contempt. But he cannot be unaffected by the changed environment and must adopt a changed attitude himself. That is to say that he becomes a changed person who now affects the original admirer differently, changing his attitude into disappointment, chagrin or further admiration. This fresh attitude reacts upon the admired once more, and so on indefinitely. This change due to mutual interplay is the problem of all lovers, leading sometimes to disaster, more often to happiness. For though it is possible for love, sympathy and admiration to be one-sided, and possibly in the case of a Spinoza to call for no similar response in return, their normal effect is

to evoke the same qualities in their object, so much so indeed that some have called sympathy an exacting and selfish trait.[1] The result is that sympathetic admiration tends to become mutual, indifference becomes affection, and, both parties becoming aware of the enhancement of joys through their interaction, they wittingly cultivate each other's society, and merely temperamental sympathy becomes reciprocal—it becomes "sympathy in the full sense of the word."[2]

It is not, however, with its final results but with its mode of working that we are concerned. Whether in the form of Hegelian dialectic,[3] of the imitative reaction described by Baldwin,[4] or of Miss Follett's "circular response"[5] reciprocity is one of the deepest principles of social life. It is to be firmly distinguished from the common notion of action and reaction, which assumes a constant stimulus playing upon an unmodified re-agent and so producing an unvarying response. This, if possible anywhere, is certainly not so in the sphere of the living, much less the social. What we find is a pre-adapted agent acting upon a pre-adapted re-agent. The stimulus is modified in the act of reception, for it is not simple stimulus but a stimulus affected by the presence of the object stimulated. It is not isolated or in a vacuum, but itself modified by that which it is to modify. There is thus no

[1] McDOUGALL: *Social Psychology*, p. 172.
[2] *Ib.* p. 173.
[3] *Logic* generally.
[4] *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 8 and 338.
[5] *Creative Experience*, Ch. 3.

possibility of the interaction of static agents, but only of mutually affected re-agents. That is to say, both are changing and each changing because of the other. At every moment therefore there is a fresh situation in which one cannot say which is agent and which is patient. As Bok puts it, "the reflex arc is the path of the stimuli received in consequence of an activity of the individual itself."[1] However paradoxical this may sound it is the fact, observable in all study of organic life, and presumably of the non-organic. Electrons doubtless exhibit this law of reciprocity, their activities being mutually determined in producing a new situation at every moment.

In the social world this law of reciprocity is of the utmost moment. Here at least action and reaction are not simply such but are action-provoked and reaction called-for. They are interdependent, nowise independent, functions. Furthermore they ceaselessly play upon an altered situation, which is their own product. Thus if you enter a committee, to be examined, it is no longer that committee plus you simply, but that committee as already altered by your presence. The committee cannot be unaltered unless it is insensible, in which case it has ceased to function. Reactions of sympathy or antipathy produce a fresh condition upon which individuals play till the whole "atmosphere" is changed. One cannot remain a mere spectator, passively mirroring events; a mirror reflects, and its reflections colour the things reflected. So a

[1] Quoted by FOLLETT: *op. cit.* p. 61.

fresh member of a society is not a mere addition of a unit, but a maker of a difference which is not quantitative but qualitative. New qualities are born of the union, and thus new possibilities arise, not merely additional to the previous (for some of those may now be closed) but different in kind. It is this fact which makes conference so fruitful. Wisdom is not gained by counting heads but by pooling thoughts. The pooling is not mere exchange, however, but interpenetration or transfusion whereby each individual is re-made, much as all the drops of water in a vessel are coloured by the addition of a drop of ink. The law of this change is the law of reciprocity, according to which individuals not only modify each other, but also their mode of interaction with each other, and so are modified in consequence of their own activity.

Reciprocity thus is productive, fertile, creative. It is a process which is self-generative and which cannot be merely guided from without. It opens up new opportunities by its own momentum ; its ideals are suggested from within. Now whilst this is true of all social experience, it is markedly true of æsthetic activity. This last is that which has especially earned the title of creative ; for whilst reason—both theoretical and practical—has often been regarded as merely directive or ordering, artistry has been constantly regarded as the very type of the creative energy. It appears then that social reciprocity is likest ideal activity when it is most artistic. As such it produces wholes which are qualitative, not merely quantitative ; unities,

not mere collections. It synthesises, not merely adds, and so produces those types which we have found to have such practical importance. It is involuntary, in the sense that its results cannot be obtained by fiat, or by collecting votes or by counting heads, but it is not blind for it is guided by ideals. Ideals change and develop, no doubt, but they give a sense of direction which is lacking to mere blind instinct (if there is any such). This is a point which is not much brought out by some who emphasize the immanence of ideals in experience,[1] yet it seems essential. The objective of social artistry is not mere efficiency, or acquiescence, or balance of interests, good as these may be, but the enrichment of life through the progressive harmonization of differences.

The continuous attainment of such an end is obviously largely a matter for the social expert. Views, at once far-sighted and comprehensive, of the direction of social affairs, are both difficult and rare ; still more so the ability to apply those views skilfully to concrete situations. Our current division into theoretical and practical favours the separation of the expert from the plain man, with the result that social living is largely a matter of the misapplication of irrelevant advice. The idea of the "impartial spectator" who is also indifferent (in the modern sense) leads to the setting up of a number of Cassandras on the one hand, and to a disappointed public on the other. It is necessary to know how to use experts. It

[1] Like Dewey.

must be recognized that they inevitably affect the situation into which they are brought, that they release (or inhibit) energies, quicken (or repress) ideas, and alter the tone of feeling. The known presence of a detective in the company of amateur investigators into a crime is an obvious case in point, but it is only more obvious, not more real. A judge, however impartial, is not indifferent to the course of justice. The social expert then should be expected to guide as well as to inform his public. The course adopted by their joint discussions should be no mere *via media* (with its disguised friction), no set of half-measures (which are usually futile), but a true synthesis which reconciles differences and promotes fruitful working.

Now this is just how art combines theory and practice, by making theory concrete and practice fertile. It is for this reason that Kant's *Critique of Judgment* is the crown of the critical philosophy, bringing to some sort of unity the diverse strands of the other two *Critiques*. For this reason it is said, no doubt, that "political science" is a misnomer; it is science, philosophy and art, "the highest art we know."[1] Social artistry is directed to concrete wholes, and uses both facts and principles so far as they are relevant to that purpose. Facts without principles are blind, principles without facts are empty, and both are comparatively futile unless unified into comprehensive wholes. Apart from some vision of such wholes, society is left to the

[1] FOLLETT: *op. cit.* p. 231.

mere contention of claims and counterclaims, rights and privileges. As between these, it is said that the aim of law is to secure justice. From the time of Plato this has been given as the purpose of the state, yet the attempt to define the rights of man has been perennial and unsatisfactory. It reached its highest point perhaps in the eighteenth century, yet the decline of the legal state is the conspicuous fact of modern sociology.[1] Must it not be that legal justice is a mere shadow of a deeper sort of justice, namely the poetic? Retributive, corrective, reformatory justice are perhaps approximations to that ideal justice which is portrayed by the poets, by the Greek tragedians, by Dante and by Shakespeare. Only comprehensive knowledge, profound sympathy and creative power are equal to it.

What then is the nature of poetic justice? It may be answered that it is the application of art to morals, and that its most important aspect is Nemesis, or an artistic bond between sin and retribution. Nemesis is the artistic side of justice, consisting most commonly in the perfect equality between the sin and the crime (as in the play of *Macbeth*), often combined with irony (as in the Greek dramas), and self-inflicted (as in *King Lear*). These seem to be most important elements in poetic justice.[2] In what sense are they more ideal than legal justice? It may be said that they are not, and that a policeman catching a thief with his hand in his neighbour's pocket and bringing him

[1] Cp. GIDDINGS: *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 302, 352 seq.

[2] Cp. MOULTON: *Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist*, pp. 44, 126, 382.

to summary punishment affords an example of complete justice.[1] But surely all depends on the kind of punishment. The treadmill is quite different in its effects from educative work, and certain forms of punishment bring home a crime to its doer far more effectively than others. Setting a thief to catch a thief may be more salutary to both than any other form of justice. It makes the punishment fit the crime, exhibits irony, and is self-inflicted. Furthermore and most importantly, it brings out the futility of the crime—thieving—in a way that few other things could do. Not only is the criminal hoist with his own petard, but the self-destructiveness of such methods is shown, which is better than any external penalty. Poetic justice thus appears to have several advantages over mere legal punishment.

Poetic justice then does not stand upon individual or even social rights as the corner-stone of morality, but gives measure for measure. It is retributive in the sense that evil is made to recoil upon the offender's head, it is truly corrective in that it brings home to a person's conscience the true nature of his offence, and it is reformatory in that it re-educates. In Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure* and in his *Tempest*, the two plays in which the problem of justice is most deeply probed, it is noteworthy that whilst exquisite justice is done, the offenders are pardoned, upon repentance, and given a fresh opportunity. The deepest justice is restorative, so much so that poetic art tries to

[1] Cp. MOULTON: *Ib.* p. 382.

gratify "that which is one of the most passionate instincts of the imagination—the longing for an ultimate universal restoration."[1] Justice resolves itself into mercy, and by the granting of fresh opportunities makes possible the miracle of good being plucked out of evil. Such justice is forward-looking rather than backward-striking; its aim is distribution of welfare according to merit, certainly, but merit is judged, not by conformity to legal rights but by its tendency to promote harmony. The poet must play providence, and as he is the creator so he must be the disposer of the fortunes of his characters, and it is one of the instincts of his sympathetic imagination to work out the welfare of the admirable and the confusion of the despicable.[2]

The upshot of these considerations is that social justice must not be understood in any mechanical fashion as a balance of interests, or conflict of legal rights, but as a process of creative reciprocity. To make it creative requires social experts who are guided not merely by abstract justice—measure for measure in the early Biblical sense—but by hopes and visions of a fairer social order to which justice is ministrant. Rights then become opportunities for contributing to that order, and duties are defined by reference to that end. True reciprocity, as response to partially self-excited stimuli, is like poetic justice in that it moves to ever richer harmony of social life; it opens fresh possibilities, and by bringing good out of evil

[1] MOULTON: *op. cit.* p. 279. [2] *Ib.* p. 384.

even hopes for complete restoration of society. There is no test of deserts beyond the tendency to promote social harmony, and the individual who can most perceive that tendency is he who can best do justice between self and neighbour. True reciprocity is thus far removed from the legal and economic state in which contract, and supply and demand, play the chief parts. It will be found in the co-operative state.

The Group.

The reciprocity which we have found to be creative and restorative produces the group. The theory of group-life is a recent discovery and is probably destined to transform society.[1] There is a steady gradation of social formations, from the mere flux of nomadic life to the highly organized group-life of a civilized community, which is an advance at once in efficiency and in beauty. Mere numbers produce an effect of chaos, a minimum of interestingness ; they are the " bad infinite " of Hegel. Somewhat removed from this is the mob, a chance collection of persons moved by common suggestions to an ungovernable pitch of emotion which expresses itself in disorderly action. This is distinctly pathological, and produces in the spectator mixed feelings of horrible fascination. The crowd, next, is normal, but exhibits so much of uniformity, is moved so much by similar suggestions, imitations, and emotions, that it is crude, and infertile ; it collects, dissolves, yet produces little, since it has little variety and richness within

[1] Cp. FOLLETT : *The New State*, Ch. 1.

it. It is not until varieties express themselves and are blended into the social whole that we have true community, a life enriched by mutual interplay of significant differences. Full sociality involves the concerted manifestation of each individual's specialities, and this is achieved only in the group. The characteristics of the group-mind can be brought out by contrast with its chief modern rivals, individualism and collectivism.

These are commonly treated as concerned with interests, which it is therefore necessary to define. Whilst interest belongs to all psychic processes, we do not speak of the pursuit of an interest till the ideational level is reached. Then it implies some object more or less continuously pursued, which is called "an" interest.[1] An interest is thus objectified, and means an object towards which, at the ideational level, a specific feeling-attitude is taken. Evidently there may be many interests, such as ourselves, our occupations, our neighbours, our surroundings, but the favourite antithesis of the nineteenth century was that of private against public, self-regarding against other-regarding, individual against collective interest. It was assumed that these pairs were opposed and that in consequence various sanctions must be invoked to reconcile them. In a famous sophism J. S. Mill tried to square the circle by assuring us that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a

[1] HOBHOUSE: "Our real interests are centered upon objects which endure."—*Social Development.*

good to the aggregate of all persons,[1] but the failure of such a facile solution is only too apparent both in economics and in politics as well as in logic. For this mistaken attempt at accommodation of self and neighbour some have substituted the coincidence of their interests in the long run, it being assumed that enlightened selfishness will take a long view and find that consideration for others pays. This involves large drafts upon a future life, however, as Sidgwick's analysis showed, and impels us to a closer analysis of the presuppositions underlying the antithesis of self and others.

The individualism of the nineteenth century assumed that interest meant self-interest, which again it commonly identified with pleasure. From the competition of many pleasure-seeking individuals it then expected to attain a working accordance, which it called the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It took the economic law of supply and demand as its typical principle, and in the writings of Herbert Spencer, its favourite philosopher, extended this competitive idea over the whole field of social and political life. The Man *versus* the State was its watchword, the struggle for existence its explanation of progress. Industry chiefly asked to be "left alone" from State "interference," popular morals extolled the virtue of "self-help," and society applauded the "self-made man." Wealth being supposed the symbol of happiness, this individualism produced perhaps the

[1] *Utilitarianism*: Ch. IV, third par.

greatest plutocracy the world has ever seen ; and political economy being its everyday bible, it also brought forth at the same time probably the world's finest crop of vulgarians. It was this individualism which Carlyle satirized when he posed the problem : given a nation of knaves, to produce an honesty from their collective action. Similarly one might ask how it is possible from a number of unsocial individuals to expect by any arrangement to attain sociality, or from an aggregate of vulgarians to distil gentlemanliness. In such a state of society there will be abundance of self-will, caprice, idiosyncrasy, oddity and eccentricity,[1] all posing as something important, whilst being negligible for real sociality. Certainly we want that which is distinctive of each person, his speciality, his peculiar contribution, yet this is not to be found in his whims and freaks but in his unique way of grasping social relations, and of expressing them in coherent form. For this reason the great-man theory of Carlyle is nearer the mark than the social atomism of his day. The hero is the man who understands the spirit of his time, interprets it, and gives it classic form. Yet this does not produce true community, for the hero is only admired, obeyed, and imitated by the many whilst their own proper contribution is lost. If as a multitude they are many scattered voices, as imitators of the hero they are but echoes. Moreover it is always a question how far a great man is original and how far a product of his time, so

[1] Cp. Dickens's characters.

that the worship of the hero, however salutary for an individualistic age, is but a one-sided expression of that individualism. Its extreme outcome is found in the glorification of the superman of Nietzsche, in whose writings—with whatever abatements drawn from certain features of his Zarathustra—egoism is placed upon a pinnacle. The wild and bizarre beauty of such masterful individuals cannot be denied,[1] any more than the disorderly picturesqueness of commonplace anarchic individualism, yet it is an inferior kind of beauty, always tending to mere confusion of discord.

Over against such individualism there stands, contrastingly, modern collectivism. This word covers all sorts of assemblages so long as the emphasis is upon the mere mass or sum which they make, and not upon their internal unity. The criterion here is quantitative, not qualitative, and a great deference is therefore paid to numbers. This amounts to paying homage to the crowd, for the crowd is the great type of mere mass-formation. The nineteenth century, the very epoch of the belief in quantity, is the golden age of the crowd. Parliamentary suffrage, far-scattered newspapers, platform oratory, all tended to the same object of influencing the crowd. Under the name of democracy the populace was appealed to by all the arts of suggestion, imitation and sympathetic contagion ; the voice of the many was the voice of God. Numbers was the final test of wisdom, and

[1] Cp. Strauss's musical portrayals in *Zarathustra* and *Ein Heldenleben*.

since the populace had the numbers, the great aim of politics was to win its suffrages. In practice this meant the attainment of a majority, and majority-rule became the established method of settling social questions. Naturally enough this method was thought unsatisfactory by permanent minorities, who were told that their business was to protest and suffer.[1] The tyranny of majorities became a familiar phrase, a tyranny only mitigated by compromise when the minorities were considerable enough to be worth conciliating.

Tyranny tempered by compromise is not true sociality, however, and hence there have arisen new devices like the initiative, the recall and the referendum, all of which still make numbers the test of policy. They are worked through the machinery of party, and party-organization is essentially crowd-organization, depending upon uniformity, repetition and imitation. Party organization is usually equal to manipulating the machinery of voting, so that Napoleon the Third ruled by plebiscite in the name of the people, and Lenin, by weighting urban votes, governed in the name of the proletariat. "Reasons of state" have usually been defended in the supposed interests of the mass of the community. All this is not to say that numbers are irrelevant,[2] but that mere collections, aggregates, crowds are of little social significance. They are notoriously fickle, irrespon-

[1] In MR. BIRRELL'S phrase, "minorities must suffer."

[2] As MISS FOLLETT points out, minorities have usually been a majority of those who understood the facts.—*The New State*, p. 146.

sible, and transient, given to emotionalism and arbitrariness, lacking in reflection.[1] The comparative weakness and helplessness of chance majorities is a familiar fact in politics, as has been their incompetency in war from the time of Gideon. Mere collectivism tends to monotony, uniformity, mediocrity, and is the evident obverse of individualism with its wild diversity. That it often has a certain impressiveness from its appeal to numbers is doubtless true, yet it is an impressiveness that soon palls, and gives place to the reflection that repetition is not reciprocity. The dissonance of individualism is not overcome by the unison of collectivism.

If neither the individual nor the crowd is the unit of society, what is the basis of true sociality? Evidently it is the group, by which is meant persons living in reciprocal intercourse which binds their diversity into a dynamic whole. There is mutual evocation of activities which are not scattered and distracted, but controlled by a sense of vital unity. It is not mere community—of sympathies, interests and ends—which is characteristic of the group,[2] but this along with the retention of manifold differences. In fact a group will best be constituted by the attraction of opposites, the mutual enrichment which comes from complementary qualities, always supposing that the sense of wholeness controls the interplay. Such a group is truly the social unit, and it is well remarked that it may

[1] McDOUGALL: *The Group Mind*, p. 45.

[2] As is suggested in DR. FINDLAY'S definition: *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 11.

consist of two friends, or half-a-dozen schoolfellows, or a million citizens.[1] The test is not quantitative but qualitative, and consists in the delicacy, richness and completeness of the personal interactions which make a living whole. Two lovers form such a group, and if their love is only "selfishness for two" it is at least far better than the selfishness for one of old-fashioned individualism. A family is, ideally, a true group, and in the form of the Holy Family has played a great part in purifying the social life of Christendom. Friendship multiplies the group-circles, and seemed to Aristotle to exhibit group-life in perfection. Clubs, schools, and even churches, being partly spontaneous and partly conventional, are dubious groups, which usually contain true groups within them. At times whole occupations, classes or nations exhibit real group-spirit, but it seems a mistake to treat the nation as the grand type of the modern group.[2] A nation is still frequently "a geographical expression." A group is not necessarily small, but in proportion to its growth it is apt to become a mass, subject to mechanical rules and regimentation till it falls to pieces through inertia. Great genius for organization in a people such as perhaps the Chinese, or in an individual such as Julius Cæsar, may preserve the integrity of an empire for long periods. Yet the difficulties of such vast aggregates when the central vitality is gone, is even now being shown before our eyes in the break-up of Europe and China. Much more obvious group-

[1] *Ib.* p. 10.

[2] As in McDougall: *The Group Mind*, Parts II and III.

unities are those corporations whose "personality" is said, by the new school of lawyers who follow Gierke and Maitland,[1] not to depend upon state creation or recognition but to be inherent in their own purposes. Thus guilds, universities, benevolent societies and the like may be true corporations expressive of a group-life far more intense and energetic than that of a state; and in the form of churches, secret societies and occupational unions, groups are quite capable of disputing power with governments. The intensiveness of the group makes it highly efficient as against the extensiveness of the mass.

The group, so understood, is the social unit. If we still speak of the individual, it is the social individual, moulded by the various groups to which he belongs. For each person is a member of many groups, which are continually interacting through him, and in consequence always tending to fresh group-formations. The person who is efficiently at once father, tradesman, churchwarden, sportsman and citizen, binds together various social groups, whilst he who fails in any of these capacities acts as social insulator. This does not mean that a person must be what is commonly called sociable, hail-fellow-well-met to all and sundry, or a frequenter of light amusements; it does mean that to the limits of his capacity he will focus social energies within himself and reflect them upon others in his own special way. This involves energy and

[1] Cp. BARKER: *Political Thought from Spencer to To-day*, pp. 175-180.

wisdom, and is incompatible with the inertia and dullness of servitude. For this reason real group-life is the very type of democracy, which if it is government by consent is not by consent which is passive but active. It is the art of living together, that is to say not over others, not under others, but with others. Primarily then it implies fraternity and secondarily equality and liberty in so far as they minister to fraternity.[1] There is a minimum of liberty which is necessary to group-life at all, and which can be embodied in fundamental laws, but real social freedom has to be incessantly won anew by creative reciprocity. It is most probable that real democracy will be first attained in the group-life of the school, for the most promising experiments in education are being conducted upon group-methods.

The principle of the group is the same as the great formal principle of beauty in æsthetics, namely that of variety in unity.[2] The various classical rules for the preservation of the unities in drama, and the like, rest upon the deeper principle that all differences must be subsumed under a governing plan in such wise that the very richness of diversity only enhances the strictness of the binding form. Doubtless, as the critics of the unities have shown, the form cannot be pre-arranged irrespective of the content; the content fashions its own form as it arises. So with the group: it avoids the mere chaotic multiplicity of

[1] Cp. MACKENZIE: *Social Philosophy*, p. 174.

[2] BOSANQUET: *History of Æsthetic*, p. 32.

individualism, and spurns the uniformity of mass-movements. It seeks to unify the most extreme differences of personality within the bond of common interests, plans, and purposes ; its law is not ready-made but is produced by the interplay of counter-posed characters who are seeking a fresh synthesis, and is therefore a law that evolves.[1] It is a true chorus which combines the many parts of individualism with the plain song of collectivism—a chorus which is, while democracy is only half-awake, often feeble and ragged, but which, one may believe, is destined to become a great symphony.

Federalism.

It follows from what has been said about the superiority of group-organization that when societies expand—which in itself is generally a sign of vitality—the utmost care will be necessary to preserve the vigour of the component factors. The healthiest states will be those in which each group has relative independence, lives its own life and yet maintains reciprocal intercourse with all other groups. The ideal will not be a hierarchy of under-groups and over-groups, for this almost certainly involves the predominance of machinery,[2] but the living co-operation of comparatively autonomous groups meeting on equal terms. That is to say there will be a maximum of home-rule in so

[1] Cp. Boutroux's treatment of natural law in *Science et Religion* (conclusion).

[2] Cp. Hegel on Roman Imperialism: *Philosophy of History*, p. 289.

far as that is compatible with working together. There may be at times groups which will take the leading part, like the clerics of the middle ages, the soldiers of the French Revolution, or (perhaps) the economists of the 19th century England, but there is no one group which will absorb all powers into itself, as at times the church or the state has tried to do. The needs of the time will decide whether priests, heroes, or philosophers are chiefly to express the time-spirit; there is no inevitably autocratic group as in the Platonic republic, still less one determined by heredity. Each group will be supreme within its own circle of interests though that sphere will cross and be crossed by many others, the whole forming that intricate yet congruent network of relations which we call society.

Home rule within a wider social whole, being then the starting-point of real group-life, one would expect to see it centre about the home. This is what it has done in simpler ages, when a home or a small collection of homes formed a fairly self-contained unit. The affairs of the clan, village or town provided real practice in living together. The Indian *panchayat*, the Russian *mir*, and the English *folk-moots* may be cited as illustrating this, not to mention the Greek and Mediæval cities. With the rise of modern industrialism the vast masses of the population in England at any rate are crowded together in half-a-dozen areas where crowd-life has superseded group-life, and local citizenship has been overwhelmed by centralized

administration. Thus in our chief cities there is little community-feeling in the different parts of the great area; the ward, which should be an obvious unit of citizenship, is of importance occasionally at election times; neighbours do not know one another and local affairs are settled at the central town hall. These cities with their crowd-mind and centralized government thus form ideal places for explosive popular movements; it is not by accident that the two great revolutions of modern Europe have centred in Paris and Petrograd. What is wanted as a basis for a healthy and well-poised citizenship is local group-life, managing its own affairs, providing opportunity for direct discussion and so for the formation of a genuine common opinion, and opening up avenues for the great amount of unused talent for social leadership.

Such local home-rule would cut across ordinary party, church, and class divisions, and would weld together the miscellaneous collection of people that one finds in an ordinary district. It would thus foster a true group-life, which is made by the unifying, not the suppressing or ignoring of differences. Local group-life is the basis of democracy; it is living, dynamic, productive, whereas bureaucracy however efficient is mechanical. So far the people have been content to hand over periodically their affairs to officials—whether administrators or legislators or executors—with the result that uniformity and routine have prevailed. It is in vain that an elaborate system of checks and counter-

checks has been devised ; a machine can never show the spontaneity and adaptability of a living thing. Mechanical balance of power has broken down on the grand scale in Europe and is manifestly breaking down in parliamentary institutions. It is significant that in Germany, the great home of efficient, if mechanical, bureaucracy there is since the great war a revolt against routine—in art, literature, politics, theology and the rest—and a great insurgence of creative life in the form of educational, social, and religious groups which spring direct from popular needs.[1] Group-life must begin at home ; it cannot be produced in an office by bureaucratic machinery. The difference is like that between real voices and their reproduction by a gramophone.

Granted local group-life as a starting-point, true sociality will spread by the contact of group with group. Locality will interact with locality, ward with ward, town with town, district with district, and region with region, each preserving autonomy along with its reciprocity. That is to say decentralization will go much farther than it does to-day under bureaucratic tradition ; government will not be concentrated but widely distributed. Not only territorial areas will claim large measures of autonomy, but other natural groups like corporations pursuing some objective—educational, benevolent, economic, and the like—will proclaim their independence within their own sphere.

[1] See Dr. Herford's lecture on *The Post-War Mind in Germany* (Manchester University Press).

Further, occupations may well require to manage their own affairs, as to a large extent the professions do now. All these are natural corporations, whose incorporation by the state does not make them real, though it may make them legal. They can be recognized as legal entities in virtue of their objectives, and without reference to any particular persons who happen to be seeking those objectives.[1] This does not mean that there are any impersonal objectives, but that it may be irrelevant whose they are in particular. A college founded for a certain purpose is a true corporation, whether legalized or not and irrespective of its precise membership, so long as it fulfils its purpose. To this extent there is group-personality: that there may be co-consciousness by different individuals of the same objective, and that the pursuit of this objective may be continued down the generations by people whose periods of life overlap.[2]

This manner of treating the reciprocal action of relatively independent groups raises the question, now so much debated between pluralists and singularists, of the highest or ultimate court of appeal. Is the state the highest or the all-embracing group? It is commonly assumed that one or other of these alternatives must be true. Yet our argument requires us to reject them both. The various groups do not form the state, but do make Society, of which the State is an organ. The

[1] Cp. Prof. Dowdall's article on The Legal Application of Ward's Psychology to the Legal Problem of Corporate Entity. *Monist*, January, 1926.

[2] Cp. McDougall: *Group Consciousness*, pp. 10 and 49.

state is the political aspect of society ; symbolically speaking, the state is the policeman. As such it is a most important group-organization, protecting society both internally and externally, but it is by no means the sum or the product of all other group-activities nor is it the highest group, for it does not (ideally) rule the churches, the universities and other groups, which are incapable of being governed by the state in their proper activities. They are the highest groups in religious, educational, and other such matters. The state is not omni-competent, nor is any one group, except that multiple-group called society itself. Social life is not concentrated in any one group or institution or person, but is diffused through all groups. Society has many organs each of which may be supreme in its own sphere. It is (ideally) many-headed, and therefore need not run the risk of those enemies of the tyrant whose wish was that they might all be gathered into one person and be decapitated at one stroke.

The outcome of these considerations is that the (proximately) ideal society will be federal in its structure. Home rule for special purposes is clearly the solution of the problem of the relations of the many and the one. Mere distribution of authority gives nothing but anarchy ; mere concentration of authority yields only tyranny. The organized unity of these two, distributed and concentrated authority, is best exhibited hitherto in federalism, which aims at preserving the autonomy of the parts in the integrity of the whole,

or rather of expressing the whole in every part and reflecting every part into the whole.[1] Sheer pluralism is no more a solution of society's ills than is sheer singularism, and mere compromise between the two involves a large amount of friction and therefore of waste. A society which washes its hands of adolescent education and then increases its police force to deal with adult crime is gaining the benefit neither of leaving alone nor of interference. Churches and cultural associations which desire state aid and yet repudiate state control must sooner or later decide the question of legal establishment. Empires must decide whether they will be in a league of nations or out of it. Half-measures, it is well said, do not produce half-results. They commonly produce no results at all.

It is noteworthy therefore that modern societies in their attempts to preserve the benefits of both unity and decentralization are turning steadily towards federalism. "If we are individualists nowadays, we are corporate individualists. Our individuals are becoming groups."[2] These groups again are so interrelated that there is no single authority anywhere, and the state itself is seen to be something of a federal society. The trend is towards decentralization of the powers of the unitary state; and home rule increases in Britain and in Europe generally. Even France feels the tendency to regionalism. Meanwhile the constitutions of the newest states like Russia, are framed

[1] Cp. LASKI: *Grammar of Politics*, Ch. 7. and Ch. 11 (conclusion).

[2] BARKER: *op. cit.* p. 181.

upon the federal principle of the ancient republic of Switzerland and the modern republic of the United States. The movement away from the unitary conception of British sovereignty, after the loss of the American colonies, to the imperialism tempered by home rule of the 19th century, and now to the idea of a commonwealth of semi-independent members, is obviously in the spirit of federalism. The existing league of nations is ambiguous; it may safely be said that if it is to prosper and become world-wide its imperialistic features will have to give way to federalistic. The city-states of Greece and the Middle Ages—the highest points of civilization attained in their times—nearly succeeded in realizing the federal principle but fell before greater powers. It seems that the world is striving again to accomplish it on a far wider scale and with vastly richer resources.

What is true in politics is also true in ecclesiastical affairs. The attempt at imperialism in church polity broke down at the Reformation, only to be replaced by particularism, at least in Protestant countries. The defects of this result are now being felt all over Christendom, but the attempts at reunion are so far without a guiding principle. Many churchmen seem unable to think save in terms of the unitary church. Union for them means centralization, domination, absorption. The model is the mediæval church and reunion is only possible by recognizing the primacy of one church. Over against this we have the remnants of modern sectionalism in all its forms, whether national or

local. The most that can be obtained from such sectionalism is an alliance for certain purposes, such as the banishment of war. But an alliance is not a union, an integration, in which the parts serve the whole and the whole animates the parts. Such a unity can only be obtained when sections meet in principle upon equal terms, and discover what new form of constitution will satisfy their claims and correlate their differences. A richer whole will then emerge than any that has yet been seen, but it will be obtained neither by yielding to mediæval imperialism, nor by compromise with later bureaucracy, but by adopting frankly the federal principle of democracy. The interdependence of groups within a growing whole, the mutual recognition of churches as members of one beloved community: this is the task of the churchmanship of the future.[1]

The great danger of all projects of union, whether religious or political or social, is that they each come to be regarded as all important. Thus even Miss Follett, with all her discernment, speaks of the state as the home of her soul,[2] as the all-inclusive group[3] and as the great moral leader of the future.[4] And similarly many churchmen think of the church as the one absolute on earth. But there is no one all-inclusive group which can be an earthly absolute except human society, which is only a group in the making. No world-state

[1] Cp. on the above W. ADAMS BROWN: *Imperialistic Religion and the Religion of Democracy*, Chs. 3-5.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 312. [3] *Op. cit.* p. 311.

[4] *Ib.* p. 333.

or world-church can exhaust this society, but the great society includes them one and all. Since, however, groups require organization, it is easy to suppose that there must be one all-dominating or all-inclusive organization within society. Our principle of harmony forbids such a supposition, however. Concord is not obtained by the overwhelming of discord,[1] nor is any one part bound to take the lead. There is no one conductor of the orchestra who is inevitable, or even any conductor at all. In the most recent experiments the orchestra conducts itself by ear, a much harder but more truly musical thing than being directed by sight. So in the new society it may be that the groups within society will guide themselves by their feeling for reciprocity, for mutual enrichment, for unity in diversity, and for harmonious expression.

Harmonious expression is a phrase which sums up the ancient formal principle of art, unity in diversity, together with the modern principle that art is to be expressive.[2] It is also, we have found, the principle of modern democracy, which is federalism. Distributed yet co-ordinated power, liberty which is at once creative and yet self-limited, organization which spontaneously arises to promote unity : these interpretations of equality, liberty and fraternity are common both to art and politics in modern times. There is no wonder that this is so, for political and æsthetic movements

[1] Cp. JAMES's remark about the singer whose anthem drowns all music but its own.

[2] CROCE: *Æsthetic as Science of Expression*, Ch. I.

represent parallel developments of a common tendency. Or rather, if the main contention of this essay be true, they represent the inner and outer sides of the same thing—the deep though obscure impulse to harmony finding expression in moulding the social life of peoples. Each new generation finds possibilities of richer and fairer civilizations before it than have hitherto been seen. Such possibilities become Utopias which are taken as practical absolutes. The effort to realize these practical absolutes explains most of the struggles and even conflicts of history, for these are in the main the growing-pains of humanity. A consideration of the fate of Utopias will therefore provide a clue for the study of that stage of sociality which we call civilization.

CHAPTER VI.

The Earthly Paradise.

Utopias.

THE sociological importance of Utopias has been little recognized until recently, when the rise of sociology itself has caused them to be studied comparatively. Since man became imaginative there have always been Utopias, but they have usually been dismissed as dreams. Doubtless they have often sprung out of mistaken history, having been ascribed to some primeval Golden Age ; or regarded as descending miraculously upon a world purged by terrible justice ; or as postponed to an indefinitely remote future. As such they have offered a fair target for the historian, the scientist and the philosopher. Yet even in these forms they are of extreme interest to the sociologist, for they have been a chief means of social progress. As Dr. Hertzler remarks,[1] the Utopians have played a stupendous part in shaping human history. Their thoughts are all about us, working obscurely and disguisedly very often, yet

[1] *History of Utopian Thought*, p. 314.

inciting to criticism of present institutions and setting up ideals of transformation. Their very success is a reason for our forgetting them, for the partial realization of their dreams is now taken as a matter of course, and we live in an age of expectation which is largely their own product. "Yet after all, the Utopia of one century is the reality of its successor,"[1] and it is our own lack of imagination that prevents us from realizing what we owe to the great seers.

It is perhaps true that the age of Utopianism is over; that our modern scientific and historical knowledge hinders us from making those visionary worlds which were possible to earlier generations. At any rate the type of Utopianism which is possible to us must be greatly modified by our recent experiences, which induce many to abandon the idea altogether. Thus Novgorodtsev traces the present world-crisis to the breakdown of the hopes for an earthly paradise formed by the thinkers of the 19th century, whether the Hegelians or the Comtists or the Spencerians, and bids us go back to Kant.[2] Modern realism also, at least in some of its chief representatives, offers little encouragement to Utopian hopes; Professor Alexander has no millennium, but simply the prospect of another stage in the march of space-time, a stage which is always ahead and always alluring by its attractiveness, yet never realized as perfectly satisfying.[3] And

[1] LASKI: *Grammar of Politics*, p. 661.
[2] *Ob Obshchestvennom Idealye*, Str. 1–27 (Of Social Ideals, pp. 1–27).
[3] *Space, Time and Deity*, pp. 400, 410 and 418.

so eminent a historian as Professor Bury challenges the idea of progress itself, regarding it as a quite relative and passing ideal, to be itself superseded by some fresh form of hope.[1] From all sides therefore there is a questioning, if not a repudiation, of Utopianism and a proclaiming of the reign of relativity. A discussion of the validity of Utopianism will therefore raise many of the problems involved in our idea of sociality.

That Utopian ideals are mainly a product of aesthetic activity will probably be readily admitted. That they have been the prime conscious factor in promoting civilization has yet to be shown. There have been different claimants for this primacy, notably intellectual cultivation and morality. Advocates of the claim of the intellect, like Buckle, Draper and Bury, have pointed out the releasing and inspiriting effects of intellectual freedom. Its wonderful successes in the periods of the Greeks, of the Renascence and of the Enlightenment are dwelt upon, and contrasted with the slowness of development in the Middle Ages. Of the Dark Ages it is remarked by Hallam that the chief cause of their stagnation was their ignorance. It is tempting to generalize from such periods and assume that knowledge is Prometheus, the great agent of civilization. Its importance is obvious, yet it is easy to show that the free and disproportionate play of rationalism exerts a disruptive force upon society. Its critical method and even its constructive proposals are apt to loosen the existing social bonds—tradition,

[1] *Idea of Progress*, Ch. 9.

custom, morality—and to dissolve them before the generality of the people can assimilate the new truths and modify their behaviour accordingly. The manner in which the brilliance of Greece, of the Renascence and of the Enlightenment was speedily extinguished in violence, is ample evidence of the danger of intelligence outdistancing morality and sociality. There are many wise judges who think that the accumulation of knowledge in the 19th century has been out of all proportion to our other capacities, and that our present and future social distresses are the consequence.

The counter claim that morality is the mother of civilization is natural enough, and finds expression in strenuously minded persons of all sorts. The unifying and preservative character of custom and morality: their tendency to form great institutions which gather and hand on the gains of social experience: and the way in which culture is fostered by a great tradition; these are emphasized to show that civilized life is impossible, or rather negligible, without them. The history of the Roman Empire or the Christian Church is exhibited as illustrating the case. Now there can be no question as to the importance of moral, legal, and traditional modes of conduct as guardians of anciently discovered good. And there is no doubt an inner dialectic in such codes which moves them to fresh fields of application. Yet their tendency is uniformly to conservatism and lack of adaptability so that they become outworn, and at last collapse through inanition. The histories of China, the great Empires and even the

Christian Church (on its rigoristic and puritanic sides) all bear witness to the inadequacy of codes, however essential these may be for human living, to maintain a high level of civilization. It is not to Sparta and Rome and Berlin that we go for instruction in the art of civilized life, so much as to Athens, Florence and Weimar.

If intelligence is the solvent of social bonds whilst morality is their conservator, what is then the factor which actively unifies them? The answer must be, constructive imagination. This weaves the new material discovered by the intellect into the stuff preserved by morality, and makes a new and enlarging social tissue. It does so by at once widening and elevating our sympathies. The spread of sympathies from member to member of a group, and from group to group, has been sufficiently described already. What we have to notice now is the way in which this acts as a spring of progress. It is well said that "the great commandment, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself' pointed the way of all progress; but great and beautiful as it was, it could not avail to break the bonds of the human spirit, the bonds of ignorance and fear."[1] These could only be gradually loosed by the growth of imaginative sympathy which discovers in others that common nature which makes the whole world kin, and at the same time pictures a more ideal society towards which to strive. Whatever may be true of the great pioneers of social advance, there can be no doubt that for the majority of men, and

[1] McDougall: *Group Mind*, p. 298.

certainly of women, imagination is a far greater source of social initiation and integration than is intellect. And their contribution to social discovery is probably not less than that of the great leaders.[1]

When the average citizen is sufficiently educated to contemplate a large group, say a region or an occupation or a nation, in all its complexity, it will be possible for social development to be consciously directed. At present there are few who are capable of even a national view ; far fewer of an international or world-view. Modern means of intercourse, however, are making possible a great enrichment and also a great interlacing of interests, whereby the individual may acquire world-citizenship. This, one may surmise, will be done not by preaching duty to one's neighbour, but by answering the question, "Who is my neighbour?" This can be done by portraying him concretely, in history and picture and song, and above all by facilitating travel. So it will gradually be within our powers to think together upon the aims of human society as a whole, and to make the future of humanity a co-operative and co-conscious enterprise. Such conjoint thinking would be the greatest engine of progress that has ever been devised, and would surpass all the triumphs of the mechanical arts, which are valuable only so far as they are wisely controlled. There would need, however, to be some concrete ideal to set before a society coming together in this way, and here it is that Utopias are of the greatest

[1] MARSHALL : *Principles of Economics*, p. 292.

value. For it is only some genius who can give coherence to the multifarious aspirations of his group, and body them forth in generally acceptable form.

It is significant that most of the great Utopias which have been imagined, at least in the West, have been conceived in times of social stress. The *Republic* of Plato appeared in a time of political dissolution, Augustine's *City of God* when the Roman Empire was foundering, the *Utopia* of More amidst the upheaval of the Renascence, and the modern imaginary commonwealths of Rousseau, St. Simon, Owen and the rest, round and about the great Revolution. The upheaval of a settled civilization releases the thinker from old use and wont, and enables him to construct a fancy picture which mingles the best in attained realities with what seems fairest in prospect. The picture is thus largely a contrast-effect; yet it springs out of the aspirations of the present, felt but unexpressed by the author's contemporaries. It expresses the deepest longings of an age, announces its greatest hopes, focusses its scattered lights. Yet it does this uniquely, being the vision of a gifted mind, alone capable of concentrating these various tendencies in one unity. Idealization this certainly is, yet it is the sort of idealizing which prompts to realization, and in other days and in unexpected forms old dreams come true. The history of the Middle Ages is largely the story of the realization of St. Augustine's vision; the whole trend of modern social reform is foreshadowed by Sir Thomas More; and

Harrington's *Oceana* is said to have supplied some principles of fundamental importance in shaping the institutions of the United States of America.[1]

Amongst other things, it might be shown that the Utopians were the pioneers of Eugenics, a science which is only just becoming accepted even amongst the educated; that they taught the equality of the sexes, which has but recently been popularly recognized; that they powerfully urged the importance of preventive medicine—including gymnastics, hygiene, sport and diet—long before such measures were generally accepted by the medical profession; that they made education, widespread and prolonged, the great means of social perfection, so that their schemes are still a great store of inspiration for the educationist; that they anticipated many discoveries and inventions of later times, if indeed they did not inspire them; that to them above all is due the theory of property as a social possession: a view which is now gaining prevalence; that whilst emphasizing the importance of politics and citizenship they did not regard the state as an end in itself but as a means to the good life, in this view being far ahead of their contemporaries; that they advocated methods of remedial justice with which we are only experimenting yet; that religious toleration was a passion with them in days when bigotry was rife; that to them is mainly owing the rise of social philosophy and sociology itself, sciences which are now so powerfully modifying human life; and that religion to-day is, thanks to

[1] HERTZLER: *op. cit.* p. 297.

their influence, being transformed from an ecclesiastical to a social concern.[1]

The Utopian therefore, though imaginative, is yet a realist who points out neglected possibilities and anticipates their achievement. Doubtless many of his projects would have been realized apart from him, but not so speedily or so effectively. Social ideals, we have seen, do not spring out of vacuity, but express what many minds are dimly thinking. Hence no doubt their gradual acceptance and later efficacy. Springing out of the present they act as guides to the future, their main value indeed being to obtain by suggestion what direct exhortation would fail to secure. By this means opposition is better evaded and obstinacy is less aroused than by a frontal attack upon existing conditions. A superiority of the aesthetic method over the didactic is here to be seen, in the way in which it can overcome the contrariant element in human nature. Its mode of address is subtler and its influence more pervasive than the directly instructive, and its fascination makes it powerful long after more sober counsels have been forgotten. People are not called upon to make decisions, but gradually accept as possible, credible, even achievable that which seemed at first merely fanciful. The Utopian's worst ordeal is usually neglect or ridicule, for the dull and prosaic are always with us ; still by these means are sifted out those ideas which are immediately practicable from those which are more far-seeing or even visionary. And in any case the mere

[1] On all the above see HERTZLER : *op. cit.* Ch. 9.

putting forth of Utopian ideals serves to break up the paralysing effect of supposed economic or political laws.[1]

The Utopians are possessed by the ideal of a perfect society. As such they must needs excite the opposition of those who divine their intentions and at the same time feel comfortable in their present conditions, whilst to the mass of the uncomfortable those intentions are generally a sealed book. To the other-worldly they are mundane and materialistic, to the earthly they are fantastic, to the mass of the commonplace they are unintelligible critics, rebels, and disturbers. They are without honour in their own day and country, nevertheless they possess a tradition of their own which they hand on as a torch from genius to genius down the centuries. The school of the prophets is never quite extinct, though it is not hereditary and can only be entered by persons of great faith, hope and courage. Their usual defects have been lack of technical knowledge, which make them seem incompetent to the specialist ;[2] an over-simplification of their problem by assuming men or conditions to be analysable into comparatively few and stable factors ;[3] a disposition to foreshorten the period of time required for the realization of their plans, leading to a neglect of the immediate means of social betterment ;[4] a tendency to be over rigid in their schemes

[1] The work of the sociologist Lester Ward is said to have greatly fostered the belief in social control which distinguishes later from earlier American policy.

[2] As in some of Ruskin's economics.

[3] Cp. Plato's psychology. [4] Cp. More as Lord Chancellor.

even in points of detail ;[1] and a general assumption of the finality of their earthly paradise when it has once been obtained.[2] It is natural enough that such results should be reached by minds not specially scientific or historical but rather artistic, and therefore tending to that aesthetic heightening and isolation which we have found to be characteristic of believers in a practical absolute.

A consideration of some of the great Utopias of literature will serve to bring out their aesthetic character, their practical results, and their defects. One of the most famous is obviously Plato's *Republic*, written by a genius both philosophical and poetical, of whose myth-making activity it is the greatest product. It dramatically portrays the construction of an ideal polity in which justice is attained by division of functions amongst the three great classes in the state—the working man, the warriors and the educators and governors. The workers are at most passive citizens in the state, whereas the warrior and ruling classes live the active and political life, though the highest pursuit, that of philosophy, is the privilege of the cultured ruling classes alone. There must be strict communism in respect of women, children and property, for all individual interests must be suppressed ; education is to be general and life-long, and identical for both sexes, which are on an equal footing even with respect to military service. Marriages are to be scientifically

[1] Cp. Calvin's theocracy.

[2] But contrast the modern socialists ; and on modern experiments see the First Report of the Society of Friends on "*War and the Social Order*," pp. 100–136.

supervised by the governing officials, and all weakly or deformed children, as well as those irregularly born, are to be destroyed. State-controlled gymnastics are to preserve health and to fit for war, whilst all forms of art are to be severely censored. The poets are to be forbidden, and only that music which inspires to moderation and courage is to be permitted. For only that is really art which consists in the imitation of the good (or God), which is the final end of the state, though recognised as such by only a few of its citizens.

This ideal state is a signal example of the power of imagination to vitalize politics, since for two thousand years it has alternately allured and repelled men, even when recognised as impracticable. Most succeeding Utopians have derived inspiration from it, educators have discussed it, and enthusiasts have partly acted upon it. The subordination of the particular interest to the good of the whole, the abandonment of private property and family life, the hierarchical structure of the state and the division of functions, the insistence upon status and its duties, and the system of ethical education by the superior few—these ideas found a large measure of embodiment in the mediæval society, in which the Church wittingly or unwittingly imitated Plato's Republic.[1] The powerful strain of communism in his teaching has reinforced monastic tendencies, and encouraged socialistic and communistic experiments in later days. It is impossible to say how much modern political communism owes to Platonic in-

[1] Cp. BENN: *The Philosophy of Greece*, p. 208.

spiration, but it is significant that Ruskin, whose teaching has many points in common with it, as well as with Plato in general, is said to have declared: "I am a communist, the reddest of the red." It is pointed out by Jowett[1] that present day individualism is of very recent growth, and that transformations of society in a Platonic direction are quite possible within a measurable period of time. Many trends of recent thought are akin to those of Plato, and modern powers of organization may make much of what has hitherto seemed a dream to be practicable upon a large scale.

For all this, from the standpoint already reached in this essay, the Platonic type of state has several great defects. In general, it over-emphasizes unity at the expense of variety. Plato, though richly endowed artistically, looked for political salvation to a Spartan constitution in which spontaneity was severely repressed. A mode of life severe, legal, and even rude, in which conformity is far more manifest than freedom, and in which the differentiation produced by specialization of function or sex has little part; a state whose constitution is almost changeless, and in which serious innovation is heinous; a state moreover resting upon servile labour which is without the means of self-expression; a city whose main occupation is politics and that extension of politics called war, for which its active citizens are mostly trained; a society lacking that richness and freshness of interest which is the result of intense family life, and yet deprived of that

[1] Introduction to the *Republic*, p. clxxviii.

diffusion of culture through all its grades which might have been some compensation for state regulation of marriage ; a social organization which is hierarchical, militaristic, and based upon a dubious myth of golden, silver, and copper natures in human beings—such a republic, whilst admirably designed to promote order and uniformity, is far removed from that idea of group-life which we have found admirable. It is one in which the individual and, worse still, society is swallowed up in the state. As Jowett says, " Plato has no idea either of a social State in which all classes are harmonised, or of a federation of Hellas or the world in which different Nations or States have a place."

A very different type of Utopia is to be found in Kant's book *On Perpetual Peace*, which, though little attended to, is a very powerful expression of the deepest longings of the modern world, by its most representative philosopher. Its aim is nothing less than perpetual and universal peace. Preliminary conditions of this achievement are to be abandonment of secret reservations, tending to future wars, in all peace treaties ; the recognition that no state can acquire another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift ; and the gradual disappearance of standing armies, state debts for foreign wars, and methods such as the use of spies and assassins which make mutual trust impossible. In order securely to establish perpetual peace amongst states three main articles must be laid down. Every state must be republican, that is, must guarantee individual liberty, social equality and impartial justice, and must be

ruled by a thoroughly representative system of government. Next, all international right must be grounded upon a Federation of Free States. Individual state rights are the corner stone of the federal structure, and are only given up under a mutual compact in order to secure the benefits of peace. These may be obtained either by agreement to seek arbitration or by a general alliance of peace. Even a partial alliance for the purpose of counteracting war and violent passions would be an advance, though always liable to break down when most needed. Thirdly, there must be no interference with the internal affairs of a foreign state, beyond demanding the right of safe conduct for those who are admitted into it as travellers.[1]

Kant was under no illusion about the difficulties of his plan, for his view of humanity was not flattering nor his opinion of politicians high. He points out the radical evil in human nature and confronts current political maxims violently with the principles of morality. Yet he thought that self-interest would lead men away from a state of nature, which is a state of war, and that the course of events would work irresistibly towards making law supreme in the long run. For nature has divided men by differences of religion and language, so that they cannot permanently be gathered under one empire, and yet has united them by mutual self-interest, as for instance, in commerce, so that they find violence unprofitable and prefer the equilibrium of power

[1] KANT: *Zum Ewigen Frieden*, S. 1–24. (Karl Vorlander's edition).

to the insecurities of war. This impels them towards legality if not towards morality, which teaches that war makes more bad men than it destroys. Hence, finally, freedom of thought for philosophy will promote peace, though it is undesirable that philosophers should become kings, for the wielding of power inevitably corrupts the free exercise of reason.[1] But before nature's highest end for the human race—world-citizenship—can be attained, Kant expected many revolutions ; for the so-called Balance of Power in Europe is like the house which was so perfectly built, according to the laws of equilibrium, that when a sparrow settled upon it it collapsed. Only on the attainment of a perfected culture (God knows when), will a state of perpetual peace be both wholesome and possible for us ; still it is our duty to seek it as a constant ideal towards which we can approach.[2]

The course of events since Kant's time supplies a melancholy commentary upon the prescience and sagacity of his plan. Few if any of his preliminary conditions were adopted in the 19th century, and so the world war came. In its train it has brought some of those revolutions to republicanism which Kant anticipated, inadequately representative though some of the new republics may be. And there is a steady drift towards federation both within the parts and between the wholes of modern states. There is, unfortunately, no one federation of states for the securing of peace, but rather three great groups corresponding broadly to the three areas

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 25–56. [2] *Ib.* pp. 58–73.

of America, West Europe (with its dependencies and mandated territories), and Russia and the East. The independence of states and their freedom from external interference is generally recognized, but the recognition is largely verbal, and intrigue by foreigners and ill-treatment of them are still frequent. Secret (or semi-secret) treaties, mandated territories, and large armies and navies still perplex and burden Europe, so that cool observers judge that it is hard to say whether the balance of forces in the world inclines to war or peace.[1] And many weighty voices[2] say that unless the influences for peace prevail, the character of the next grand war will be such that civilization itself, at least in the West, may be irreparably damaged or destroyed. We are so far from obtaining the Kantian Utopia, "the highest political good, perpetual peace," that it is desirable to enquire into the causes of the breakdown of its pursuit in the 19th century, and to discover what now hinders that degree of sociality from being attained.

Kant, who in this as in other matters focussed modern European thought, evidently conceived his Utopia far too abstractly, narrowly and formally. His starting-point is rights, individual or national, and his goal is freedom under law. Society is the result of a contract, and even an international federation is the product of a compact to secure the benefits of peace. The state itself is based upon individualism, which, together with a thorough

[1] Cp. HOBHOUSE: *Social Development*, p. 297.

[2] E.g. LORD OXFORD; PROF. GILBERT MURRAY; DEAN INGE.

representative system and the separation of the legislature from the executive, establishes the ideal republic. The American constitution was referred to as an illustration. What Kant (and the 19th century in the main) did not see was that freedom even under law was a barren principle in itself, and that its coincidence with the promptings of self-interest was problematical. Perhaps he could not be expected to foresee the rise of industrialism as a result of which plutocracy dominated the West, even when republican. Plutocracy and militarism joined hands, and in the name of freedom exploited foreign lands and waged war to secure peace. The most popular national philosophers were imbued with the spirit of state individualism. Hegel glorified the Prussian state, Comte regarded France as the natural centre of a West European Republic, and Herbert Spencer expected a "lay millennium"[1] from an extension of British competitive methods. The outcome of the doctrine of rights, liberties and contracts has very nearly been that condition of "everlasting peace," satirized upon the signboard of an inn underneath the picture of a churchyard, which amused Kant in his day.

The fact is that modern thought has lacked positive ends to realize and has in consequence handed its policies over to individual or national caprice which it has mistaken for freedom. Idiosyncrasy has run riot and has tended to chaos in economics and politics ; the great war with its welter of revolution and dictatorship is but the result, the

[1] Renouvier's phrase.

consummation of this aimless striving. It is not seen that even peace itself, to which most politicians and publicists do lip-service, is not the supreme end of policy but rather a by-product of that end. Kant himself recognized this when he said, "Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason (morality) and its righteousness, and your great object, namely, the blessing of perpetual peace, will be added."[1] He even recognized a certain sublimity in war, that "flail of mankind,"[2] but a far higher, indeed the highest sublimity in a peaceful union of men under public law.[3] But he never worked out the thought, about which he hovered many times, that the earthly end of man is not freedom but the culture which that freedom makes possible. The succeeding century likewise never resolutely held this end before itself as supreme, but regarded it as a means to attainment of wealth, power or pleasure. The ugliness, foulness and noisomeness of our present civilization—now deplored on all hands—is the price we have paid for not putting first things first.

Peace itself will follow rather than precede absorption in things of the mind. It is to be obtained by finding a moral equivalent for war, such as the adventures of scientific discovery, the excitements of politics and the travails of the arts. It is commonly allowed that the monotony of routine in modern machino-facture[4] is a cause of exhaustion and irritation tending to issue in discontent and strife. If it is to be redeemed, and we are to escape the

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 45. [2] *Ib.* p. 59. [3] *Ib.* p. 71.
[4] Lester Ward's convenient term.

mischiefs that flow from hands rendered idle through "over-production," a vast extension of the social arts will be necessary. Whatever be the motive of war, whether love of glory (as Kant thought), or fear or mere pugnacity, man must learn to sublimate these propensities in the creative pursuits of peace. This will not be an easy or short undertaking but will demand far more labour, patience, and ingenuity than war. It is easier to set lions fighting than to make the lion sit down with the lamb. Even if it be the case, as Kant said, and the 19th century after him supposed, that "the mechanical course of Nature clearly shows that it is her intention to bring men into harmony out of discord, even against their own will," the method is likely to be expensive. We have now sufficient science, both natural and social, to control and direct human progress and to shorten the period required for the attainment of harmony. Modern knowledge of group-psychology is furnishing us with power sufficient to master our destiny if we have but the courage and the wit to seek a practicable Utopia.

This will be found neither in the statuesque perfection of a static order such as the Platonic republic, nor in the legalized individualism of Kant's cosmopolitanism, but in the fostering of that richer synthesis of social interests which we have called the group-spirit. We shall not glorify the state, as both Plato and Kant did, but treat it as a function of society of which the earthly aim is the culture of the human spirit. Politically our aim will be to avoid *statism* and to approach that *communistic anarchy*

which Tolstoy describes. This will require more organization than Tolstoy thought desirable ; indeed social organization will need to be improved beyond all modern conception. In particular education will have to become an art far surpassing the arts of war, and carrying with it greater honours. But the principle of a minimum of government with a maximum of imaginative sympathy will prevail more and more, if civilization is to prosper. Intercourse will weave groups together into a great society of which the highest cultivation of human powers will be the aim. "The ideal of human life," says Renouvier, "is *le jeu de la vie*. This is the optimistic ideal, in which life, regarded as good in itself, finds no further obstacle to manifest itself as such in reality, both for reflection and for sensibility, being a pure satisfaction of desire, a harmonious fulfilment of individual and social functions, in an environment and under conditions such that man shall be delivered from need, and from the appetites and passions which belong to the struggle for existence."[1]

Prospects of Civilization.

What are the prospects of the realization of such a condition as that portrayed by Renouvier? This is the question of the future of civilization, about which there is so much concern at the present time. We need draw no sharp line between culture and civilization, though no doubt the former pertains rather to the individual, the latter to the society. Culture consists primarily in the perfecting of per-

[1] *Introduction à la Philosophie Analytique de l'Histoire*, p. 144.

sonal capacities,[1] civilization in a progressive movement of society.[2] Culture is the more natural, spontaneous unfolding of the powers of man under the stimulus whether of nature or of society; civilization is the product of more witting, self-conscious and even artificial life. Culture is rather of the soil, civilization is city-bred. Yet there is no necessary breach between them. If culture consists, as Emerson said, in the measure of things taken for granted, civilization consists in the measure of social traits that may be assumed. And it may be shown that in the long run personal perfections and social dispositions reinforce each other, whilst reversely either will languish in the prolonged absence of the other.[3] A brilliant Athens may show the highest degree of individual cultivation, but for lack of enduring social bonds it rapidly perishes. Rome, because of its social organization, imposes its civilization on Europe for centuries, yet declines for lack, above all else, of creative genius. The history of Western Europe so far as it is continuous and successful, consists in the interplay of these two factors, individual and social activity, internal and external improvement. It cannot be supposed that

[1] Cp. KANT: *Critique of Judgment*, p. 355. "The production of the aptitude of a rational being for arbitrary purposes in general (consequently in his freedom) is *culture*. Therefore, culture alone can be the ultimate purpose which we have cause for ascribing to nature in respect of the human race . . . . . ."

[2] Cp. GUIZOT: *History of Civilization*, Ch. I. (p. 11. Sisley's edition). "The idea of progress, of development, (of a people) appears to me the fundamental idea contained in the word *civilization*."

[3] Cp. MACIVOR: *Community*, pp. 214-9.

Western Europe is richer in native capacity than was Greece or Rome, yet the greater variety of its elements,—Roman, Christian and Gothic—has produced an equipoise and on the whole a harmony which have ensured steady progress for a thousand years. It is often found that an inferior but well-balanced nature in an individual will outdistance a more gifted but one-sided character. So it has been with the West, which, with all its shortcomings in separate directions as compared with ancient civilizations, has shown at once a richness and continuity of development which surpasses theirs. So at least the Western mind thinks.[1] We have yet to enquire whether this moving equilibrium has been fatally overthrown, this harmony ended.

On many hands we are warned that European civilization is imperilled. This is easy to see after the Great War, though when in the 19th century, thinkers like Ruskin, Renouvier and Tolstoy uttered grim warnings, their words fell unheeded. One or another pointed out that with the industrial revolution the aims of the western world had become quantitative rather than qualitative, that mass-methods had taken the place of distinctiveness in production, and in general that mechanism was ousting art. The consequence, they thought, was increased feverishness of life, restless for new markets in which to find new stimuli for jaded tastes and in which to dispose of masses of wares, and a disposition to violence which sprang from the competition this involved and the fears it excited. The

[1] Cp. Guizot: *op. cit.* Ch. II.

destruction of beauty, whether natural or human, was the fitting accompaniment of such a brutalized state of mind. The competitive system was likely to find a suitable climax in the havoc of war ; whilst the worship of quantity rather than quality was tending to be expressed in the most colossal massacre in history. They thought in consequence that "civilization" was on the edge of a catastrophe, some even like Morris hailing the event with joy as the beginning of a better way of living. The foregoing picture, though a composite one, fairly represents the views of the chief prophets of the last century.[1]

Now that war has stunned us there are those who see in it the *débâcle* of civilization, the destruction of its equilibrium, the tragedy of the occidental world-view which, with its illusion of progress by mechanism, has misled men into a deadly optimism. We must therefore renounce such an optimistic world-view, and confining ourselves to mystical insight into the will-to-live, attain a new enthusiastic and religious ethic—reverence for all life—which will beget a new civilization.[2] Another writer, of much celebrity, tells us that history runs in parallel though not simultaneous epochs, whose stages broadly resemble each other. They begin in spontaneous culture, artistic and religious, and develop to a healthy maturity in which philosophy flourishes, to end in a

[1] Cp. *The Social Philosophy of Carlyle and Ruskin*, by F. W. Roe; RENOUVIER: *Le Personnalisme*, pp. 203–4; TOLSTOY: *The Kingdom of Heaven is Within You*, Ch. 12.

[2] SCHWEITZER: *Civilization and Ethics*, Preface and Ch. 1 and 21.

scientific and mechanistic civilization. Our present life in big cities is the very sign of the last stage of an epoch, the stage at which ripe culture becomes corrupt civilization. It forebodes social dissolution and the decline of the West.[1] A somewhat similar conclusion, based on economic analysis, is reached by some who see in the great disparity between rich and poor, in the parasitic idleness of some sections of society and the human wreckage of others, in simultaneous "over-production" and "under-consumption," in limitation of output by monopolies and workmen alike, in economic and political imperialism with its natural reaction in revolution, a drift towards universal sabotage and the decay of capitalist civilization.[2]

It seems likely however that these gloomy estimates are as mistaken as were the absurdly sanguine beliefs in mechanical progress which preceded them. It is too early yet to speak of the downfall of civilization, or even of that portion of it called western. True, civilizations have perished before now and left their records only in stone or sand. There is insufficient evidence that it must have been so, and certainly the argument from analogy between the course of life of an individual and that of a Culture is precarious. The culture-epoch theory, with its periods of nascence, maturity and decline—still less with its periods of 1000 years[3] —cannot be said to have justified itself to the extent

[1] SPENGLER: *The Decline of the West*, Vol. I, esp: Ch. I, 10, 11.
[2] SYDNEY AND BEATRICE WEBB: *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization.*
[3] As in Spengler: see tables at end of Vol. I.

of warranting predictions.[1] Fatalism of this kind is likely indeed to promote its own verification, but it may be argued that the belief in possible progress is equally capable of achieving its own realization. This belief is itself a comparatively recent thing as a widespread philosophy of history, and, with its correlative of confidence in the power of cultures to control their destiny, may save us from the inertia which has been a chief cause of the doom of civilizations. Arguments drawn from our present conditions are the most powerful of all, yet they must not be one-sided or omit to point out the means of salvation. It is in the hope that warnings will be effective and that the present state of civilization is not irremediable that we must put our trust. The present position seems to be one of nearly even equipoise between the destruction of our form of civilization and its advancement to heights of unparalleled success.[2]

Wider questions here begin to open out. Have we any warrant for supposing that the issue, happy or tragic, is in our own hands? Is it not rather the case that we must accept either an optimistic or a pessimistic world-view which will determine the issue for us? There is a temper which finds (or makes) the world-course a comedy, whether human or divine or both; it may be expressed in the phrase that this is the best of all possible worlds, or that the real is rational, or merely that in the long run all's right with the world. This faith (for proof there is

[1] Cp. the criticisms upon the Herbartians in Education.

[2] Cp. HOBHOUSE: *Social Development*, p. 297.

so far none) is most probably temperamental, the accompaniment of successful striving for existence, and as such highly useful but nowise scientific. A sanguine temperament is like opium for causing pleasant illusions, and illusions are sometimes advantageous for a while. Animal spirits will often be successful where reflection would fail, and in any case failure will not be recognizable by them. Naturally enough it is the inexperienced peoples that are sanguine about the future, and in historical times, these have mostly been found in the West. The young religions of the West had as their correlative the belief in a future happy life whether in Valhalla, Heaven or Paradise. This made them largely indifferent to their fate in this world, their hopes being other-worldly. Their modern counterparts are those cheerful believers in a future earthly paradise which is to come automatically by the processes of evolution or perhaps of catastrophe. Plainly optimism encourages carelessness and inactivity about the course of civilization, breeds complacency or recklessness, and is inimical to progress.

Its popular antithesis is pessimism which, however stated, implies that evil prevails on the whole over good. It therefore advocates the extinction of desire in man, for life is tragedy. Long experience and deep reflection bring disillusionment of sanguine hopes, and it is felt that the future cannot be expected to be better than the past. The ancient civilizations of the East are the natural home of such pessimism, for there physical and social conditions are so rigid

and oppressive as to stifle hopes of improvement. Yet it is significant that in the last century the West adopted in part this gloomy doctrine, the connexion of which with mechanical and social oppression can hardly be doubted. Where the creative impulse is thwarted, there resignation and eventually despair are likely to set in. There are few who can contemplate decadence with the forced joy of Nietzsche who, believing the world's course to be a perpetually recurring cycle, can say cheerfully "*Da Capo!*" The monotony of such a fate must bring lethargy or revolt, in either case resulting in indifference to plans for the future of civilization. That some such mood possessed large sections of European people in the beginning of this century is indisputable, and after the disillusionment of the war and its results it still remains the chief enemy to progress. Some, Schweitzer for instance, accordingly say that the chief issue of our time lies between an optimistic and a pessimistic world-view.

These are nevertheless not the only alternatives; they are not strict contradictories but admit of a mean. That mean is meliorism, which teaches that man's lot is improvable. Rejecting alike the fancy that man is a favourite child of nature and the dread that he is her enemy, meliorism holds that, so far as science can see, the cosmos is neutral and that it is man's business to master her forces. Finding himself the product of the cosmos, and discovering that there are no known limits to the exploration and use of her powers, he can believe in the indefinite betterment of his estate. Physical science fixes no term

to his development but rather encourages hopes of the vast extension of his control over nature,[1] whilst social science is insistent that the immediate need is the resolute application of the knowledge he possesses. This attitude to the world (including humanity) is, as a general and consistent method, of recent growth.[2] It has arisen in consequence of our vastly increased knowledge since the Renascence, and of our conviction that knowledge is power. The discovery that there are regular laws of nature, yet that these can generally be found or turned to account only by diligence and wisdom, is the great incentive to exertion. That the future of civilization turns upon man's own efforts for social betterment is the scientific conclusion of meliorism, which rejects alike the illusions of optimism and the despair of pessimism. If pessimism is comparable to ugliness and optimism to easy beauty, meliorism is to be likened to what is called difficult beauty. The world-course seems to be neither a comedy nor a tragedy, but so far a melodrama whose climax we may help to decide.

That the notion of progress, conceived as indefinite improvability of man, has its difficulties is unquestionable. We need not identify it with evolution in the sense of gradual and continuous change, for history shows too many cases of gradual decadence. And reversely history shows improve-

[1] Contrast the different accounts of man's place in nature, given by Bertrand Russell in his essay, "A Free Man's Worship" and in Henderson: *The Order of Nature*. The true doctrine seems to be that stated by Lester Ward: *Outlines of Sociology*, Ch. 2.

[2] FLINT: *Philosophy of History*, p. 203.

ment taking place as the result of sudden and discontinuous change. Progress probably occurs dispersedly and by spurts, and is subject to many setbacks ; at the best it is more like a spiral than either a circle or a straight line. There is no need to assume that the idea of progress requires it to be the necessary outcome of the psychical and social nature of man, the destined advance of civilization in the future.[1] All that is required is the possibility of progress, and for this science certifies the stability of the present conditions of the solar system for many myriads of years to come.[2] There is then no necessary law of human progress ; there is only a challenge to the goodwill of man. The law of his actions, whether progressive or regressive, is only empirically discovered after the event. But we may safely believe that man will profit by experience in the effort for betterment. What is chiefly requisite to-day is the prophet who can concretely visualize the possibilities of the near future, body them forth in generally understood language, and give them a local habitation and a name. Social control of human destiny is for the first time becoming possible, and though man's perfectibility is no doubt a matter of faith, his indefinite improvability is a matter of science, and in this sense it is still possible to entertain the idea of an earthly paradise.

It is then an exaggeration to speak about the shipwreck of the idea of an earthly paradise,[3]

[1] As Prof. Bury does in *The Idea of Progress*, pp. 5 and 7.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 6.

[3] NOVGORODTSEV : *Ob Obshchestvennom Idealye*, Gl. 2.

especially when the chief projects of recent times have not been tried. Their realization will tax man's creative powers. They are indeed practical absolutes but not theoretical, and they need not be assumed to be final. They thereby escape the criticism that Utopians are subject to the illusion of finality.[1] Nevertheless, they are ideals for the race, not for individuals, since the shadow of death creeps over every person. Death is man's tragedy and unless the individual can feel that the universe is friendly, his hopes for the race are always mingled with some personal bitterness which tends to break out in competition for the good things of life. The friendliness of the universe towards the aspiration for progress takes usually the form of belief in immortality. This alone seems to satisfy the full desire for indefinite advancement, and it is not an accident that the idea of progress has arisen in a civilization impregnated with the belief in a future life. Even cosmic emotion, the worship of the greatness and perfection of the universe, does not satisfy the hopes of the Faustian soul[2] of the western man. He demands "the glory of going on and still to be." Whether this demand can be gratified or not is a question which takes us into the sphere of religion, and turns upon the perhaps insoluble problem of the relation of time to eternity. Only in the religious realm, however, can the harmonization of all our aspirations be attained, and full sociality be realized.

[1] BURY: *op. cit.* Epilogue. [2] Spengler's term.

BOOK 3.

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RELIGIOUS.

"The only being which has the purpose of its existence in itself is man, *who can determine his purposes by Reason; or, where he must receive them from external perception, yet can compare them with essential and universal purposes, and can judge of this their accordance æsthetically: This* man *is, then, alone of all objects in the world, susceptible of an Ideal of* beauty; *as it is only* humanity *in his person, as an intelligence, that is susceptible of the Ideal of perfection."*—KANT: *Critique of Judgment* (p. 86 Bernard's Translation).

"The admiration for beauty, and also the emotion aroused by the manifold purposes of nature, which a reflective mind is able to feel even prior to a clear representation of a rational Author of the world, have something in themselves like religious *feeling. They seem in the first place by a method of judging analogous to moral to produce an effect upon the moral feeling (gratitude to, and veneration for, the unknown cause); and thus by exciting moral Ideas to produce an effect upon the mind, when they inspire that admiration which is bound up with far more interest than mere theoretical observation can bring about."*—KANT: *Ib.* (p. 424 Bernard's Translation).

CHAPTER VII.

Fellowship.

Spiritual Fellowship.

THE most hopeful attempt to attain a fuller social harmony than is possible to a mere earthly organization is made in what may be called spiritual fellowship. The term "fellowship" has not necessarily any religious flavour, yet it has lately been so much used in a quasi-religious sense that we may justifiably continue to employ it as involving super-earthly ends. It is the group-idea in religion, and as we have seen reason to regard the group-idea as the most productive of harmony in secular organizations, so we may find the idea of fellowship to be the most promising in religious. The fact of fellowship is of course as old as religion itself; yet it has been overlaid by forms of organization borrowed from political, economic or other sources, so that its re-assertion in recent times comes with the force of a new discovery. As a method wittingly and explicitly used, it has been in the main confined to a few religious innovators, like some of the great founders of new faiths, and has persisted chiefly in small sects like the Quakers. The tendencies to imperialistic or individualistic modes of organization

have produced the great historic churches of Europe; it remains to be seen whether the conscious re-application of an old method will not renovate, perhaps reconcile and possibly transform them.

The literature upon the subject is scanty,[1] necessarily so, for the movement is yet in its experimental stage. Yet those who during the last ten years have taken part in its activities are persuaded that a new hope for religion in a disillusioned world has arisen with the method of fellowship. Though here called a method, its main external features are just absence of stereotyped method, the lack of formal constitution, and the rapid fashioning of new modes of organization when accustomed ones flag. In this respect it is the religious embodiment of that communistic anarchy which we previously accepted as the social ideal. There are no settled leaders in a fellowship and consequently there is no hierarchy of offices. Persons come together for no other purpose than the cultivation of the spiritual life, and their relations to each other are ruled by the principles of freedom and love. There is, therefore, no discipline, though there is the far more effective stimulus of mutual sympathy. The common pursuit of spiritual ends makes the fellowship a quest rather than an institution, in which respect it differs from those apparently similar formations, the monastic orders. The members are strictly colleagues, and

[1] I have used *Personal Religion and the life of Fellowship*, by BISHOP TEMPLE; *Christian Fellowship in Thought and Prayer*, by MATTHEWS and BISSEKER; and the *C.O.P.E.C. Reports*, Nos. I and II. But chiefly I have relied upon personal experience during the last ten years.

there is no superiority save that which comes of fitness for performing certain temporary services.

To speak more positively, the method of fellowship assumes the truth of William Morris's dictum that isolation is hell, and seeks to find heaven in the corporate pursuit of spiritual ideals. (By spiritual is here meant God-ward directed, however we may at present define God, and the epithet covers that desire for deity of which Professor Alexander speaks[1] as well as more conventional aspirations). It is therefore above all a joint search for spiritual guidance, and it assumes that where a company of people submit themselves freely and unitedly to such a quest, there superhuman and ideal influences play upon them. They become the instrument upon which cosmical powers play according to the degree and direction of their faith. This attitude is obviously experimental and to be justified by its results. It can be adopted by scientists in the pursuit of truth or by practical men in the solution of everyday difficulties. It is most obviously seen in the groups which sprang up around the great enquirers such as Buddha or Socrates, the great reformers like St. Francis of Assisi or John Wesley, and pre-eminently in the band of disciples selected by Christ. Christianity was born in a spiritual fellowship, and it is the belief of many devout persons that its vitality ebbed when it forsook its original way of life and became a comparatively stereotyped organization.

There are two or three pre-conditions of spiritual fellowship. Evidently it is a voluntary society, de-

[1] *Space, Time and Deity*, Book 4. Ch. 2.

pendent from first to last upon spontaneous service. It springs into being usually from some similarity of spiritual experience, some felt lack or deprivation to be made good, some vision of an end to be achieved. To this end the members feel themselves to be dedicated, and in their pursuit of it they discover one another and enrich each others' experience by mutual intercourse. This intercourse is the *sine qua non* of fellowship, but it is important that it takes place not just between the like-minded, but rather between the most diverse characters. There is little value in repetition of experiences, and a predominance of one type of mind is likely to lead to a lack of perspective. Hence wise pioneers in the way of fellowship have sought to obtain the contributions of persons the most distant in status, capacity and education. In some cases[1] it is even made a custom that fellow-members shall perform certain duties—both menial and honorific—in rotation, in order that each shall enter the others' experience, however far removed ordinarily from his own. This is not merely a lesson in humility ; it is a valuable means of gaining deeper insight into common problems. For, finally, what fellowship requires is not simply service, still less charity, but sharing ; sharing of spiritual experiences primarily but also, it may be, of activities and goods.

The most famous of spiritual fellowships, that of the Twelve, exhibited these characteristics of voluntariness, diversity of gifts and functions, and participation in a common life. And further, it

[1] As in some colleges and settlements, and notably in the institution called Toc. H.

exemplified the maxim : " From each according to his ability, to each according to his need," for evidently there are different obligations upon the gifted and the ungifted, the strong and the weak. The disciple who doubts, the sons of thunder, the impetuous and the meditative—each and all have their special contributions to make and their proper dues to claim. Even the traitor, when known to be such, is not excluded from fellowship by public action but only by his own decision, to learn indeed that isolation is hell. The great danger that besets the fellowship is conspicuously illustrated in this case of particularism, though indeed all his fellow-members showed themselves in some measure devoid of insight into the wider and ulterior issues of their enterprise. Thus further progress upon the old lines becomes impossible ; catastrophe increases the confusion, and it is not till the members have learnt by bitter experience the difference between the spirit of sectarianism and of all-comprehensive devotion that they begin again to form groups in order " to turn the world upside down." Perhaps this story is a parable illustrating the normal law of the growth and expansion of spiritual fellowships ; we have yet to learn, however, more of their methods.

The first stage in the method, so far as it has been formulated in recent times, consists in the endeavour to attain corporately complete receptiveness to divine guidance. Just as the art-student has first to unlearn many of his acquired habits and regain " the innocence of the eye," so the religious seeker must recover innocence of spirit. This is attained by self-abase-

ment before Divine Wisdom, which faith assumes to be available for the direction of those who honestly seek it. The abandonment of personal preferences and prejudices, of "hopes to rise and fears to fall" even in one's own estimation; the desire to become stainless media through which divine influences shall pour; the attitude of acceptance towards any fresh revelation of truth that may be given—these conditions constitute what may be called natural piety, and are the beginnings of wisdom in spiritual things. Very often this stage is one of prayer, perhaps spoken but oftener silent, wherein the motives of the enquirers are exposed to ineffable light and undergo severe purification. Maybe a leader will guide the devotions of the company in the way of dedication of their powers to whatever new obligations they may find to be laid upon them; but the whole procedure avoids routine and encourages open-heartedness and expectancy. From the fact that Divine guidance is sought corporately, confidence in the results is more especially felt. It is justifiable to hope that more and higher spiritual values will be attained than by more individualistic search, however intense. Though indeed the individual worshipper is always one of a group of two.

The next stage in the process is that of corporate discussion, or more explicitly of the attempt of the members to think together with God. For again it is taken for granted that communication, not only with fellow-members but also with deity, is possible to persons who think and speak reverently and earnestly seek for divine direction. Such a faith

must be justified by its results, but certain it is that it produces a candour, a humility and a fearlessness not perhaps to be attained in any other way. Since the opinions of individuals are held to be but broken lights of the full spectrum of truth, the contributions of each are received as possible expressions of the spirit of all truth, and valued only in proportion as they seem to be intrinsically illuminating. Consequently no deference is paid to age or youth, wealth or position or learning, as such, but only to self-evidencing wisdom. The result is often at first a complication of the issue, since the problem whether theoretical or practical is seen from many new angles ; but it is generally found that apparently intractable questions yield surprisingly to frank and concerted discussion, so that those who participate therein are constrained to believe that they have had divine co-operation. Whatever be the psychological explanation, there is confidence among the members of the group that they have been reinforced by an invisible yet real presence, which has conferred with them and aided them in a solution beyond the limits of their own unaided human powers.

The consequence of this is that the group-members feel themselves committed to action beyond that attainable by a non-religious society. The assurance of a divine revelation leads to the belief in a mission to which earthly forces must yield. The test of experience is believed to verify this claim, and the successes of movements like those of various recent religious fellowships within the churches, of the inter-denominational social crusades, and of the inter-

national unions for the spiritualization of the political, economic and social orders are taken as confirmatory instances. It is held by those who have lived through some of these experiences that a use of this group-method will regenerate old institutions and also generate new ones. The "method" of course is not new; yet the spirit of division has so prevailed in later days that this return to the practice of the greatest masters of the religious life, especially Christ, is thought to be big with promise for a renascence of religion. The foregoing exposition, which has aimed at being as scientific as possible will necessarily appear to be cold and empty to those who have taken part in fellowship meetings, whilst to others it may seem to contain nothing fresh or distinctive. Yet it may well be that the modern recovery or development of an ancient art of corporate living is to be the ark which will preserve the treasures of civilization.

From a philosophical standpoint there are two or three features which distinguish the religious fellowships just described from others. There is for one thing the sense of a Presence more and other than that of one's human fellow-members. This may be variously described in different religions; but it seems to be a constant accompaniment of a truly spiritual society. The preparatory stage in the recent somewhat methodized fellowships is intended to allow this sense of real presence to be attained, and it is believed to be possible in proportion to the reverence and receptiveness of the devotees. Following this, the period of conference together is re-

garded as one of active intercourse, not only between the visible members, but also and most importantly between them and the invisible but present and sacred Being. The success of the deliberations is believed to depend chiefly upon this latter intercourse. Indeed the whole conception of divine guidance and fresh revelation requires this assumption of faith, but it is held to be confirmed pragmatically. In recent times no stress has been laid upon extraordinary events—upon signs and wonders—but much upon the rapid and unexpected consensus of conviction, both about general principles and concrete issues, which seemed humanly unattainable. Lastly the sense of power resulting from this commerce of human and superhuman is remarkable, carrying men and women to deeds of heroism and martyrdom from which worldly wisdom would generally flinch. The fellowship leads to the crusade.

In this religious revival (for such in a wide sense it may be called) the alliance of the social and the æsthetic is obvious. Whilst there is little attempt to work up emotional excitement, there is a marked tendency to employ, wittingly or not, the methods of social contagion—sympathy, imitation and suggestion—which are commonly the accompaniments of group-meeting. Very much of the efficacy of the movement must be attributed to this cause. But furthermore the factor of rhythm, which is perhaps cosmic in its scope and is certainly a fundamental characteristic of human nature, is manifest in the fairly orderly sequence of expectancy, deliberation and execution which is usually adopted, as well as

in the periodicity of meeting together. "The religious consciousness is as rhythmic in its action as any other aspect of the human mind."[1] Moreover a deliberate attempt is made to obey the canon of variety in unity by including within the groups persons of all sorts and conditions, who then are expected to be fully expressive, and not to be satisfied till full harmony is attained. Rhythm, expression, and harmony are among the chief principles of the æsthetic life and they are being exhibited, perhaps unwittingly, in the religious movements which to-day are most promising. Finally the governing belief in divine guidance, manifested by a genuine presence of the divine with the devout company, is a grand instance of experimental empathy in the spiritual world.

The question at once arises, what are the limits to a spiritual community such as has been broadly sketched? Must it necessarily be restricted to a few chosen spirits, or to scattered bands of devotees here and there in the world? Certainly the zeal of its present-day members does not so conceive its mission, but contemplates a world-wide community.[2] Nothing less than a world-church satisfies the aspirations of these ardent souls. Such a church has often been dreamt of but its realization has been as often thwarted by schism, so that in the 19th century Lotze could say in impressive words:

[1] PRATT: *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 166. Cp. the whole of ch. 9 with the above.

[2] Cp. in the political sphere Mr. Laski's vision of a world fellowship: *Grammar of Politics*, pp. 63–5, and Mr. Hobhouse's "Inter-communal Society," *Social Development*, p. 299.

"But while this world of truth and of ideas increases, human nature will not change, and life will always remain a long way behind the ideals that are set before successive generations. There will never be one fold and one shepherd, never one uniform culture for all mankind, never universal nobleness; but strife and inequalities of condition and the vital strength of evil will always continue."[1] And he illustrates this by showing that not one of the great international problems which had, so far, been taken up by European Congresses had received a satisfactory solution.[2] The Great War only underlines this failure. Yet perhaps the break-down was the result of a wrong method. If unity be conceived as uniformity and as imposed by one central authority, then we may readily believe that it will share the fate of all imperialisms. But mankind is beginning to conceive a mode of unity which shall embrace and even encourage differences. In the method of federation it vaguely feels that it has the principle of the resolution of discords.

In the light of such a principle differences will *prima facie* be claims to vocation. It will be assumed that varieties of gifts establish presumptive rights to their expression. The genius whether of individualities or societies will be respected as probably an enrichment of the total good. Evidently then the nature of that total good will shortly be a question of importance for our consideration, but for the moment it may be enough to point

[1] *Microcosmus*, Bk. 7. ch. 5. p. 300 (Eng. Trans).

[2] *Ib.* p. 567.

out that, before reflection has taken place upon this question, people are bound together by the pursuit of a common cause. In the spiritual, far more than in the economic sphere, a common cause is a means of mutual attraction amongst persons of very unlike talents. The problem of the blending of diverse wills is largely solved by the discovery of a cause to which all can be devoted. As Royce would put it, such a cause is primarily fascinating—a quasi-æsthetic term—and it is in the pursuit of such a cause that appreciation of others is greatly intensified. A mere assemblage becomes a true community when it reaches the stage of mutual appreciation for the sake of fascinating ends. Such a community loses that tinge of superiority often attributed to societies of mutual admiration, and becomes a chivalrous body of persons attracted to each other and to a common objective. We may call it a community of appreciation.

A World-Church.

There have been many such communities on a small scale, but never one on the grand or world scale. And for this reason, that no great world-cause has been placed before humanity, explicitly and with something like the general consent of the experts. Could some such cause become generally accepted it might lay the basis of a World-Church. Now we have seen earlier[1] that the great causes of humanity are what are called the ultimate values—truth, virtue and beauty—and there is

[1] pp. 103-4.

something like a consensus of opinion among modern philosophers that these are the characteristics by which deity is known.[1] Here then seems to be a universal human objective, a world-cause and an ultimate object of worship. All schools of theology and philosophy might meet here, however variously they interpreted the relations of the great values to each other and to reality as a whole. A spiritual community appreciative of the values to be found in its members and in the cosmos would be born, having for its object the maintenance and increase of those values. This would be no mere Comtist religion of humanity, for its sacred object would be cosmic, not merely human; it would reveal indeed what are commonly called the attributes of God. As a gifted young thinker who perished in the great war says: "The Religion in which men were held together would be a communion of believers, though there was no perfect unanimity of faith: love of the beautiful, no less than love of the true, would unite men for whom beauty assumed many shapes, and truth surpassed the effort of individual thinkers. This Church of Universal Humanity would represent the widest interest that any person may have—the interest in the Universal itself, in human life, knowledge and creative power."[2] Such a World-Church, he adds, is sometimes taken for more than a dream, for a happy guess at the inmost meaning

[1] Cp. DEAN INGE in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 195.

[2] *The Moral and Social Significance of the Conception of Personality*, by ARTHUR HEATH, M.A. p. 148.

of reality, and is on the border-line between earth and heaven.

Such a vision is unquestionably fascinating. The only question is as to its realizability. After several thousands of years, mankind still has not one fold and one shepherd, notwithstanding the efforts of great religions. May it not be however that the herdsmen have been over-eager to put a particular brand upon all the sheep, and have meantime forgotten to clear the ground of obstacles to the construction of sheepfolds at all? It has been left for comparatively recent thinkers to fix the outermost bounds of the spiritual community beyond the limits of any particular church and to admit to the religious fellowship all those who admire, respect and enquire after the ultimate values. This seems to be the least that can be required of the candidate for membership, but it is implicit in all human nature. The credit for making this qualification explicit belongs in the first instance to Kant, though many successors have entered into his labours.[1] In consequence, a World-Church, having for its object the worship of deity under the aspects of the great values, is conceivable and even attainable. It is likely that by a selection from the world's great religious literature, art and music a common form of worship could be found for those who hold the supreme values sacred. Such a faith would be a religion within the bounds of pure reason, certainly, but those churches which

[1] Notably Cousin, whose *Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bon* contains the fullest discussion known to me of the nature and relations of the great values.

have most claimed a special revelation have also insisted upon the existence of a natural religion discoverable by human reason. The extent to which thinkers so representative of East and West as Rabindranath Tagore[1] and Höffding[2] can speak a common language, and at the same time agree with so orthodox a churchman as Dean Inge,[3] points to a convergence of belief upon religious principles such as has not been hitherto seen in the world. Upon the foundations of a world-religion there is even now a large measure of agreement; upon the superstructure there may long be diversity of opinion. The foundations are laid in a psychology of human nature and a philosophy of the ideals to which that nature strives. Such ideals form a practical absolute or God for religious faith, and are under whatever title:

> In ev'ry Age,
> In ev'ry Clime ador'd,
> By Saint, by Savage, and by Sage,
> The Universal Lord.

The universal presuppositions of our manifold and diverse constructions are usually discovered last, and religion is not exempted from this rule. But so far as they are agreed upon we have the bases of a World Church.

Thus far then, Lotze's foreboding, "Never one fold and one shepherd" would seem to be unjustified.

[1] In *Sādhanā*: *The Realization of Life.*

[2] In *The Philosophy of Religion.*

[3] In *Faith and its Psychology.*

There remains for consideration another suggestion, that "if every stumbling-block were smoothed away, then indeed mankind would be as one flock" but with the result that it would return to a pre-civilized state and like a flock of innocent brutes would feed upon the good things provided by Nature.[1] At this price, truly, we should not wish to become one flock; but is the price necessary? We have seen reason to think that at least the grosser ills of humanity—poverty, disease, war, etc.—are preventable or remediable, and a large part of mankind has set itself to achieve the social goods of liberty, equality and fraternity. These last, which are profoundly in accord with our predominant Western religion,[2] seem to be well within the limits of human attainment, not indeed by the state but by the church. For a true community cannot be established by force, but only by love. "It is fraternity alone can work the miracle of a reconciliation between the conflicting claims of liberty and equality."[3] Supposing this to be accomplished, there would be no need for humanity to sink back into brutish sloth, for it might strive incessantly to renew and to increase the great values. There will never be too much of them, and they will always beckon us afresh to their realization. This would be a policy as well as a religion, and far from leaving us inert in the arms

[1] *Microcosmus*, p. 301.

[2] Cp. A. T. CARLYLE: *The Influence of Christianity upon Social and Political Ideals*, ch. 2.

[3] *Personality*: by ARTHUR HEATH. p. 154. (Contrast the methods of the modern Communists with those of the Friends).

of a kindly mother Nature, would incite us to make Nature bring forth more abundantly of her treasures of beauty.

Here evidently we touch upon the relations between matter and spirit. Whatever be their metaphysical connexions it is plain that man's duty toward the material is to make it subserve the production of the great values. In the study of physical nature man has an inexhaustible field for the acquirement of knowledge. "Nature's infinite book of secrecy" is a training ground for candour, honesty, veracity. Again, the production and distribution of her products is a possible discipline in industry and justice. Man's moral nature is exhibited and exercised in dealing with economic goods, and the economic order might become a great teacher of ethics. Once more, the natural world might be treated as a source of beauty, the sensuous revelation of the divine. Matter, that is to say, is for the purpose of being spiritualized, and dedicated to the highest ends that we know. Any lower treatment than this is idolatry, the worship of inferior things when we know the higher. Such action is a deadly sin, of momentous consequences for human nature. It is melancholy to think of the amount of scientific knowledge perverted to base ends, of greed and injustice in the getting and spending of material wealth, and of the callous destruction of natural beauty in England alone to-day. All this is done in honour of false gods like wealth and power, for the sake of which we ravish nature and brutalize ourselves. Such

idolatry is, after a century and a half of industrialism, having its appropriate results in social strife and revolt. The whole story is mythically told in Wagner's *Ring*.

The reconciliation of matter and spirit is possible only if matter is treated as ministrant to the great spiritual ends. So used it becomes sacramental, in the classic sense of an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace. A sign of this sort is an emblem, a symbolic representation of the divine, or, as Berkeley might say, a spiritual language. Now the aim of natural philosophy in the nineteenth century in the West, scientifically and practically, was to reduce nature to a machine from which purpose, meaning and spirituality, were as far as possible banished. The result was to depreciate the great values, and at the best to restore them by a roundabout argument for the existence of God, based upon the discovery that even a machine which shows the capacity of evolving must imply directive control.[1] Equally important, however, is the question what the evolution is towards, to which our answer has been that it is towards the production of the supreme values. This means that the cosmical machine's value is not in itself but in the ends which it subserves. But now it becomes a sign, an indicator of a deeper reality than itself, a means of conveying spiritual "graces." As such it is seen with the eye not so much of a mechanist as of an artist, for an artist of all men is one who realizes the spiritual significance of matter. The scientist and the moralist

[1] Cp. Mr. Turner's argument in *Personality and Reality*.

indeed, may see the same truth, but not, we previously judged,[1] with the same assurance of finality.

Science and morality (may we not say ?) are prone to mechanize reality. Science (meaning thereby exact knowledge) is mathematical, and mathematics deals with the quantitative but is impotent to treat of the qualitative. It can explain nature as a system of homogenous forces, but not as a vision of delight ; it can account for music as a physiological reaction to certain sound waves, but not as " the food of love." The scientific ideal seems to be to reduce all qualitative differences (those for instance, of colour-scale or tone-scale) to variations in the relations of some simple elements, such as space-time. Such a simplification of reality may be true as far as it goes, but it does not go far or deep. As Urban says, " the mechanical world order, the immensities of time and space are, as such, worthless." They are valuable only as indispensable conditions of the spiritual, and the scientific knowledge of which they supply the material seems thereby limited to relatively superficial values. And again ethics, with its tendency to formulate life into codes whether of law or morality, is apt to judge of values by the external test of conduct. It is occupied much with the machinery—political or legal organizations—whereby right conduct can be obtained, but in so doing is most liable to result in formality.

Art is antithetical to the mechanical and formal. It attracts and it inspires, is in spirit most akin to religion of all the great pursuits of man. With all

[1] See pp. 103-4.

its great dangers (which it shares with religion) of over-excitement of the passions, it is also that sphere in which we most plainly see inspiration. It is capable of transforming nature (physical and human) into a symbol of the divine. Indeed its symbolical mode of expression is the one most commonly used by religion, and the close connexion between art and religion in history points to their near affinity. The language of prayer, praise and ritual is mainly couched in æsthetic terms ; ritual is religious drama, and even the great creeds are poetical rather than scientific (or even philosophic) statements. Worship, as contemplated by an onlooker, would most aptly be described as action-play. To the Protestant, who does not believe in Transubstantiation, this is how Roman Catholic worship largely appears ; whereas to the Roman Catholic, who does so believe, Protestant worship conveys a similar impression. Even to the believer himself much of his worship is expressed in forms symbolic rather than precise. The great mysteries of the Church are necessarily bodied forth in anthropomorphic terms, and so long as this is done wittingly and cautiously it conveys truth in a way not otherwise possible.[1] The æsthetical and the religious are not simply identical, truly, but their intimate union with one another and with the social[2] indicates the need for a religious training which shall combine the resources of art and of society for the furtherance of religious ends. This brings us to consider the means of education at our disposal for

[1] Cp. on the above CANON STREETER : *Reality*, ch. 2.

[2] Cp. MISS HARRISON'S : *Ancient Art and Ritual*, especially chs. 3 and 7.

the production of a community appreciative of the spiritual values.

Education.

Our argument has so far been to the effect that the æsthetic is the core of the social as the social is the core of the religious life. If this main contention be true, it will follow that education in the spiritual values will focus in the æsthetic. This is so because the æsthetic is more intimately bound to desire than is the intellect or the will, and in desire we discover the innermost nature of a person. "As a man thinketh in his heart so is he." In desire we learn what really attracts us, in spite perhaps of our theoretical convictions or our dutiful actions. And attractiveness or fascination in the realm of spiritual values we found pre-eminently if not solely in the æsthetic,[1] education in which results in the purification, steadying and balancing of our desires. It may be said,[2] why then are artists of all sorts so notoriously unbalanced and often vicious in their lives? There are many answers to this charge, supposing it for argument's sake to be substantially true. The great art which we have so far been considering is the art of living together, and this is a far wider art than that of any specialist. Success in one field of art does not of itself guarantee success in another, but rather hinders it. A great poet is not often an expert musician as well; for though the basic principles

[1] Cp. *supra*, pp 96-8.
[2] As by a friendly critic to the writer.

in both arts may be the same the techniques are quite different.

And in any case it is most doubtful whether skill in one pursuit spreads over to other pursuits, as educational psychology has shown abundantly. What is necessary in education is training in the general principles of all art and in the special skill of one. The art of living together is a big and complex affair, success in which is not ensured by (often precocious) development in a limited field, such as painting. Too often with the young virtuoso the art of living is neglected altogether. Still (it may be urged) that is no sufficient reason why artists should not behave decently, like other inadequately educated persons. For one thing, however, modern, and especially Protestant, religion has severed the earlier relation between itself and art, and has thus lost moral influence over it. Art has thereby become secularized and often paganized. Furthermore with the divorce between it and religion has largely gone also the union between it and the social, for the respectable (mostly churchgoers) have avoided it. Its natural channel being thus obstructed it has become a matter for cults and coteries which have gone their own careless or contemptuous way. Even then, however, the faults attributed to the artistic are mainly those of passion, of intemperance whether in wine or in sexual life. These are at least warm-hearted sins, whereas the sins of their opposites—the Philistines—are apt to be cold-hearted, for instance, acquisitiveness. The results of the

division of society into the acquisitive Philistine, the careless Bohemian, and the conventional Puritan are illustrated in Lord Morley's description of a Lancashire town in the 19th century.[1]

Few pictures could illustrate better the results of the separation between religion, culture and the social life. The nineteenth century in England probably saw the world's completest severance between these natural allies which from the twelfth to the seventeenth centuries had together chiefly produced the greatest civilization in history (at least in the West). History does not support the suspicion of art as being superfluous or inimical to the social or religious life. It is the plain fact that religion has been generally favourable to art and to social living and that Christianity especially has fostered both. This was conspicuous in the life of its Founder, and when it has allowed asceticism to gain the upper hand, as in Monasticism or Puritanism, it has been untrue to its own genius.[2] The great art of the Middle Ages was at once social

[1] "Although the theology of a town like Blackburn is of a narrow, unhistoric, and rancorous kind, yet one must give even this dull and cramped Evangelicanism its due, and admit that the churches and chapels have done a good service through their Sunday schools and otherwise in impressing a kind of moral organisation on the mass of barbarism which surged chaotically into the factory towns. Lancashire theology does not make a man love his neighbour; but its external system promotes cleanliness, truth-telling, and chastity, and the zeal of the clergy of all sects, however much we may wish that it had been connected with a more hopeful doctrine, has been a barrier, for which civilisation will always owe something to their name, against the most awful influx the world ever saw of furious provocatives to unbridled sensuality and riotous animalism."—F. W. HIRST: *The Early Life and Letters of John Morley.* Vol. 1, p. 10.

[2] TROELTSCH: *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen*, p. 45.

and religious, and the post-Renascence art in the main continued to be so. "Protestantism produced the greater part of the greatest poetry, prose and music in the modern world; it produced great architecture, great painting and the one great religious painter since Tintoret—the mighty Rembrandt."[1] And Protestantism has led the way in the diffusion of spiritual goods throughout society by means of education. Yet in the 18th and 19th centuries Western religion allowed both the social and the æsthetic life of the community to drift away from its sphere of interest—the one to become the prey of the "economic man" and the other to be treated as a luxury. Relations between the three are not much better generally to-day, and in some respects far worse. Were Lord Morley alive now, he would be discussing whether a civilization so torn could continue to stand.

From our present educational point of view the instant need then is for a reunion of art, social life and religion. The other great values besides beauty received much consideration in the 19th century, for the churches supported morality steadily upon the whole, and society upheld the claims of science even against the churches. There is little need to-day to urge the importance of the ethical values in religious education, and the truth-values have, in spite of obscurantism both amongst scientists and ecclesiastics, largely ceased to divide cleric from layman. There remain the æsthetic values to be fully acknowledged by all our spiritual guides,

[1] Dr. Percy Dearmer; *Art and Religion*, p. 42.

as those which unify and harmonize the rest. That they do so may be shown from the way in which they have been treated by great thinkers and educationists since they were explicitly recognized as a distinct cultural discipline. This took place under the influence of Kant's analysis of the mind into the pure reason, the practical reason, and the æsthetic judgment. The æsthetic philosophy of Kant tentatively brought together again the pure reason and the practical will, which had been sundered by his earlier agnosticism. For this reason the third *Critique* has been called the crown of the Critical philosophy. It is true that Kant did not draw the pedagogical conclusion which might have been expected, and that he remained to the end a moralist in education, and one whose God was a Law-Giver.[1]

His disciple Schiller did draw the conclusions over which his master hesitated, and definitely regarded art as the synthesis of the pure and the practical reason, of nature and morality. Sense and reason, duty and inclination should not struggle painfully against each other, but should harmonize in a way which finds expression in beauty. This can take place only through the influence of art, which acts without coercion and insensibly raises us beyond the struggle between the natural and the spiritual. Art denotes not only the beginning of the spiritual life but also its loftiest point. The highest philosophy, like the highest morality and politics, ends in a poetic idea. Civilization—which

[1] *Kant on Education*: translated by A. CHURTON. p. 110,

has separated church and state, law and morality, labour and consumption, and has truncated the individual by division of labour—must be unified by perfection of culture, which at its highest is æsthetic. This will give free and balanced and harmonious play of human powers and produce the " beautiful soul," with whom it is not individual actions that are moral but the whole being. The maximum of perfection in man's nature is moral beauty which only arises when duty has become *second* nature. Reasoning may change individual modes of thinking but never convert the whole person. Only desire can drive out desire. It is the business of æsthetic to reconcile the other powers and transform the whole man. " All other exercises give to the mind some peculiar aptitude, but for that very reason they impose upon it a particular limit; only the æsthetic leads to the unlimited. . . . . The æsthetic alone is a whole in itself. . . . . Here alone we feel ourselves snatched out of time."[1] So speaks the deeply religious poet, whose advice, had it been wholeheartedly pursued, might have guided the 19th century between the rock of industrialism and the whirlpool of militarism which together eventually wrecked it.

The greatest educationist of the last century, J. F. Herbart, continued—whether intentionally or not—the thought of Schiller, and fashioned it out into a system of education which has been of

[1] Cp. A. von Gleichen-Russworm: *Schiller als Erzieher*, pp. 84–5, etc. Also see Höffding's excellent summary of Schiller's teaching: *History of Modern Philosophy*, vol. 2, pp. 130–135.

the greatest importance to Europe. Whilst accepting morality as the end of education his view of ethics was very different from the ordinary conception, and was to be expressed, he said, in the maxim, "Be this," not "Do this." His ethics was æsthetic in character: indeed the science of the estimation of value is called æsthetics in the widest sense, and ethics is subsumed under it. Ethical judgments proper are distinguished from the æsthetical in general by the fact that they apply to human beings, not to beings of all sorts. But the relations between one man's different inclinations, or between the wills of several men, are beautiful or ugly just as are the relations between the qualities of things. The object of Taste is "the proper, the beautiful, the moral, the right—in one word *that which in its perfect state pleases after perfect contemplation*." "Taste is strict and retracts nothing. Life must be ruled according to the laws of Taste, or it sinks under its reproaches."[1] These laws are immediate and intuitive, when reflection is aroused, and can no more be proved than the laws of music. A person judges himself and his neighbours by these laws of ethical taste which in time exert that slow pressure which we call conscience.[2]

Conscience expresses itself in judgments upon the harmonious or discordant relations between a man's convictions and acts, or between the actions of several men towards each other. Thus, if there is lack of harmony between a man's insight and his

[1] *The Science of Education*: translated by FELKIN. p. 195.

[2] *Ib.* p. 66.

action, we find him lacking in Inner Freedom ;[1] if he lacks fulness of insight and energy we deplore his lack of Completeness or Perfection (*Vollkommenheit*).[2] In his relations to others, disinterested devotion to their welfare arouses the idea of Benevolence which is intuitively regarded as admirable, whilst the agreement of wills to prevent strife about external objects yields the judgment of Right. Finally, benefit or harm done by one will to another awakens the immediate thought of recompense or punishment and furnishes the judgment of Equity. Herbart, at least, regarded these five relationships, internal or external to an individual, as being æsthetic relations comparable to those between musical sounds, and in conditions of purity and clearness as being necessarily and immediately discerned.[3] Doubtless he has not discovered all the " musical " relationships of man, and probably he does not wholly agree with other æsthetical moralists in the arrangement of his system. But do other moralists agree, and have they a settled system ? It is not unlikely but quite the reverse that the æsthetical relations within and between men will broadly agree with those discovered

[1] Contrast, " Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free," with " The evil that I would not, that I do."

[2] As in the case of people with " good intentions."

[3] Cp. the following extract from a letter of W. E. Gladstone upon the two chief virtues : " I should almost dare to say that there are five generous men for one just man. The beauty of justice is the beauty of simple form : the beauty of generosity is heightened with colour and every accessory, but they always tend to divert from justice. The man who strongly loves justice must love it for its own sake, and such a love makes of itself a character of simple grandeur to which it is hard to find an equal." (Quoted in James Ward's *Psychology applied to Education*, p. 135).

by ethics,[1] for our thesis has been that all the ultimate values converge in one unity or absolute. Herbart seems at least to have supplied what was lacking in the views of Schiller, namely scientific æsthetic analysis of the chief relationships of the human will, and his system has been successfully applied.

Worked out as a sociology Herbart's five æsthetico-moral ideas furnished the following bases for a regenerated society; the idea of Equity that of a system of Reward or Wages, the idea of Right that of Social Justice, the idea of Benevolence that of Good Administration, the idea of Perfection that of a system of Culture, and Inner Freedom that of an Ideal Society. An æsthetic which proposes to reform economics, law, politics, culture and even religion needs a great method. The method is education, and the school is to be a society in miniature which exhibits at work the great ideas just described. Its means will be an æsthetic revelation of the world in which the course of history will be exhibited as the theatre in which these ideas have been working their way in the hearts of men; as a movement which reveals the whole known world with its imperfections and contrasts, and uses all the resources of education to make vivid the forms of creation and the efforts of man to reach perfection; as a drama set against a background of nature, and striving upwards to the super-sensuous—to God as the Highest Being. This method, inadequately sketched here,[2] has been tried in very many schools

[1] Herbart himself meets the objection that they are *logical* relations! *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Meiner's ed. p. 149).

[2] See *Science of Education*, pp. 57–77.

and has proved perhaps the greatest means yet discovered for reforming European society. It binds together the æsthetic, the social and the religious, and builds up a community appreciative of the great values in a way that would have delighted the heart of Plato. It is a practical demonstration of the importance of applied æsthetics, and given full scope, would perhaps restore a sick civilization.[1]

The chief English champion of the importance of the æsthetic in education was John Ruskin. Though he often did not distinguish clearly between the spiritual values, and was prone to assume the office of preacher or moralist, it is very evident that his great message was the importance of beauty in nature, art and social life. It is this theme that binds together his analysis of natural forms, his social policy, and his theology, and makes his philosophy a coherent whole in spite of minor inconsistencies. His insight was that of the seer rather than of the discursive thinker, and he had a vision of a world in which nature—unsullied and fair as before the industrial revolution—was a prime teacher, where social life was moulded by ideals of perfection surpassing those of Greece, and where the glory of God was plainly manifest in all forms of beauty. Education was to be essentially an application of the dictum that we live by admiration, hope and love. He tried to teach his generation what things to admire in physical nature, in art and literature, and in human life. His hope was shown, in spite of heavy

[1] The foregoing rather lengthy exposition was perhaps necessary to meet protests that æsthetics are inapplicable in real life.

discouragement, in his schemes for the regeneration of a society over which he prophesied woes. And the impossibility of appreciating rightly anything, whether natural, human or divine, without love, was a cardinal point of his teaching. John Ruskin is a signal instance of the heroic strength and tender devotion which may spring from the worship of beauty, and of the insight which the æsthetic vision gives. And he shows once more how closely art, sociality and religion are bound together.[1]

The messages of such teachers as Schiller, Herbart and Ruskin give point to the claim that an æsthetic revelation of the world is the chief need in religious education to-day. The rights of science have now been largely admitted by religion, the dues of morality have been stressed, but the claims of art have been generally ignored. It is well said that the problem of our time is no longer the reconciliation of religion with science, but the reconciliation of religion with art.[2] Widening the term "art" to cover what is well called God's art—the beauty of Nature—the prime need of religious policy in education is to restore to man his birthright : the glory of the world. "The 19th century found the world beautiful and left it ugly,"[3] and thereby blotted out the most obvious sign of the presence of the divine. A religion that wishes to have its foundations secure will restore with all speed this essential part of its justification. "Two things fill me with

[1] Cp. on above JOLLY : *Ruskin on Education* ; *The Social Philosophy of Carlyle and Ruskin*, by F. W. ROE ; and R. DE LA SIZERANNE : *Ruskin, ou la Religion de la Beauté.*

[2] DEARMER : *op. cit.* p. 32. [3] *Ib.* p. 28.

awe," said Kant, " the starry heavens above and the moral law within." The heavens of the modern Englishman are mostly hidden in smoke, his air foul with poison-gas and his land defaced by mammonism. Not until the bible of nature is unveiled once more to him will he, on a large scale, care much again about the bible of the churches. The masses of the common folk in whom the religious tradition of Europe still works deeply, though obscurely, feel instinctively that in spite of the combination of churchly asceticism with commercialism, which has taken place in recent times,[1] the splendour of the earth is made for their spiritual nurture and enjoyment. This they will have at any cost to institutions. The churches will be wise to forestall this demand.

As for social life, the church that desires to be effective in the future will concern itself not merely with " the moral law within " but with that law exhibited concretely in human relations without. It is possible to make of modern society what the Greeks made of their state : a work of art.[2] The human body may become primarily a temple of the Holy Ghost instead of an engine of economics or war ; and human beauty, the sign of health and purity, a chief end of education. Social relations may be governed by the æsthetic principles of Herbart, and applied as a practical sociology. The economic system may be transformed from a competitive struggle to a distributive system where each contributes according to ability and receives according to need ; social law

[1] TROELTSCH : *op. cit.* pp. 790–794.

[2] HEGEL : *Philosophy of History*, Part ii, ch. 3.

may establish relations of equality, liberty and justice ; politics may become a real art for the promotion of the well-being of society ; we may fashion an adequate and fair educational system ; and even begin seriously to plan an ideal society. Such measures, carefully adjusted and integrally united, would go far to found that society which is often described as the kingdom of heaven on earth. It seems appropriately described as a harmony on human wills,[1] and it is for churchmen to say whether they seriously desire such a harmony.

Finally, organized religion will need to exhibit concord within itself. The bitterness of sectarianism must give way to mutual respect and admiration. A comprehensiveness which yet does not sink differences, but prizes them, will be indispensable. Yet to be attractive the Church must be epical in character, earnestly engaged in a heroic contest with error, foulness, and evil. It should be not too shy to deal with the powers of the earth, but obviously engaged in a crusade. For this purpose it should employ all modes of beauty, being sure that none are common or unclean. In so doing the Church would simply be returning to its age-long practice, and restoring to the common man his spiritual heritage. The widespread dissatisfaction with the meagre content supplied in the churches' services to-day[2] could be largely met by a liberal use of the resources of living art in all its forms. The churches' buildings might be models of noble structure, themselves suggestive

[1] Cp. HOBHOUSE : *Social Development*, p. 199.

[2] DEARMER : *op. cit.* p. 32.

of reverence and adoration ; they might be treasuries of pictures painted by modern artists who could tell us how religion appears to their vision ; they could be chambers of music where the foremost of modern arts was heard in all its fulness of religious expression, the works of the greatest masters with their vast breadth of popular appeal being constantly used ; they should be schools of literature where people could learn what inspiration meant by reading and hearing religious scriptures expounded as if they were truly living ; perhaps most of all in this kind they should be places of worship[1]—places where the highest worths or values, of which one is beauty, are given due homage.[2]

[1] Cp. CARLYLE's explanation of the word " worship " in *Heroes and Hero-Worship*, ch. I.

[2] " I would place it (social art) next to religion in power to transform the brute into the angel. . . . . If there is anyone in this age who does the work of the Amoses and Isaiahs of old, it is an Ibsen, a Tolstoy, or a Victor Hugo."—Ross : *Social Control*, p. 416.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Kingdom of God.

Christ as Poet.

THE most famous æsthetic revelation of the world is that which is bound up with the name of Jesus Christ. That the Kingdom of God was such a revelation is perhaps for the first time in history receiving adequate recognition. We are discovering that Christ was not primarily a theologian[1] but a poet who thought imaginatively and presented his teaching in pictorial form. The literature of the Old Testament upon which he was principally nourished is in the forefront of the world's æsthetic creations, and the gospels of the New Testament have the quality of great art.[2] It is unfortunate that Christ had to use the strongly legalistic and moralistic language of his contemporaries,[3] and that his words had to be strained of their poetic content to suit the more prosaic

[1] Bishop Temple: *The Kingdom of God*, p. 11.

[2] Canon Streeter: *Reality*, p. 67 (note).

[3] Clutton Brock: *The Kingdom of Heaven*, p. 54.

minds of his followers; yet it is evident that his mind was predominantly of the artistic kind. He spoke largely in parables, stories and epigrams; many of his sayings were in the form of gnomic wisdom; his dialectic was often ironic and witty. His dialogues, imperfectly transmitted as they are, are living and dramatic, and even his monologues (especially as represented in the fourth gospel) are full of symbolism. His concreteness of imagery, together with profundity of meaning, is shown in his references to children, to birds and to flowers, all of which he described with the touch of creative genius.

If we consider those teachings of his, which are regarded as central by most Christians, similar results are reached. The Lord's Prayer, it is pointed out,[1] may be viewed as a dispatch from a subordinate officer upon the frontier of empire to his highest superior. After a salutation—"Our Father which art in heaven, hallowed be Thy name"—there follows an expression of desire for the spread of His empire—"Thy Kingdom come." Then occurs a request for material supplies—"daily bread," and a plea for leniency towards personal faults. Then the desire is uttered that duties may not be too exacting, but succour sent when danger appears, the whole being rounded off by an outburst of glorification of the supreme Ruler and His Kingdom. This is the concrete pictorial language of empire-builders, of men engaged in spiritual warfare.

A similar impression of the picturesque is given by

[1] TEMPLE: *op. cit.* p. 71.

the Beatitudes. These are seldom discussed in works on philosophical ethics; they are almost ignored by the moralists, whether partisans of the end as pleasure or as duty, or even as self-realization. The very expositors of Christian Ethics themselves find no necessary place for, or order amongst, them; they are treated as parts of an ideal character[1] or else as detached aphorisms of an inspired seer that shine by their own light. They are probably best considered, however, as the verdicts of a connoisseur in happiness, who is describing the qualifications of persons who are to live as citizens of the Kingdom of God, of which the Sermon on the Mount sketches the outlines. Blessedness is the condition of those who are seen or who see themselves not from an earthly but from a heavenly or ideal standpoint. In such a vision, ordinary human valuations—of food, clothing, wealth, justice, love, sorrow—become transformed, much as a mountain-view transforms the features of a landscape. Christ had the artist's vision as contrasted with that of the dull pedestrian; the pains of climbing were lost in the delights of contemplation. His teaching upon ethics is summed up in the words "Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect," and perfection is the character of the contemplative life in which striving is simultaneously fulfilled in attainment. This is the way in which the theologians have generally described the life of God, though often without using æsthetic terms.

[1] Cp. A. B. D. ALEXANDER: *Christianity and Ethics*, pp. 189 and 190.

Further, if we consider the life of Christ itself as portrayed in the gospels, it is evident that its pictorial character overwhelms all else. It was drama, though historical drama, and of a moving and sublime order that has surpassed any other story, real or imaginary. The histories of Buddha, Socrates or Mahomet are emotionally ineffectual in comparison with it, though (in the second case at least), told by a consummate literary artist. As Dr. Streeter puts it,[1] merely as a "myth" it would stand to the myths of India or Greece as a drama to a dream; one may add that as an epic—which is perhaps its nearest artistic description—it is the world's supreme portrait of the heroic.[2]

Turning to the æsthetic revelation of the world which Christ gave to men, we find that it took the form of a Utopia. In this respect it was a continuation of the Utopianism of the Hebrew prophets and apocalyptists. The former had generally conceived of the future as an earthly kingdom, perhaps world-wide, but having Israel for its centre, a descendant of David for its King, and Jehovah for its God; the latter mostly saw their Utopia as a state miraculously and catastrophically produced by divine intervention, but again so nationalistically conceived that non-Jews would have had to give up their political allegiance and become merged in the elect of Israel. The glorious poetry of Isaiah and the vision of Daniel may be taken as typical of these two Utopias, and it is plain that they affected the minds of Christ's

[1] *Reality*, p. 56.

[2] Cp. Carlyle's *Heroes*, Ch. I.

contemporaries. These two pictures of the military and political state on the one hand, and of the miraculously established on the other, were purged by Christ of their grosser and more fantastic elements, and transformed into a scheme of social and individual renewal that was both universal in its scope and practicable in its method. This Utopia was the Kingdom of God, about which Christ seems to have been far more concerned than about anything else ; it was the centre of his teaching and in it we find " the summit of Utopianism, and no higher peaks have been discovered in the nineteen centuries since his time."[1]

The great difference between the Utopia of Christ and that of his fore-runners and contemporaries is shown in his choice of metaphor with which to express its inmost spirit. His ideal is that of family life—the Divine Fatherhood and human Brotherhood. Love of God and love of man are, therefore, his governing principles, and all the rest of his Utopia is but a working out of these principles. It is, therefore, different in temper from the theocracy of the Jews, who looked for an earthly or a heavenly kingdom of a quasi-political sort. And again it differs from the ideal of the classical world, which was that of a State—perhaps a republic—in which the great virtue was justice. It may very well be the fact that Plato's Justice had the same unifying and organizing place in his system that Love had in Christ's : yet with what a difference of feeling ! In the ideal family relationship there is no need of a

[1] HERTZLER ; *Utopian Thought*, p. 70.

system of rights and duties, of a fixed organization, and a code of laws. All activities spring spontaneously out of mutual love, and harmony is secured not by authority but by joyful impulse. Right relations are secured by happy tact, functions determined according to gifts, and ends sought from a sense for wholeness, which is more obviously æsthetic than anything else. It is always difficult to explain family relations—especially perhaps the marital—in ethical terms ; it is easy and natural to speak, as lovers and parents do, in the language of poetry.

Christ's Utopia contained many paradoxes, as a work of art is apt to do. This is the reason, no doubt, why it has been so differently understood in different ages. Thus, it is at once present and future. It exists here and now, and what people have to do is to realize this as Jesus himself did. Publicans and harlots enter into it under the eyes of the self-righteous, who, with all their desires for it, are unaccountably left outside. It does not come with observation, but is found already in those who are child-like. All the same it grows and expands like seed or leaven. It will surely be realized, though just when even Christ does not know. Sometimes it seems at hand, with immediate judgment ; sometimes it has to be patiently waited for like the harvest. Now we shall see later on that if any explanation of time and the timeless is to be found, it seems most likely to be found in the realm of art. For the moment it is enough to recollect that in contemplation we have reposeful activity in which the tension between

present vision and future fulfilment is overcome. In it one can

> Hold infinity in the palm of your hand,
> And eternity in an hour.

The utilitarian attitude of using mere means to future ends is lost, and the existent is enjoyed as an end in itself. The paradox of a Kingdom of God that is both present and to come does not exist for the person who has got beyond the prosaic, practical, common-sense condition, and has reached the contemplative. And so it was with Christ.

Again, it is a great puzzle to many people that the Kingdom of Heaven is both an earthly and a heavenly society. Christ says both that it is not of this world, and that it is already within you. It is certainly a heavenly kingdom, yet it is to prevail on earth as in heaven. It is immanent yet transcendent, earthly yet heavenly. This paradox is foolishness to the critical intellect, yet it is solved daily by the artist who sees in the beautiful the sensuous presence of the divine. For those who murder to dissect, things are of the earth, earthy. But for those who admire disinterestedly there is inexhaustible wealth of beauty even in a rain-drop. The same is true of human beings : as " hands " in industry or numbers in an army they are but animated tools or weapons, whereas to the contemplative eye they are ends in themselves. To the historian or the scientist they may be but instances of a general law : all depends upon the purpose. But to the pure artist the individual man in his concreteness is of intrinsic interest, and, to the social or

religious artist, a member of a whole, all the parts of which are valuable yet mutually helpful. Christ saw earth and heaven as parts of one community; regarded as mere means its members were earthly, regarded as intrinsic ends they were heavenly. People who lived in the world and yet as not of the world, those who lived as contemplating it from a non-utilitarian standpoint, were already in the Kingdom of God; whilst the self-righteous who sought it as a means to their own private advantage —their "salvation"—lost it.

A similar paradox to the preceding in Christ's Utopia is the relation of the individual to the universal. Christ often speaks of the entrance to the Kingdom as a matter for personal choice, as involving individual responsibility (either for talents or for property), and as requiring separation of the disciple from his own family, wife and friends. Yet again he considers the Kingdom as being world-wide in its scope and not complete until every sheep is gathered into the fold. For these reasons some[1] regard these —individualism and universalism—as the two great principles of the sociological structure of the Kingdom. They point out that entrance into it is no mass-movement, yet neither is it made easy for any particular individuals.

"Strait is the gate and narrow the way, and few there be that find it." "Many are called but few are chosen." Naturally enough, these two tendencies to individualism and universalism have been a source of contention in the history of Christendom, some

[1] E.g. TROELTSCH, pp. 39–42.

parties stressing the one in their theories of the "elect" and some the other in their hopes of "universal salvation." The relations between the particular and the universal are still debated amongst the logicians,[1] yet the harmony of the two is constantly being attained in works of art. By a process of selection the artist makes particular feature and universal idea combine into a concrete whole. This has neither the manifoldness of sense-data nor the abstractness of the concept but the merits of both together. The idea pervades the details whilst the details reinforce the idea. It seems likely that Christ as a religious artist had some such picture in mind in his description of the Kingdom of God. By a selective process individuals were to be knit together into a meaningful whole, pervaded indeed by the spirit of its dominating King, yet depending for its completeness upon the contributions of individuals. Compared with such an ideal picture, local emphasis would be isolation or "hell," and congruence with the rest of the whole integration or "heaven." Neither individualism nor universalism seems to meet the Kingdom's requirements: there must be selection, combination, harmonization. In this process many individuals will be disappointed, and many astonished at the parts they are called upon to play. The last shall be first, and the first shall be last. Yet if the great retain the spirit of humility, and the lowly that of pride in service, whilst all show the temper of mutual forgiveness,

[1] Cp. Prof. Stout's paper on Universals in Proc. Brit. Acad. Vol. x.

there is a possibility that the clash of particular and universal may be overcome in that truly æsthetic manner which is expressed in the words "Be a whole or join a whole,"[1] or better, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God."[2]

The foregoing study of Christ's Utopianism goes to show that it was a great and new æsthetic world-view in which many old oppositions were unified by religious genius. It is justly said that it is not to be denied that "the Founder of Christianity looked out upon the external world with free and friendly eyes, or that the ultimate tendency of this religion is to make man feel that the world, and he himself, are parallel expressions of one and the same Divinity."[3] That is to say, Christ was not ascetic but humanistic, and such renunciation and sacrifice as he taught and practised were encouraged not as good in themselves, but as part of that winnowing method which is necessary to the highest perfection. "Jesus' ethic is heroic rather than ascetic,"[4] and the early church in its art was true to this spirit by representing him chiefly as the good shepherd, or the divine teacher, or the god-like musician who overcame death and animal passions. At this time—the second century—it is said, the church was nearer to the spirit of the Founder than perhaps she was ever to be again.[5] A long period of asceticism followed, yet the medieval church on the whole supported perhaps the greatest

[1] Bosanquet: *What Religion is*, p. 12. [2] Matt. 6. 33.

[3] Bosanquet: *History of Aesthetics*, p. 129.

[4] Troeltsch: *op. cit.* p. 45.

[5] Pater: *Marius the Epicurean*, p. 272 (pocket edition.)

movement in art that the world has yet seen, not only in the fine arts, but in the art of living. St. Francis, "the Orpheus of the Middle Ages," was a spirit akin to Christ. His mystical contemplation, his joy in nature and men which led him to fashion new poetry and song, and his skill in the humane art of teaching and managing men, all bespeak a richly endowed æsthetical nature whose influence has deeply affected the western world even to this day.

The medieval world found its aesthetical world-view in the vision of Dante, which it is probably safe to say has had more influence upon the life of the common man in Christendom than the works of any scholastic theologian. For good or ill the picture it presented in finished form was that which, crudely seen, expressed and animated the lives of men for centuries. It indicated the fate that had come upon that happier idea of the Kingdom of Heaven possessed by the early church. The world was split into two divisions, the material and the spiritual, the earthly and the heavenly, and the dualism has never since been wholly overcome. Protestantism still divided the Kingdom into Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained, "this" world and the "next," with the result that its art has been confused, its social life disrupted, and its religion uncertain. The whole modern world has suffered with it from the same dualism, and the great social struggles of to-day still largely centre about the relations of the secular and the sacred, the earthly and the heavenly paradise. There is no modern aesthetic revelation of the world as a whole, and it is significant that with one excep-

tion the arts are half-paralysed whilst the greatest social upheaval that the world has seen is occurring. The exception is music, which has become the master-art of the West, and which is probably more capable of expressing the social life and religious faith of the western world than any other medium whatever. Whether it will be used by us to give coherence to our social and religious life, or whether it is the swan-song of an outworn civilization, is uncertain.[1]

Evidently the great requirement of our time is a world-view which shall combine the best achievements of the ages with a purpose great and wide enough to extricate civilization from the slough into which it has fallen, and to set it moving once more in a forward direction.[2] Fortunately, this need coincides with the recovery of the ideal of the Kingdom of God, which we are beginning to see again in its original outlines. It is frequently made a matter for regret and reproach that the historic churches have laid the emphasis upon the wrong place, and in their presentation of Christianity have stressed the messenger rather than the message. Christ said, "Believe me," whereas the churches have said, "Believe in Me."[3] And what Christ believed in was the Kingdom of Heaven. Indeed he expressly said that not those who used the correct title "Lord, Lord," but those who did the things that he said,

[1] Cp. Miss Harrison: *Ancient Art and Ritual*, p. 233; and Spengler: *The Decline of the West.*

[2] Cp. Schweitzer's books: *The Decay and Restoration of Civilization* and *Civilization and Ethics.*

[3] Cp. Clutton Brock: *The Kingdom of Heaven*, p. 39.

would enter the Kingdom. However correctly the churches may have formulated the mysteries connected with the messenger, have they obeyed the message? At the end of nineteen centuries the fact that nations nominally Christian can engage in wholesale fratricidal strife, must lead us all to question whether we have not misplaced the emphasis. Had we been more concerned to follow Christ's ideal in his own spirit than to arrive at right formulæ about him, most probably the Kingdom would be vastly nearer attainment than it is.[1]

The Kingdom as Social.

There are scholars who suppose that Christ was himself so expectant of a miraculous establishment of the Kingdom of God, that he was indifferent to questions of mere culture and social order.[2] Others, again, find in him no theologian but a moral reformer, who lived a life of love and service but founded no ethical system, no church, no economic or political order, no party, sect, or programme.[3] For such the religious life would be most appropriately the imitation of Christ. Yet a third group, however, would find in Jesus a revolutionary who was concerned with social relations rather than with theology or church or creed, and whose aim was a new social order which should dispense with the political aristocracy and the ecclesiastical hierarchy,

[1] Cp. FAIRBAIRN: *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, pp. 523–5.

[2] Cp. EUCKEN: *Lebensanschauun gengrosser Denker*, p. 169.

[3] LICHTENBERGER: *Development of Social Theory*, p. 83.

and bring about the elevation of the poor and the lowly.[1] All agree, however, that Jesus had a vision of a new world which has been obscured in the course of history by emphasis upon other things than those which he thought central: a vision which we are only just beginning to recapture through the labours of historians. Or perhaps it is the historians themselves who are prompted by the needs of our day for a new world-view, and who therefore seek inspiration from the greatest of Utopian pictures, cleansed from the dust and smoke of time. However this may be, it is certain that the ideal of the Kingdom of God is taking possession of the imagination of contemporary men, and helping to mould the future. It is a great instance of the triumph of an ideal even where historic institutions are crumbling under our feet.

Corresponding to those writers who regard the original vision of the Kingdom as being apocalyptic, there have been disciples who regarded the church as an ark of refuge against a world-flood. Many of the early disciples no doubt took this view, in expectation of an immediate second coming and judgment. It appears that they misinterpreted the mind of Christ, who said nothing about a second coming, though he did speak much about a coming and that at once.[2] It was at hand, and he was its herald. But his disciples were incapable of appreciating their master's poetry, and insisted upon a one-sided literalism which has persisted to our own

[1] HERTZLER: *op. cit.* pp. 68–9. Cp. the discussion in TROELTSCH, Vol. I. pp. 17–33.

[2] TEMPLE: *Kingdom of God*, p. 38.

day. It has produced mean and narrow and unlovely forms of Christianity such as the monasticism described by Charles Kingsley in *Hypatia* ; it helped to check the development of architecture about the year 1,000 A.D., when it was thought that the end was approaching ; it took possession of the Protestant churches to this extent at least, that even to-day thousands of their members consider the second coming as imminent, and consequently social questions unimportant. It necessarily lies like a blight upon most humane activities like art and social living, and concentrates attention upon personal safety. It usually produces small sects of the elect who cherish a belief in their own salvation, and leave the rest of humanity to its fate. All that need be said is that this apocalyptic expectation has been falsified by nineteen centuries of history.

As contrasted with this interpretation of the Kingdom, there are those who regard it as a great model to be set up within "this" world and its members' life as properly that of the imitation of Christ. The attractiveness of the Master's life is sufficient for such persons to ensure a life of great personal saintliness, and often of great reforming zeal. Probably the best life of the Middle Ages was sustained by such admiration, upon the æsthetic character of which one need not dilate. The religious paintings and poetry of that period, portraying mainly the Man of Sorrows, were a great incentive to the life of personal devotion ; just as the book by Thomas à Kempis has led many along the mystic way. Add to this the lives of the Saints and the legends of

the Holy Grail and the like, and one can somewhat understand the fascination of the ideal of the imitation of Christ. The recovery of this medieval material and its religious use would be a great purification and enrichment of our popular taste, debauched as this now largely is with sexual novels, barbaric music, and sensational films. The great religious plays of Wagner, like Tannhäuser, The Mastersingers, Parsival, and such plays as Mr. Shaw's Joan of Arc and the Passion Play at Oberammergau are great means of popular instruction in the art of the imitation of Christ; yet they mostly have a precarious existence in England for lack of serious support. Still it remains true, here as elsewhere, that " in the widest historical sense, though not in the strict language of philosophy, there is no doubt whatever that art is the instructress of peoples."[1]

The ideal of the Kingdom of God as composed of the imitators of Christ is, however, exposed to its own subtle dangers. It is apt to be selective of those features in the life imitated which are congenial to the follower, with the consequence that there are as many Christs as there are imitators. The Man of Sorrows of the Middle Ages is very different from the blithe Good Shepherd of the early church, and both again from the Light of the World of Holman Hunt. Doubtless, these are quite compatible, yet without the steadying influence of a broad community-life they are apt to be exclusive. That this is so, is manifest from the way in which the moral reformer who aims at being an Exemplar is tempted to use

[1] BOSANQUET: *op. cit.* p. 139.

authority to promote his aims, whether the authority be spiritual or secular. St. Bernard and Calvin would both set up an ideal theocracy modelled after their own very different conceptions. Even when on a large scale, a model state or church can hardly fail to be selective and exclusive in its interpretation of the Kingdom, as the very example of Christendom itself shows. In its historical connexions, this came to mean the dominance of one church, which had stressed certain features of Christianity to the neglect of others. The break-up of Christendom into different churches, each attracted by a different aspect of Christianity, shows the many-sidedness of the Kingdom as well as the difficulty of both personal and sectional imitation of its founder.[1]

The Roman Church, it is said, is the church of Peter; the Greek Church, of John; and the Protestant of Paul. Here are three corporate ways of the imitation of Christ, yet who does not see to-day how partial they are? The inclination, therefore, is to integrate these in some form of union, and so to re-establish Christendom.[2] Reunion would doubtless do much to restore the broken arch of the church and to remove a spiritual scandal. That it would restore Christendom (in Europe at least), is not nearly so plain, for great sections of the people have broken from churchly control, apparently never to return. Europe has heard the accent laid upon the second

[1] Cp. Dr. Temple's argument against (mere) Imitation, based on the necessity of compromise, which, however, I think very dubious: *op. cit.* p. 86. On Christ as no mere reformer, cp. FAIRBAIRN: *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 263.

[2] Cp. SOLOVIEV'S *Integral Christianity*.

part rather than the first part of the word Christendom, and is not likely to care to hear it repeated. A "spiritual imperialism" (in Dean Inge's phrase) is beyond attainment in the modern world, and in any case it is not identical with the Kingdom of God. It is well that there should be individuals and communities—or even one community—specially engaged in the imitation of Christ and aiming at being an example to society of the way in which the ideal life should be lived. Yet, once again, all depends upon contemplating the Kingdom in its completeness, and when this is done, it is seen to consist not in any one institution, however splendid or great, but in a society which is in intention world-wide and comprehensive of all activities. Otherwise we are likely to get the sort of divided life portrayed in *The Cloister and the Hearth*.

In considering the thesis that Jesus was primarily a revolutionist, and a social revolutionist above all, one may recognize that, in this, sociology has made an important suggestion from a new point of view. That it should be asserted by the chief student of Utopianism is a noteworthy fact. Yet perhaps one must distinguish between the direct intention of Christ's Utopianism and its remoter implications. His declaration about fulfilling and not destroying, his acceptance of the national and imperial institutions point in the conservative direction; his deadly criticisms of civil and ecclesiastical authorities in the opposite.[1] Their hostility to him probably sprang

[1] Cp. the discussion in TROELTSCH (*op. cit.* pp. 72–77) who sums up that Christianity was not in general revolutionary, but that it contained revolutionary elements.

mainly out of a perception of the social consequences of his teaching.[1] They were right, to this extent at least: that Christ was the greatest of the internationalists, a citizen of the world, for whom the national and imperial boundaries were unimportant by comparison. Naturally the Jewish and Roman patriots were alarmed and formed an incongruous union to put him to death. For even to the Stoics, in spite of their magnificent conception of a world-reason, the limits of citizenship were in effect bounded by the Roman Empire. To such, and to the believers in a Jewish theocracy, genuine world-citizenship must seem subversive of the social order. It has been so in the West ever since; there is no reason to think that Christ in the time of Joan of Arc or Edith Cavell would have fared essentially any better than he did in the first century. The aggressive modern internationalist is usually either shot as a traitor or confined as an imbecile.

The Kingdom of God, however, with its central doctrine of love to God and love to man, is intrinsically international. It is accurate to say that, though nominally a kingdom, it rests upon the willing service of the citizens and is not maintained by forcible authority. It is no more to be compared with a modern kingdom depending upon compulsion than is Plato's Republic to be compared with a modern republic. Resting as it does upon free consent, love and service, it may well be called a democracy or a love-communism.[2] The life of its

[1] LICHTENBERGER: *Op. cit.* pp. 84 and 87.

[2] TROELTSCH'S term.

citizens is, therefore, not one of mere personal safety, nor even, first, of setting a high example of good deeds in a naughty world, but one of participation in the world's life in order to make it an ideal family. It does not appear that we could attain a higher condition than that of universal brotherhood united by a common fatherhood : this would be the millennium. It would involve the transformation of many things which the powers that be consider necessary, or at least convenient. It would mean the banishment of ignorance, and the wide and deep diffusion of education among all classes and races of men. The withholding of spiritual goods from men, by neglecting their proper education, is anti-social and anti-religious. As is well said :[1] "Our callousness to this awful waste and injustice will some day be condemned as universally and as severely as the indifference of our forefathers to the evils of slavery is condemned now." Education is the price of liberty.

Further, the family ideal would involve the abolition of servitude, whether of people to people, or class to class, or sex to sex. This change alone is one which the world is only just beginning to contemplate, and that with a sense of apprehension which it is curious to see. The denial of ancient claims to dominate others seems to great sections of the modern world sheer diabolism, and is perhaps preparing the materials for great social upheavals. Yet there can be no doubt what the social ideal of the Kingdom of God demands, and one can only think with shame upon the length of time it has taken for

[1] By PROF. WARD : *Psychology applied to Education*, p. 182.

the implications of that ideal to be seen. Though the historic church was in the main upon the side of personal liberty, social equality, and international fraternity, it is thought by good judges that the natural social consequences of the Kingdom were largely stultified by the theology of the Early Fathers who justified slavery as the consequence of sin, and forbade the attempt to obtain liberty by escape.[1] It was not until the 19th century that several causes, amongst which the religious was one, combined to abolish slavery.[2] Even yet there is little recognition of equality in the economic sphere.[3] Similarly the idea of personal liberty was repressed by the Medieval Church, partly from fear of anarchy, partly through the imperialization of the Church after the conversion of Constantine, and mainly through the introduction by the Church into the West of oriental ideas of absolute government.[4] Yet "when the French revolutionaries placarded the streets of France with the great phrases of liberty and equality, they were only restating the fundamental position of Christianity."[5] All that can be said is that if these principles have prevailed but little in the Christian West, they have had far less success anywhere else.

Above all, the idea of human fraternity involves the abolition of war. This institution, upon which empires are founded and revolutions flourish, is the

[1] A. J. Carlyle: *The Influence of Christianity upon Social and Political Ideas*, p. 44.

[2] *Ib.* p. 39.

[3] *Ib.* p. 51.

[4] *Ib.* p. 91.

[5] *Ib.* p. 38.

very negation of God upon earth ; it is now widely recognized as the mortal danger of civilization, which must either sheath the sword or perish by it. There can be no doubt as to the prevalent teaching of Christianity upon the subject ; yet the Church has at times both condoned and advocated the deadliest warfare. The idea of spreading fraternity at the point of the sword could only occur to a church which had mistaken itself for the Kingdom of God, which is perhaps the most insidious and fatal of all heresies. The abolition of war is the great task of our time ; it would be probably the greatest step towards the Kingdom of God that has ever been made in history. Yet after the recent great " war to end war," the Old World is more deeply divided into two camps than ever before, and signs multiply that Nietzsche may be right that the twentieth century will be the classic age of war. Probably only by the wide-spread refusal to bear arms will this calamity be avoided : a refusal which will indeed be a revolution, though a peaceful one.[1] In this sense Christ will indeed have proved himself a revolutionist, for to tame the fighting spirit of the West will be the greatest achievement of his spirit. The crucifixion of Christ will indeed have proved efficacious for the salvation of men if and when it puts an end to the long and bloody martyrdom of man by war.

It is plain that the idea of the Kingdom as that of participation in the world's life in order to transform it—to act as leaven or savouring salt—is one that will

[1] Cp. TEMPLE : *The Kingdom of God*, p. 83.

make great demands upon the citizens of the Kingdom. It is far harder to be in the world whilst not of the world than to withdraw from it into seclusion. Evidently world-citizenship implies the breaking down of any hard and fast distinction between the sacred and the secular. "There is nothing common or unclean except sin."[1] Evidently the Founder of the Kingdom thought so and acted upon it; for this reason he met with the animosity of formalists and precisians of his time. For this reason the extension of the Kingdom into the affairs of education, of politics and economics, and especially of international relations, will meet with the opposition of those who would keep religion and "secular" affairs in separate compartments. That there is great convenience in specialization of functions as between church and state, business and leisure, missions and politics, etc., no one can deny. Yet these things interpenetrate, and there can be no wholesomeness of one of them apart from the rest. They are after all prosecuted by people having broadly the same traditions and education; and weakness or failure in one department is bound to react injuriously upon the others, just as strength and purity here reinforce healthy growth there. The Kingdom of God as world-citizenship is incompatible with oppression, ignorance, exploitation, or war anywhere. There cannot be harmony if one instrument is out of tune.

Similarly, world-citizenship requires the abandonment of particularism, whether as personal or national individualism. There is no doubt that

[1] Dr. Garvie in *Proceedings of C.O.P.E.C.* p. 12.

loyalties are best fostered in their infancy in narrow circles: thereby they become firm and intense. Hence education must proceed by a gradual widening of the sphere of loyalties, lest responsibility should be lost in a vague sentimentalism. Yet what is common to man as man is more important than what belongs to this or that individual or nation. The pedagogical order is one of convenience in dealing with weak and immature beings; it is not one which can be made the test of intrinsic values. So in the education of the race the narrower loyalties have had their great uses; they have not disclosed the worth of human nature simply as such. It is time for the race to put away childish things, and to affirm that it knows nothing of distinctions of colour or sex or nation save as these subserve world-community. This may very probably involve the ignoring of local institutions, whether "sacred" or "secular," and the honouring of provincial laws rather in the breach than the observance.[1] The narrower loyalty must give place to the wider. Civilization is more important than any nation, and the Kingdom of God than any particular state or church. It is very likely that many disciples will have to follow their Leader in suffering martyrdom for this cause; it is, however, the one grand objective which is worthy of the modern mind.

Here, then, is a Cause which contemporary

[1] Cp. T. H. GREEN: *Principles of Political Obligation*, secs. 106-7; also LASKI: *Grammar of Politics*, pp. 91–97. for a recent treatment of this question.

civilization may set before itself and of which the churches may be the inspiration. Such a Cause, we saw previously,[1] is that which evokes the energies of men by setting up an attractive ideal, by becoming fascinating. In Royce's presentation of the Beloved Community[2] we find a philosophic account of this Cause which is at once social in its spirit and modern in outlook. Few can read this account without recognizing the deeply religious temper that pervades it, and the churches would do well to instil its message into the minds of their members. The fundamentals of a social and religious world-view are to be found there. Yet it has certain defects. For one thing, it is cut away from the history of the Founder of Christianity, about which Royce thinks we can be sure of little. Therefore it centres in the teaching of Paul about the Church, which Royce modernizes into the Beloved Community. Now of any such attempt it seems wise always to bear in mind the saying of Matthew Arnold, that Christ vastly transcended the minds of his reporters, and (one may add) his interpreters. Paul, with all his genius, was a narrower and harder spirit than his Master, and the one-sided emphasis upon his teaching, or certain parts of it, has been very largely responsible for what is unsocial and unlovely in Protestantism. Protestantism is not an expansion, but a concentration of Christianity.[3]

[1] See above, p. 217.
[2] *The Problem of Christianity.*
[3] Cp. REVILLE: *History of Religions*, p. 214, English Translation.

Again, the Kingdom of God we have found to be essentially an æsthetic world-view, the view of a poet and artist, and therefore intrinsically attractive and inspiring. This cannot be said about Paul's world-church or even Royce's community. Paul was decidedly prosaic in comparison with Christ; and in Royce's version of Paul, profound as it is, there is lacking the appeal of great beauty. It seems to express the community-sense of the New World, which is superseding its earlier individualism, but it does little to depict a religious New World which is æsthetically attractive. For this reason it may be called an adaptation of the ideal of the Kingdom of God to the modern western world: it leaves the ancient ideal in its central and commanding position. For Christ the Kingdom of God had the same sort of reality and certainty that we sometimes find in a work of art. It was merely a question of being earnestly contemplative, and one could "see God." Blindness, dullness, hardness of heart—in a word insensibility—were the great hindrances to life in the Kingdom. "According to Christ, the universe . . . . . is like music." "But, further, to be aware of the reality of the music of the universe is the highest good, the greatest happiness." "He Himself heard it and danced to it; and the beauty of His dance, of His life, of His whole state of being, has for two thousand years allured the world, even while the world would not understand the meaning of it."[1]

Fortunately, the work of scholarship is enabling

[1] CLUTTON BROCK: *The Kingdom of Heaven*, p. 48.

us to see that ideal, to hear that music, more nearly in its original form than ever before. It is probably true to say that to-day we have more means at our disposal for understanding what Christ meant than had any of his disciples. The researches of modern history, philosophy and comparative religion, enable us to see much that was obscure to them in the conditions of their time, whilst the effects of the good news of the Kingdom, which were largely a matter of faith with them, are for us a matter of ascertainable fact. And one great way of understanding a thing is to see what it becomes. "By their fruit ye shall know them."

A modern presentment of the ancient gospel will indeed require from the interpreter great genius, in order to apprehend the spirit of the first herald of the Kingdom; it will also demand deep knowledge of history, to disentangle essential from accidental consequences of its establishment; it will need strong and comprehensive grasp of modern affairs, to which the old principles have to be applied; above all, it will involve the power to make its interpretation concrete and vivid, so that the millions of illiterate, or at best semi-educated persons in the modern world-community which is now forming, will be captivated by its glamour, and so drawn to realize it. Possibly no one person is equal to all these requirements; perhaps they will have to be provided by the co-operative efforts of many minds; but at least we begin to realize the conditions of success.

Those conditions were most nearly met (I believe)

in the great Russian writers of the last century. Born in a land which partakes of the nature of the East and the West, they were more able to enter into the spirit of Christ than were Western men. For Jesus Christ was an oriental by birth. And there is that in the Russian soul which is spiritually akin to that which is deepest in Christianity. It is said by an historian of Russian literature that "in spite of being the youngest of all the literatures, it seems to be spiritually the oldest . . . . . It is

Old in grief and very wise in tears

and its chief gift to mankind is an expression, made with a naturalness and a sincerity that are matchless, and a love of reality which is unique . . . . . of that grief and wisdom which come from a great heart; a heart that is large enough to embrace the world and to drown all the sorrows therein with the immensity of its sympathy, its fraternity, its pity, its charity, and its love."[1] The same writer notices Pushkin's all-embracing humanity; Tolstoy's colossal greatness, in dæmonic power, in realistic insight, in breadth and depth of imagination, and in faithfulness of practice; and Dostoyevsky's goodness which breathes from his works, which reflect beyond any other books in the world "not only the teaching and the charity, but the accent and the divine aura of love that is in the Gospels."[2] This verdict, which will be confirmed by those who know Russian literature, is

[1] BARING: *Russian Literature*, p. 250.

[2] *Ib.* pp. 200, 209 and 222.

supported at least on the æsthetic side by the musician who says[1] that "it may be doubted whether any abler body of men, except perhaps our own Elizabethans, ever gathered into one artistic coterie," than the Russian musicians of about 1865.

In this great art, then, we may find the nearest approach to that modern æsthetic revelation of the world, that depiction of the Kingdom of God for our times, which we have been seeking. This young yet mature art can perhaps reconcile old and new, East and West, in a manner more comprehensive than any other. Internationalism, belief in the despised and rejected, brotherhood, love of peace—these requisites of the Kingdom find in it their supreme expression in our day. The prosaic statement of this vision is to be found in Tolstoy's *The Kingdom of God is Within You.* The common view of Tolstoy as an ascetic who founded his Utopia upon a few texts from the New Testament—the Beatitudes notably—is grotesque. Tolstoy's *Kingdom of God* is a philosophy of history and of society which is profounder than that of his contemporaries Comte or Spencer. It admits the relative uses of war, state and church, in the past; and is in appearance revolutionary only because it believes that humanity has learnt the lessons that these institutions can teach, and is now able to adopt the negligence towards them which Christ himself showed in his day. Religion, Tolstoy believes, is forward-looking; it sets the

[1] HADDON: *Music*, p. 215.

tasks for the future. The great modern task is the making of a world-community, a universal brotherhood under a divine fatherhood. Hence the need for simplicity of life, for peace, and for action according to the Sermon on the Mount. Christianity has undermined the pagan world, with its belief in war and wealth and pride and divisions, and is now able to be adopted as a world-faith; and its motto is "Be ye perfect."[1]

Tolstoy vividly foresaw the catastrophe that was coming upon Europe, and warned people to escape from the tottering house before it fell. His message is not any the less pertinent than it was; it is vastly more so. Wise after the event, leaders in church and state are echoing his message with anxious voices. Few, however, have taken to heart his teaching about the necessity of a new kind of art which shall present a new world-view. The vast expenditure upon art, in all its grades and varieties, which is poured out to-day for crude indulgence, needs directing towards the realization of the future world-community. Art, like religion, should reveal the new conception of life. Or rather, it should be the æsthetic expression of the new way of life which modern religion is seeking. (In this sense Tolstoy was a futurist.) A thorough purging of earlier and present-day art is therefore necessary, and an adoption of that which corresponds to the new way of life, communicates humane emotions, and diffuses them among the common people. Art is still the great popular teacher, and

[1] *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, p. 100.

whilst it is wrong other things cannot be right.[1] We have noticed the defects of Tolstoy's views of art previously, but can it be questioned that he was fundamentally sound, or that he has accurately shown us the task for our own day?

The Kingdom as Religious Ideal.

A change of attitude, such as is involved in turning our faces towards a world-picture like that which we have just considered, is commonly called conversion. And conversion is our chief need. We must be converted from the toleration of ignorance, oppression, war, vice, and the like, to a passionate belief in education, justice, peace and brotherhood; from the kingdom of this world in which sacred things are treated as means to human gratification, to the Kingdom of God in which man dedicates himself to the highest ends. These have to be recognized as super-human or divine, and worshipped accordingly. To effect this change of heart or conversion may be a slow process. For it is increasingly evident that conversion is rarely sudden and that only in exceptional cases is it violent. Conversion is not normally catastrophic but a gradual and imperceptible process. It is not so much a struggle away from sin as a striving towards something new and better. It implies a want, a desire for transformation; and this means the acquirement of new purposes and new *tastes*, which of course cannot be forced. For this

[1] *What is Art?* Ch. xx.

reason it is compared[1] to the change from a love for crude music to a love for Beethoven. There is no one time or cause for such a change ; it depends upon musical education and general mental development. "The same thing is true of religious conversion. It follows the same laws as the change of taste ; because, in the last analysis it is itself a change of taste—the most momentous one that ever occurs in human experience. It is an *Umwerthung aller Werthe* ; and all the processes and experiences and lessons of life are involved in it."[2]

If this verdict of one of the chief contemporary psychologists of religion be true, a main contention of the present essay is proved. The religious life is primarily the finding of the ideals which must be accepted and loved;[3] these then dominate the desires of the natural man and give consistency and poise to his activities. His nature is thus unified and harmonized and given definite direction. The will supports this tendency by constant efforts of attention, but only a new desire can cast out an old one. The intellect guides the will, and clarifies the ideals, though its part is not conspicuous.[4] The whole process is manifestly in the main an appeal to the æsthetic side of human nature, and obviously everything turns, therefore, upon the kind of æsthetic presentation of religion which is given. A progressive revelation of the world has been provided in the vision of the Kingdom of God which has allured men for nineteen

[1] By PRATT, in *The Religious Consciousness* (pp. 160–165) whose views are summarized in the text.

[2] *Ib.* p. 164. [3] *Ib.* pp. 123–4. [4] *Ib.* p. 124.

centuries. It has largely changed the tastes of the western world, and is now appealing to humanity at large. The time has come for the believers in it to acknowledge their conversion—it may be explosively—and to justify its claim to establish a world-community founded upon love, joy and peace.

CHAPTER IX.

Ultimate Harmony.

As Æsthetical.

THE thought of realizing the Kingdom of God necessarily raises certain cosmic problems. Its possibility must depend upon cosmic conditions; for if they are favourable we may entertain the hope of its attainment, whilst if they are not our efforts may be futile. The difference of temper involved in these alternatives is seen in the contrast between Mr. Bertrand Russell's resolve as a free man to face the world with "the courage of unyielding despair."[1] and the cheerfulness of Bergson, who thinks that we may overcome the last enemy, even death. The attitude of despair, however courageous, can hardly be called religious, for religion implies the ascription of worth to its object.[2] It is generally allowed to-day that religion centres about the question of the

[1] Essay on "A Free Man's Worship" in *Mysticism and Logic*.

[2] Cp. again Carlyle on worth and worship. *Heroes*, Ch. I.

fate of values, and a cosmos which was believed to be indifferent or adverse to them would be one in which religion would be impossible. For religion involves a cosmic sense, a cosmic emotion, a conscious relation to Cosmic Reality.[1] This last, if it be found worthy, may become the object of religious adoration, but if not, will be treated with contempt and with the impulse to—

> . . . shatter it to bits, and then
> Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire!

Religion must satisfy the human heart to this extent at least, that it gives ground for hope and not for despair.

That is to say, religion must justify the ways of God to men so far as to show a cosmic tendency to harmony. The æsthetic principle that end-values—the satisfactoriness of the issues—mainly determine the merits of a drama, is one that applies to the cosmic process. The demand that the history shall be worth while, crudely expressed in the desire for a happy ending, is one that lies deep in human nature. The thwarting or denial of it leads to cynicism and pessimism, which are anti-religious attitudes.[2] We live not only by admiration and love of the excellent, but also by hope of its realization. Apart from such hope, existence is felt to be stultified and futile. This does not mean that every chance wish and fancy

[1] PRATT: *Psychology of Religion*, pp. 261 and 304. Cp. Turner's definition: *The Nature of Deity*, p. 173.

[2] Buddhism does not, I think, refute this statement. See MRS. RHYS DAVIDS' *Buddhism*, pp. 182–3.

must be gratified, but it does imply that the course of the cosmos is in accord with man's fundamental aspirations. After all, he is a part and a product of that cosmos, and it is reasonable to suppose that he partakes of its essential nature, and that his deepest judgments upon it are consistent with that nature. There is no more reason to trust his logical conclusions than his æsthetic or moral beliefs about it.[1] In each case we are led ultimately into the region of faith, for science and morality and æsthetics are none of them complete or infallible ; still, it is important to know what amount of evidence there is for our belief in the tendency to ultimate harmony.

It is remarkable what a consensus of opinion there is about the actual harmony to be found in the cosmos. The music of the spheres is an ancient conceit, and one of the sources of Plato's religious "cosmism" (as it has been called) ; but it is now commonly regarded as a mere myth. Modern scientific philosophy, however, goes far to establish the æsthetic character of reality, without indulging in poetic fancies. Thus Herbert Spencer shows at much length that rhythm is to be found in all the observable natural processes of the Solar System, a rhythm which is intrinsic and deducible from the principle of the persistence of force. All motion is necessarily rhythmical, and as there is no such thing as absolute rest, it follows that "rhythm is exhibited universally, from the slow gyrations of double stars down to the inconceivably rapid

[1] This is what Mr. Russell seems to forget.

oscillations of molecules—from such terrestrial changes as those of recurrent glacial epochs to those of the winds and tides and waves ; and is no less conspicuous in the functions of living organisms, from pulsations of the heart up to paroxysms of the emotions."[1]

Whatever be the value of Spencer's explanation to-day, it is plain that his observations are confirmed by recent science. Thus Professor Whitehead says that vibration enters into the ultimate nature of physical organisms, that physical quantities are aggregates of physical vibrations, and that physical vibrations are the expression among the abstractions of physical science of the fundamental principle of æsthetic experience. That principle is the feeling arising out of the contrast of identity in difference, and " an actual fact is a fact of æsthetic experience."[2] For it is not true that there is an actual world which happens to exhibit order ; there is an actual world because there is an order, for without an order there would be no world. Hence the foundations of the world are to be found in the æsthetic experience of order, for order is æsthetic, and the moral order is merely certain aspects of the æsthetic order. The actual world is the outcome of the æsthetic order which is derived from the immanence of God.[3]

This verdict of a physicist is confirmed by the judgment of a biologist who says that, especially

[1] *First Principles* : §§ 82, 89 and 92.

[2] *Religion in the Making* : pp. 115–6.

[3] *Ib.* pp. 104–5.

as field-naturalist, the biologist is continually impressed with that practically omnipresent quality of organisms which we call beauty, and that Animate Nature is all for beauty, and the exceptions prove the rule. Further, "no doubt there are discords and disharmonies" in the animate world, but "perhaps Lotze was nearer the truth in hearing an 'inward advancing melody'", for "the supreme rewards in the Animal Kingdom go to good parents, good lovers, good kin. . . ."[1] The older notions of animate nature as a vast gladiatorial combat must give way to the more recent discoveries of the great amount of co-operation to be found there, and of the predominating tendency to harmony.

In the human sphere it is altogether questionable whether the view is correct that primitive peoples are sanguinary or even war-like. It is perhaps true that war came with the institution of private property, and is a comparatively "civilized" institution.[2] Even amongst "advanced" peoples it has served largely as a means of elimination of the most warlike, and is obviously doing so to-day on a grand scale. The great civilizations which have persisted—notably the Chinese and the Indian—have been those which have despised war, whilst those which have vanished have been the great military empires, of which the Roman is the most conspicuous example. Perhaps the comparative youthfulness of our nominally Christian civilization is the cause of its vigour, its warlike nature, and

[1] *Contemporary British Philosophy*: Vol. 2, pp. 318, 333–4.

[2] Cp. the works of Perry and Elliot Smith.

its tendency to disruption. On a broad view of history, however, there is discernible a movement to harmonious adjustment of men to each other, a progressive trend to unity on a wider and wider scale.[1] The chief factor in this process has been man's native sociability guided by the religious ideals of great leaders like Confucius, Buddha and Christ. For these were all agreed on certain fundamentals, namely, the futility of violence, the superiority of the social law of love over selfish interests, and the possibility of all beings meeting on a spiritual level in what would thus become a world-community or world-religion.

Again, it is argued on metaphysical grounds by a great modern school of philosophers that reality is essentially harmonious, or at least tending to harmony. The disciples of Hegel find an intrinsic rhythm in reality, expressive of ultimate unity in spite of all apparent differences. All oppositions are reconciled in the Absolute. The famous rhythm of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis—whether to be understood in a temporal or eternal sense, or both—is grounded upon an analysis of reality which leads to an ultimate optimism. The validity of that analysis may be questioned, as it often has been. It is, therefore, striking to find that it is now said to be confirmed by recent scientific discovery. Thus Professor Wildon Carr finds that Hegel's dialectic unwittingly anticipated the modern electrical theory of matter, according to which the electrical charge is the unit of physical science,

[1] Cp. HOBHOUSE: *Social Development*, Ch. 14.

and the electrical charge is but "a synthesis of opposites, a polarization of attractive and repellent forces."[1] Both in physics and metaphysics then the ultimate concept is activity, in which antithetical factors are at once kept apart and held together in moving equilibrium.[2] This is real creative evolution: no pre-established harmony, but an immanent harmony springing out of the very nature of reality itself.[3] The convergence of these two lines of thought, physical and metaphysical, is indeed remarkable.

It appears then that, at least in the views of some high authorities, natural science agrees with social science, and both with metaphysics in asserting the intrinsically æsthetic character of reality, and in finding therein a prevailing tendency to harmony. In the physical sphere it appears as springing out of mutual attractions and repulsions; in the animate world as arising from appetitions and aversions, likes and dislikes, etc., which strive towards more and more complex integration; in the spiritual world as an internal dialectic impelling to progressive synthesis. There is constant elimination of conflict, maladjustment, discordance, and a steady trend towards more efficient and congruent activities. These discoveries are, it is here maintained, at bottom the result of our empathic activity, which seeks for evidence of the æsthetic in all the objects of experience, and finds it wherever there is har-

[1] *A Theory of Monads*, p. 284.
[2] *Ib.* p. 318.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 289–291.

monious activity. This it cannot avoid treating as a sign of life, and hence it comes to regard all reality as animate.[1] Its procedure, is, however, tentative and experimental, and the degree or mode of animation it ascribes to its objects depends upon the kind of response they make. Hence matter, however active, is found to have a low degree of harmonious activity, say in the form of a statue, compared with a highly responsive human being of similar external form. Even from the wondrous beauty of nature, with all its empathically felt harmony of form and colour, it is true that, as from the statue,

> . . . . . we turn
> To yonder girl that fords the burn.[2]

The kind and degree of harmony that we find in reality will, of course, depend upon two factors : our own ability to project ourselves empathically into the surrounding reality, and our receptiveness of its response to our overtures. But that we must so project ourselves does not seem to be doubtful. Thus physical science rests upon certain categories such as cause and effect, activity and passivity, attraction and repulsion, force and energy, persistence and conservation ; and these are one and all ways of explaining nature in terms of what are primarily modes of our own immediate experience.[3] The scientist does not differ from the savage in his fundamental principles of explanation, save that his

[1] LIPPS : *Ästhetik*, Band 1. SS. 163–5.

[2] BROWNING : *The Last Ride Together.*

[3] Cp. WARD : *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. 2, p. 38.

method of applying those principles is vastly more methodic, exact, and controlled by verification. The attempt to avoid the use of such principles, and merely to "describe" nature instead of "explaining" it, gives up the hopes of understanding it and amounts to a scientific agnosticism or phenomenalism. It is found, however, that such mere phenomenalism cannot be consistently maintained throughout all the world of experience. Such believers in the descriptive method as Hume and Mr. Bertrand Russell are found, in dealing with historical and social affairs, to use the explanatory method, sometimes with curious results.[1] It seems arbitrary to use one method in a certain field of experience, and not in another; is it not wiser to recognize frankly the necessity of empathic interpretation—carefully verified—everywhere?

It may be objected that there are fields where such interpretation is not allowable: the mechanical and physical for instance. The admission of mental imputations, especially if emotionally coloured (it may be thought) will introduce a disturbing and confusing factor into all physical calculations, which have shown such remarkable successes in modern times. Now it may be granted that each scientific method should be given full scope to account so far as it can for any fact. It is just their fullest employment which will reveal their capacities and their limits. This is what occurs with the mechanical method. Passing over the fact that its fundamental categories are, as has just been said, really empathic

[1] Cp. HUME's treatment of Cromwell.

imputations, we discover that the perfection of the mechanical—its ordered arrangement of parts so that they necessarily work together as a single unity which is independent of constant and direct control —is just what reveals its character as a manufactured, or otherwise mentally controlled article. That is to say, the more it exhibits the quality of self-acting routine, which is what is required from a machine, the more it betrays to a reflective eye its dependence upon mind. A calculating machine, which is more complex than, for instance, a weather-vane, owes its mechanical superiority to the thought which has fashioned it. Its uniformity, accuracy and unity of functions are the result of mental control which the routine character at first conceals, but upon analysis only makes the more apparent.[1]

When we find machines evolving instead of wearing out and dissolving into their component elements: when we find one of them become a "self-stoking, self-repairing, self-adjusting, self-increasing, self-reproducing engine":[2] then the foregoing argument is reinforced, and some theory of vitalism is required. The way in which certain parts of an organism assume control over the rest points to a focussing of psychic powers in certain organs, analogous to that which takes place in an army or orchestra. The orderly development of species, notwithstanding friction and waste—a development in complexity of qualities and values—and again, the historical development of the

[1] Mr. Turner develops this argument in an interesting way in his *Personality and Reality*.

[2] THOMSON and GEDDES: *Evolution*, p. 75.

human race : these, on a background of an evolving physical cosmos, make an impression of purpose which is markedly æsthetic. It is like the unfolding of a drama or symphony of which we have certain leading ideas or motives. This undeniable æsthetic effect is correlative to the logical "argument from design," and can be ignored only by those who attribute little value to æsthetic insight. It is remarked that "Wordsworth, Emerson, Meredith, these and many other Nature-poets are perhaps the truest, because deepest biologists of us all."[1] They are perhaps likewise the truest seers into the nature of reality, if, as we have seen reason to think, its deepest interpretation is that which is given in terms of harmony. This can be perceived only by empathic interpretation.

As Social.

When such empathic interpretation is thoroughly pushed home it becomes a monadology, that is to say, the belief that reality is ultimately composed of entities which are psychical rather than physical in nature. Whilst the descriptions of the natural scientist must be accepted, as far as they go, it is maintained that upon a deeper analysis they reveal themselves as external expressions of what is at bottom spirit. The physical unit to-day is held to be a centre of energy ; the atom is electrical or perhaps merely an "atom of action." In any

[1] *Ib.* p. 202.

case activity has replaced the older concept of "matter" as hard inert substance, and modern science points to a plurality of beings consisting of such activity rather than to one cosmical substance.[1] Even if the cosmos be reduced to Space-Time it may still be maintained that its elements, point-instants, are energetic.[2] But what meaning can we give to energy, centres of force, atoms of action, and the like, except a meaning borrowed from the immediate experience of putting forth effort? That is to say we must explain physical units as psychical unities, as little souls or Monads; their organization into bodies as resulting from the dominance of certain monads over others; their exhibition of law as the manifestation of their impulse to self-betterment; and their tendency to harmony as springing out of their incessant efforts towards mutual adjustment by trial and experiment.

All this means that reality is essentially social. Monads are in reciprocal intercourse from the lowest levels of being to the highest developments of human or superhuman society. There are no solitary monads and no windowless monads; their life consists in the interplay between them which physical or biological or social science discovers. It is for science and history to disclose the particular modes of inter-communication between them; metaphysics simply re-interprets those modes as manifestations of the inherent sociality of spiritual beings, even the lowliest. These manifestations

[1] PATRICK: *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 235.

[2] I understand Mr. Alexander to hold this.

are no doubt æsthetic in the widest sense of the term; that is, they are impelled by an impulse to harmony which springs from and satisfies feeling in an ever-increasing degree. The harmony, however, is an acquired one: it is not pre-established by any divine fiat, nor again does it consist in mere correspondences between the individual activities of different monads. It is asserted that "if the action of one monad in giving expression to its internal nature calls forth the activity of another to give corresponding expression, then each will find in its own experience the interpretation of all experience."[1] True, but if the monads are self-enclosed—"windowless"—how can one monad call forth another's activity? And if they are not, what need of mere correspondences of expression, instead of genuine interaction? Sheer expressionism, in metaphysics as in æsthetics, seems committed to a "desperate enterprise," a fatal dilemma.[2]

Assuming then, that reality is intrinsically social[3] and that sociability involves monadic intercourse, we have to ask how this is possible. The answer must be that each monad has some measure of creativeness. This means the bringing into existence of that which did not previously exist, and it has commonly been most plainly illustrated by the

[1] Cp. WILDON CARR: *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 124. [2] Cp. above, p. 11.

[3] Cp. WHITEHEAD: ". . . . . every entity is in its essence social and requires the society in order to exist." *Religion in the Making*, p. 108.

action of an artist in producing his works. The interaction between monads may very aptly be regarded as the co-operation—often confused and erratic, no doubt—of artists who are engaged in learning the art of living together, mastering their methods by labour and pain, and seeking ever afresh to produce a more admirable work. All that is covered by the phrases "struggle for existence" and "mutual aid" is covered by this effort at betterment, and a large part of what is known as the problem of evil is comprised therein. For no more than in art-production is social living attainable without friction and waste. Blindness, narrowness, obsession and the like possess in large measure all striving creatures; their very creativeness makes possible collision and misunderstanding, which involves incessant readjustment. Yet just as Shakespeare, seeing all the tragic waste and suffering of the world, still leaves it to be understood that reality is on the side of goodness,[1] so even on a cosmic view we may feel sure that there is a soul of goodness in things evil and that experience is worth what it costs.

The foregoing account implies that order is gradually evolved, not pre-ordained. It is true that the stream of tendency is towards harmony, and that individuals only work their own undoing if they oppose or retard it. Yet they appear to have the ability so to do, whether by faults of commission or omission. Within certain limits there seems to be indetermination in the use of

[1] Cp. BRADLEY: *Shakespearean Tragedy*, p. 35.

creative activity, since the gates of the future are open. No being has the right to gamble with its chances; yet it may, or rather must, discover the limits of its powers by fair experiment. We are here on the edge of a mystery—the origin of evil. Is it absolute, or only relative failure? Is it contingent or necessary? One can but argue that a self-acquired order is, in type, superior to an imposed one so long as there are fixed limits to the possible ill results of failure. In modern æsthetics the attempt is resolutely made to include the ugly within the compass of the beautiful, as counterfoil and means of enhancement. There are limits to this project, no doubt; perhaps varying gradations of pure beauty would serve the purpose far better. What cannot be doubted is that difficult beauty is higher in kind than easy beauty; it allows possibilities of unexpected discord, but opportunities of new resolutions of discord also. It may be that cosmic harmony is the supreme case of difficult beauty.

It may be objected that the preceding doctrine of a world of souls and of its evolution is mere analogy and even mythology; that it involves introjection, that is, the throwing of what is merely subjective experience into the objective order and reading the cosmos in terms of man. To this it will be sufficient to reply that it has commended itself to such scientific thinkers as Leibniz, Renouvier and Ward, and has found a skilful advocate recently in Lutoslawski. When natural science can explain action at a distance, attraction and repulsion, the genesis of life and the history of plants, without

invoking psychical analogies or using subjective categories, it will be necessary to reconsider our argument. Meanwhile it may be pointed out that even so strenuous a realist as Professor Alexander uses the analogy of body-mind for all relationships of togetherness, whether of body and mind at the human level or of ordinary bodies or of space and time or of the elements of all these, point-instants. It is perhaps not too much to say that his philosophy is worked by means of this analogy. And for the very good reason that such analogies are unavoidable. Man is inevitably ego-centric, and his choice is between explanation in terms of his own immediate experience or not understanding the world at all. We are constantly driven back to empathic imputations in our social life for the realization of the doings of other people ; we are not the less obliged so to seek an understanding of the lives of plants and animals and of the activities of "material" bodies.

This procedure may be condemned as anthropomorphism, or the making of things in the likeness of man. If all that is meant by this is that our knowledge is human, the charge may be admitted. Our knowledge cannot be otherwise than human, but it is not therefore invalid. The human mind is part of the cosmos, which it at once expresses and reflects. This it does in its own way, which is presumably unique. Very possibly angelic beings would have a mode of cognition different from ours : one more purely intuitive or contemplative, let us suppose. Human knowledge will be none the less

true knowledge after its kind. In order to maintain this it is not necessary to believe that there can be such a thing as a transparent consciousness which merely receives and records the nature of objects : a stainless medium which in no wise reflects the character of the subject receiving. This would be sheer impressionism, the counterpart of that expressionism we have just considered. Both rest upon the same error—the denial of genuine interaction in knowledge between subject and object. The simple doctrine of apperception is enough to overthrow mere impressionism, as imitation would refute mere expressionism. Assuming then, that these two, impression and expression, are but two poles of the one fact, which is interaction, we must allow as far as possible for the peculiar nature of each factor, object and subject. Just as natural science assumes that by varying the observer it can get rid of the personal equation, so does æsthetics hold that by a critical comparison of judgments it can avoid merely fanciful imputations and anthropomorphism. But in both cases knowledge remains truly human.

Since human knowledge is not only limited, but piece-meal, and therefore requires to be eked out with hypothesis, empathic imagination, though legitimate and even inevitable, must be controlled by the responses made to it by the objects upon which it is exercised. If suns and stars do not behave as departed heroes should ; if woods and rivers do not conceal fairies and sprites ; if trees do not converse nor spheres make music : then

these beliefs must be given up as mere fancies. It does not follow that the method of empathic imputation is wrong, but only that it is misapplied. It is commonly said that modern astronomy springs out of the ancient astrology; it is not on that account to be derided. It has progressed by incessant purging of the old imaginations, till it has reached its present degree of accuracy in what is perhaps the greatest myth of all—the belief, in many quarters, that the cosmos is a great soulless machine. In a similar way, it is possible for empathic imagination to be chastened and purified by criticism and verification till its wild fancies become the sober investigations of a Bose, who finds that plants respond to stimuli as do men or animals; or of a Paulsen who suspects that the action of the atom are the result of psychic motives; or of a Whitehead who finds that "to be an actual entity is to have a self-interest," . . . "a feeling of self-valuation," . . . "an emotional tone,"[1] and that the actual world is a community of many such entities.[2]

It is plain that empathic imagination depends upon the use of analogy and its wide extension over the whole field of experience. We have seen that such analogy is unavoidable, but also that it is capable of constant criticism and correction. For in all analogies the differences are as important as the resemblances, and hence the ways in which reality responds to our overtures are indications of the measure in which it resembles ourselves. In certain creatures

[1] *Religion in the Making*, p. 100. [2] *Ib.* p. 88.

the resemblance is of the slightest: it is more expressive of sleep or stupor than anything else. Hence for Leibniz matter was a body asleep. In other cases mere sensitivity seems to predominate: hence Shelley's (or Bose's) sensitive plant. In others there seem to be extraordinary combinations of powers suggesting superhuman (say angelic) beings. In machines of all sorts there is that degree of concealed purpose which belongs to an instrument or tool. The working out of these analogies into a system would require the scientific knowledge as well as the imagination of a Fechner.[1] Yet none of it need be arbitrary, for as Lipps put it,[2] the analogy between plants—their boughs, leaves, flowers and behaviour generally—and human relations is very vague, and any attempt to make it precise would be merely comical. The differences between the two are of specific æsthetic significance. And similarly with other natural phenomena; the æsthetic impression they make is decisively conditioned by the empirically-found qualities of things. Yet we are under the necessity of interpreting both likenesses and differences after the analogy of our own experience.

There comes a point at which analogies break down; where the mind has merely to suggest its meaning by arbitrary signs. There is little or no resemblance to-day between spoken words and the things they refer to, such as there was in the ancient

[1] Such a system is, of course, to be found in WARD'S *Realm of Ends* or RENOUVIER'S *Le Personnalisme*.

[2] *Ästhetik*. Band. 1, S. 168.

picture-writing. Pictures have become symbols, in which the form is inadequate to the content. The sign means more than it is. The sword, the cross, the scales—these stand for more than they directly express; they are no longer imitative pictures but ideas. The tendency to the use of symbolism is very marked in recent times, in which art is being reduced to its elemental forms, to which new and often arbitrary meanings are attached. It is a movement of liberation from conventionalism, and however wild it may seem to be, is perhaps destined to produce a new and great art-period. Much depends upon wise guidance by its leaders, and upon serious and appreciative criticism by observers. For this æsthetic movement is bound to have its social and religious consequences, as well as correlates. Social and religious symbolism, in the form of manners, ritual, worship and *cultus* generally, has a great reactive effect upon the life of peoples. It helps to determine the tone and temper of intercourse between human beings, and also between them and the rest of reality.[1] Now it need not be denied that our foregoing account of a world of souls tends in the end to become symbolical, to suggest more than it can represent in imagination. What a world of monadic intercourse would be we can only faintly shadow forth. Yet we are here only in like case with those who describe Reality as an Absolute or as Space-Time, or even as a grand Machine. Finite thought must necessarily resort to symbolism, it would seem, to indicate

[1] Cp. the old ritual of the Latins in their everyday affairs, as described, say, in *Marius the Epicurean*.

the nature of Ultimate Reality. It makes much difference, however, what symbol is chosen.

These considerations apply with great force to the question of religious symbolism. Religion, with its trend towards æsthetic representation is bound to use symbolic language, especially as it approaches ultimate problems. Such language frees from local and temporal and sensuous conditions, and liberates the idea which they enshrine [1] For this reason it is easily liable to be misunderstood, especially by people who think concretely, in realistic and literalistic fashion. This is a large part of the reason for our western failure to understand eastern religious ideas.[2] It is pointed out[3] that we have largely misconceived Christ's Kingdom of God because of our confusion of the image with the idea. It must be allowed that the ideal of the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man is a metaphor, which needs careful interpretation. The picture of the universe as an ideal family, though nearer the mark than other pictures, remains symbolical and is more important for the emotional suggestion it conveys than for the exact knowledge of ultimate reality it imparts. The idea of that reality must ever remain inadequate in finite beings, yet it may be that we are able from our limited experience to suggest what complete experience would be. This hope rests upon the belief, before touched upon, that each part or factor in reality expresses and mirrors the universe of which

[1] Bosanquet: *History of Æsthetic*, p. 143.
[2] Cp. Moulton on religious symbolism: *Modern Reader's Bible*, pp. 1448–50.
[3] Clutton Brock: *The Kingdom of Heaven*, p. 32.

it is a portion. The justification of such a belief would involve a sustained metaphysic. This is impossible here, but we may enquire whither it would lead.

As Religious.

We have so far found reason to regard harmony as cosmic in character, as giving an impression of purposiveness in the cosmos, and as being explainable as the expression of a world of souls striving towards perfection. The very idea of perfection is eminently an æsthetic one. It was seen previously that the nature of perfection is most plainly shown in the characteristics of beauty. These have been generalized under the term harmony, by which is meant the unity in difference of spiritual expression.[1] It is true that the same definition could be given of truth or virtue, only there we should approach perfection from other sides, and speak of consistency of thought or integrity of character. A being completely harmonious in its activities would be the æsthetic ideal of perfection : it is the æsthetic description of God. Since no finite creature reaches such perfection, whether from internal or external conditions, complete harmony becomes our notion of infinite being. This notion is not merely negative, obtained by stripping away the characteristics of the finite, but is a positive one reached by attributing to a being completeness,

[1] Cp. Mr. Bax's definition : "Self-consistency or satisfaction within the synthesis of the higher consciousness." *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 67, Vol. 2.

fulness and wholeness of those features which constitute partial harmony in finite beings. Those features which make for disharmony—pain, evil, isolation and the like—are therefore supposed to be absent from the nature of divine being.

This ideal is, however, not a quantitative but a qualitative one. Deity cannot, on this showing, be the totality of things, for they contain much dissonance, imperfection. It appears then that Deity is one being amongst others, possessing perfectly what they possess imperfectly, that is entire harmony. That there is such a being cannot, perhaps, be demonstrated: it is an object of aspiration or faith. Its progressive discovery from the human side is parallel to what is called revelation from the godward side, and the whole process may be regarded as the divine education of the race. The justification of such a faith is a matter for metaphysics, which has been called the hypostatization of our ideals.[1] That justification cannot be attempted here, but one part of it will consist in æsthetic imputation, in experimental empathy which is verified by the response which it obtains from the universe. It is a fact of history that the human mind has persistently believed itself to receive confirmation of its faith in a perfect being, an æsthetic response to its hunger and thirst after Deity. This it has found in the beauty of nature, or of a unique personality, or of an ideal which seems to be its own guarantee of real being. It is well said that the æsthetic is a witness for the

[1] WINDELBAND: *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 40.

objective worth of the contents of spiritual life,[1] and if we can make intelligible to ourselves the nature of Deity it would seem to be most feasible in the terms of art.

The object of art is ideal actuality. Both aspects of this definition are necessary. Art must be concrete, sensuous, actual. Yet it must also embody an ideal. It is no mere empty desire but a desire made actual, fulfilled in a perfect form. It is incorrect, therefore, to regard the life of art as a lower stage than that of reason : as the foreschool to logic. This (Hegelian) view does injustice to the independence and importance of the æsthetic life, which has its own rights and value. Neither again is it subordinate to the moral life, as Kant suggested. It is autonomous, though closely bound up with all other mental activities. More especially, it shows concretely what the ideally actual would be, and thus is the most comprehensible illustration of the life of Deity. It is, therefore, the original source of our religious ideas.[2] In particular, it shows us what we may conceive the ground and the end of the cosmos to be, namely, the creative purpose of God. The cosmos is God's work of art. Here we are speaking, of course, in terms of analogy, as any attempt to understand pure creative activity must do. Yet the nearest approach to fathoming the nature of the divine life must be couched in terms of our highest activities ; these, however, being conceived not under human and finite

[1] WUNDT : *System der Philosophie*, Band 2, S. 265.

[2] WUNDT : *Op. cit.* Band 2, S. 266.

limitations, but as carried to their highest pitch.[1] In doing so, we are brought back to the ideal of pure creativity, which is shown in its most manifest form in æsthetic production.

In our previous attempt to analyse the nature of æsthetic production, we were led back ultimately to value-feelings. These were never found to be mere feeling-tone (pleasure-pain), but were at the emotional level where elements of thought, feeling and will were mingled. These emotions when developed became loves and hates, desires and tastes. The most comprehensive description of the higher emotional life was found to be love of the admirable, or of beauty. This is the driving-force, the motive of the highest life we know, and hence if our analogical method is right, it is the motive of Deity in creating. Creative love will be the most hopeful clue to the mystery of reality, for it will furnish the explanation of the tendency to harmony which we have found in nature, in society and in religion. Universal harmony, towards which the whole cosmos strains and travails, would be a proper and intelligible result of a perfect love freely creating. Doubtless, there must be far more in the divine experience than can be expressed by such a phrase, but it does not seem that there can be less.

If the motive of creation be love, the method, so far as we can grasp it at all, will involve the expenditure of time. The time-process in relation to perfect being is perhaps beyond our compre-

[1] The scholastics would say "conceived eminently."

hension,[1] yet there are illustrations which somewhat relieve the difficulty. These are commonly drawn from art, which affords the nearest parallel to pure creation. The famous account of Mozart's method of composition is a good instance. He explained that he began with a theme in his mind, which theme developed itself spontaneously till it worked itself out completely, he meanwhile enjoying the glorious music as if it had been inwardly played to him. Apparently he could enjoy the musical sequence as one whole, that is, he could grasp the successive simultaneously. Any one who has composed at all will in some measure recognize this capacity, whether before or after the event of composition. If the divine activity be comparable to this, it may be that what from a temporal point of view seems wholly evil, discrepant, discordant, may from an all-comprehensive position be seen to conduce to the highest type of harmony. Whatever be the relation of time to the timeless, it would seem that the function of time is to give possibilities, opportunities to finite creatures to enhance the total harmony of the universe.

This implies, however, that created beings are not without creativity themselves. If the world be a world of souls it is arguable that these will each and all have their measure of creative activity, being, in Platonic language, sparks of the divine. It is doubtless difficult to conceive how the divine being could communicate his own nature to finite beings, yet there is some analogy in the way in

[1] Though Mr. Mackenzie sheds some light on it in *Mind*, No. 141

which an artist leaves something of himself in all his productions. It is sometimes said that it is impossible to create creators, yet this seems to be sheer assertion and to be open to the counter-assertion that a creator could not create anything else. There are admitted limits to creative power, and it is more difficult to understand the creation of the mechanical than of the further creative. And at all events, in such last creation we have some explanation of the presence of evil in the world, of its friction and dissonance, for in finite creators there may well be found some degree of intractability. The attainment of the divine objective may be liable to some mode of frustration through the freedom of creatures, if divine activity does not work upon the passive material which Aristotle called primary matter, but through beings having relative independence.

The motive of creation being love and its method the process of history, the objective may be judged to be the attainment of a realm of ends, that is a universe in which all beings have intrinsic worth and are found in harmonious relations. This would be the ideal actuality which was just spoken of as the object of art. Divine artistry can be satisfied with nothing less than perfection, and perfection we have seen to be best describable in æsthetic terms. Doubtless there are kinds of perfection. "There is one glory of the sun and another of the moon." So that a perfect universe would admit of many kinds of perfection, each existent being perfect after its own kind. There seems to be no

need to suppose that a perfect universe would require imperfection in its parts or factors. Evil is no necessary condition of good, any more than, as we are told, ugliness is a necessary condition of beauty.[1] The perfection of a whole may be assured by the varieties of perfection within it, each variety contributing its own special glory. There is no competition between the lily and rose, even though we may admit the one's superior beauty, but rather mutual enhancement and completion. So a universe which contained many types of being, each perfect after its kind, might be one which was wholly admirable, and which redounded to the glory of the divine author who sustained it.

Such a universe would be what we call heaven. A condition so far removed from our present state necessarily makes demands upon our imagination which cannot be fully met. Yet so far as we can guess at such a state it would seem that its bond of union would be emotional rather than intellectual or moral in nature. It is commonly found that differences of knowledge divide: the separation of expert from amateur is apt to become great, through lack of common ground. And, similarly, distinctions of virtue are prone to result in social grades which harden into castes. It is sympathy, we have found, which unifies individuals, and we must suppose that in a perfect society it would be completely expressed. That is to say, our ideal of heaven would be what at the human level we call mutual friendship or love;

[1] RUSKIN: additional notes to *Modern Painters*, Vol. II, No. 154. Cp. also Part V. Ch. ii, § 16, note 1.

it would be a completely appreciative community. It would not be an idle mutual admiration society, however, for we have found that the obverse side of appreciation is creation. New-made objects are the result of appreciation. Hence an ideal state would be one in which perpetual creation was occurring along with admiration. Such creation was previously described as reposeful activity, and we have no nearer understanding of what the perfect experience could be. It is possible to conceive an experience which has got beyond the struggle between right and wrong ; it is one which finds continual satisfaction in the contemplation of new-made objects of beauty.

The universe which we have been considering, however, is a world of souls. That is, it is monadic in structure, and a monad is a miniature world or microcosm. Each monad reflects the whole universe in its own unique way, and hence forms a copy of the whole, the macrocosm. This it does in no merely passive fashion, but by continuous acts of representation. A familiar illustration is a chamber composed entirely of mirrors in which each mirror represents everything that occurs in all the other mirrors. The chamber as a whole is therefore described as self-reflecting. Similarly, the intimacy between the components of a monadic universe is so close that what occurs to one of them is repeated in all, though in a quite distinctive manner in each case ; yet not repeated mechanically (as in the case of the mirrors), but actively and creatively. Empathic insight results in sympathetic intercourse, and both conduce to general harmony. In this way the

universe is a self-reflecting unity, each factor participating in the experiences of all the rest. Isolation is impossible, reflection is inevitable, though apparently there is some choice of modes in which it may be done. Creative representation implies some measure of novelty in the process of the universe, a measure only limited by the control of the supreme being whose constant aim is fulness of harmony.

In a world of souls of this sort, in which there was complete harmony of feeling between all individuals of whatever grade, it could be said that perfect sociality had been attained. So far as we can divine the nature of reality, this seems to be its central objective. It is the secret of the apparently blind impetus of the physical world, of the impulses of animate nature, of the creative activities of man, and even, so far as we can surmise, of the purpose of God. It is an ancient belief, indeed, and one which is world-wide, that the nature of Deity itself can best be described in social terms. Inter-personal love is our ideal of highest bliss, and perfection may well be found in a divine community which is completely integrated. These speculations would take us far, but at least we may see, in them all, much confirmation of that belief in ultimate world-harmony which is the faith of every profounder lover of beauty.

I have seen
A curious child, who dwelt upon a tract
Of inland ground, applying to his ear
The convolutions of a smooth-lipped shell ;
To which, in silence hushed, his very soul
Listened intensely ; and his countenance soon
Brightened with joy ; for from within were heard
Murmurings, whereby the monitor expressed
Mysterious union with its native sea.
Even such a shell the universe itself
Is to the ear of Faith. . . . . .

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